



Comments of

TechFreedom

Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century

Topic 5: The Commission's remedial authority to deter unfair and deceptive conduct in privacy and data security matters.

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Overview

TechFreedom is a non-partisan think tank dedicated to promoting the progress of technology that improves the human condition. To this end, we seek to advance public policy that makes experimentation, entrepreneurship, and investment possible, and thus unleashes the ultimate resource: human ingenuity. Wherever possible, we seek to empower users to make their own choices online and elsewhere.

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Since its launch in 2011, TechFreedom has spoken often on the FTC's regulation and enforcement of antitrust, unfairness, and consumer protection laws. We welcome the opportunity to once again interact with FTC staff as it works through these issues in a changing world where technological innovation has brought huge benefits to consumers, but has also raised novel questions related to privacy, data security, and unfair business practices.

On June 20, 2018, the FTC announced that the agency will hold a series of public hearings on whether broad-based changes in the economy, evolving business practices, new technologies, or international developments might require adjustments to competition and consumer protection enforcement law, enforcement priorities, and policy.⁴ In preparation for those hearings, the FTC seeks public comment on eleven (11) issues, through the filing of separate comments on each topic. TechFreedom is pleased to submit comments on five (5) of these topics:

- **Topic 1:** The state of antitrust and consumer protection law and enforcement, and their development, since the Pitofsky hearings⁵
- **Topic 2:** Competition and consumer protection issues in communication, information, and media technology networks⁶
- **Topic 5:** The Commission's remedial authority to deter unfair and deceptive conduct in privacy and data security matters⁷
- **Topic 10:** The interpretation and harmonization of state and federal statutes and regulations that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practices⁸
- **Topic 11:** The agency's investigation, enforcement and remedial processes²

⁴ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Announces Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (June 20, 2018), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/06/ftc-announces-hearings-competition-consumer-protection-21st>.

⁵ Comments of TechFreedom, *Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Topic 1: The state of antitrust and consumer protection law and enforcement, and their development, since the Pitofsky hearings* (Aug. 20, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ftc-august-2018-workshop-comments-topic-1.pdf>.

⁶ Comments of TechFreedom, *Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Topic 2: Competition and Consumer Protection Issues in Communication, Information, and Media Technology Networks* (Aug. 20, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ftc-august-2018-workshop-comments-topic-2.pdf>.

⁷ Comments of TechFreedom, *Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Topic 5: The Commission's remedial authority to deter unfair and deceptive conduct in privacy and data security matters* (Aug. 20, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ftc-august-2018-workshop-comments-topic-5.pdf>.

⁸ Comments of TechFreedom, *Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Topic 10: The interpretation and harmonization of state and federal statutes and regulations that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practices* (Aug. 20, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ftc-august-2018-workshop-comments-topic-10.pdf>.

TechFreedom expressed our concerns with the FTC’s use of its remedial authority in regulating data security and privacy practices in testimony presented to the Senate Commerce Committee, attached hereto.¹⁰ We encourage the Commission to use these hearings as an opportunity to:

1. Implement policies to encourage more empirical analysis, provide clearer guidance, and prevent undo improper reliance upon consent decrees;
2. Clarify the Commission’s substantive standards and pleading standards; and
3. Employ a more flexible standard in determining what constitutes an “unreasonable” data security practices guided by the principles of negligence.

5.a. The efficacy of the FTC’s use of its current remedial authority

The Problem with Consent Decrees The problem with consent decrees: resolving judicial concern about the Commission’s approach to developing its “common law” of data security

Absent a comprehensive statutory framework, the FTC has been the primary cop on the beat in policing the vast number of data security and privacy practices not covered by the few Internet privacy and cyber security statutes currently enacted. For two decades, the FTC has grappled with the consumer protection issues raised by the Digital Revolution. Armed with vast jurisdiction and broad discretion to decide what is unfair and deceptive, the agency has dealt with everything from privacy to data security, from online purchases to child protection, and much more. The FTC has become the Federal *Technology* Commission—a term we coined,¹¹ but which the FTC and others have embraced.¹²

⁹ Comments of TechFreedom, *Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Topic 11: The agency’s investigation, enforcement and remedial processes* (Aug. 20, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ftc-august-2018-workshop-comments-topic-11.pdf>.

¹⁰ *FTC Stakeholder Perspectives: Reform Proposals to Improve Fairness, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance, & Data Security* (Sept. 26, 2012) (testimony of Berin Szóka & Graham Owens, TechFreedom), available at http://docs.techfreedom.org/Szoka_FTC_Reform_Testimony_9-26-17.pdf [hereinafter, 2017 Senate Testimony].

¹¹ Berin Szóka & Geoffrey Manne, *The Second Century of the Federal Trade Commission*, TECHDIRT (Sept. 26, 2013), <https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130926/16542624670/secondcentury-federal-trade-commission.shtml>; see also Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission, Report 1.0 of the FTC: Technology & Reform Project, 3 (Dec. 2013), http://docs.techfreedom.org/FTC_Tech_Reform_Report.pdf.

¹² Kai Ryssdal, *The FTC is Dealing with More High Tech Issues*, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting then-Chairman Edith Ramirez), <http://www.marketplace.org/2016/03/07/tech/ftc-dealing-more-high-tech-issues>. See, e.g., Omer Tene, *With Ramirez, FTC became the Federal Technology Commission*, IAPP (Jan. 18, 2017), <https://iapp.org/news/a/with-ramirez-ftc-became-the-federal-technology-commission/>.

This was inevitable, given the nature of the FTC's authority. Enforcing the promises made by tech companies to consumers forms a natural baseline for digital consumer protection. On top of that deception power, the FTC has broad power to police other practices, without waiting for Congress to catch up. As the FTC said in its 1980 Unfairness Policy statement:

The present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion.¹³

The question is not whether the FTC *should* be the Federal Technology Commission, but *how* it wields its broad powers in the digital age. For all that academics like to talk about creating a Federal Search Commission¹⁴ or a Federal Robotics Commission,¹⁵ and for all the talk in Washington of passing “comprehensive baseline privacy legislation” or data security legislation, the most important questions turn on the FTC's processes, standards, and institutional structure. How the FTC and Congress handle these seemingly banal matters could be even more important in determining how consumer protection works in 2117 than will any major legislative lurches over the next century. Indeed, with the costs of cybercrimes expected to reach \$2 trillion by 2019,¹⁶ the business community can ill afford to have to anticipate the approaches of both hackers and federal regulators simultaneously, and it would seem more practical for the agency to help guide businesses by providing best practices to better protect their consumers. Yet, rather than promulgate rules or provide any clear guidance, past FTCs have instead chosen to approach the issue through case-by-case enforcement actions, almost always ending in consent decrees, which do not admit liability and only focus on prospective requirements of the specific defendant in that case.¹⁷

¹³ Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness> (hereinafter 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement).

¹⁴ See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, *Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search*, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008), <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Bracha-Pasquale-Final.pdf>.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Ryan Calo, *The case for a federal robotics commission*, Brookings Institute (Sept. 15, 2014), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-a-federal-robotics-commission/>; Nancy Scola, *Why the U.S. might just need a Federal Commission on Robotics*, Washington Post (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/15/why-the-u-s-might-just-need-a-federal-commission-on-robots/?utm_term=.38dfc4bec72e.

¹⁶ Steve Morgan, *Cyber Crime Costs Projected to Reach \$2 Trillion by 2019*, Forbes (Jan. 17, 2016), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#6e10063a3a91>.

¹⁷ See *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 257, n.22. (3d Cir. 2015). Notably, this practice is not entirely limited to data security and privacy enforcement—though for reasons later discussed, the effects on

This approach, and the resulting ambiguity, has left companies facing uncertainty in terms of whether their data security and privacy practices are not only sufficient to safeguard against an FTC enforcement action, but more importantly, whether they're utilizing the best practices available to protect their consumers' data and privacy.

Understandably, this ambiguity has frustrated judges and legal commentators alike, even resulting in one company's demise.¹⁸ Such frustration was made abundantly clear by the Third Circuit when, despite affirming the FTC's authority to regulate cyber security practices under the "unfair practices" prong of Section 5, the court nonetheless questioned the Commission's assertion that its consent decrees and "guidance" somehow create standards against which companies' cyber practices can be tested for "unfairness."¹⁹ In fact, the Third Circuit emphatically agreed with the defendant's claim that "consent orders, which admit no liability and which focus on prospective requirements on the defendant, were of little use to it in trying to understand the specific requirements imposed by § 45(a)."²⁰ The court continued:

We recognize it may be unfair to expect private parties back in 2008 to have examined FTC complaints or consent decrees. Indeed, these may not be the kinds of legal documents they typically consulted. At oral argument we asked how private parties in 2008 would have known to consult them. The FTC's only answer was that "if you're a careful general counsel you do pay attention to what the FTC is doing, and you do look at these things." Oral Arg. Tr. at 51. We also asked whether the FTC has "informed the public that it needs to look at complaints and

companies are arguably more severe in this context—by the Commission, with one study finding that 1,524 of the 2,092 enforcement actions brought by the FTC in either federal or administrative courts have ended in consent decrees without any adjudication. This means that almost 73% of the FTC's enforcement actions have ended in legally enforceable orders, despite no impartial judicial guidance as to the factual and legal legitimacy of the FTC's claims. See Daniel A. Crane, *Debunking Humphrey's Executor*, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1867 (2015). But in tech-related cases its almost 100%, meaning the courts have played essentially no role at all in disciplining the FTC's use of unfairness in "informational injury" cases. See e.g., *See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017 WL 4150873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017); *Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2015); *LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, No. 1:14-CV-00810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2014), *aff'd*, 776 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015); *F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2014).

¹⁸ See Dune Lawrence, *A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off: Michael Daugherty learns the high price of resistance*, BLOOMBERG LAW (April 25, 2016), <https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmd-ftc-tiversa/>.

¹⁹ *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 252-253, 255 (3d Cir. 2015).

²⁰ *Id.* at 257 n.22.

consent decrees for guidance,” and the Commission could offer no examples. *Id.* at 52.²¹

The court’s frustration did not end with the Commission’s use of consent decrees either, making sure to also address issues with the FTC’s 2007 guidebook, *Protecting Personal Information, A Guide for Businesses*, which, according to the FCC, “describes a ‘checklist[]’ of practices that form a ‘sound data security plan.’”²² Ultimately, the court recognized that “[t]he guidebook does not state that any particular practice is required by [Section 5],” and “[f]or this reason, we agree ... that the guidebook could not, on its own, provide “ascertainable certainty” of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices fail [Section 5].”²³

Despite being rebuked by practitioners and courts alike, past FTCs have brushed aside this frustration and continued to rely on consent decrees, conclusory guidebooks/reports, and “blog posts” to inform businesses as to what constitutes reasonable data security and privacy practices. In contrast to its remedial practices in the data security and privacy context, the FTC has provided significantly more thorough guidance in an area not considered to be the FTC’s primary jurisdiction—environmental regulations through “Green Guides.”²⁴ As explained below, these Green Guides reflect a sincere and thoughtful effort by the FTC to gather relevant data as the basis for analyzing not only “what” is required, but more significantly “why” is it essential and “how much” of a certain practice is necessary.

On privacy and data security, the Commission has refused to do such empirical work or to issue clear guidance, relying instead on consent decrees and conclusory reports and guidebooks that lack any evident empirical foundation. This has deprived businesses of the regulatory certainty and clarity they need to comply with the law—and deprived consumers of better, more consistent data security and privacy practices. The Commission has flaunted the warning given it by the D.C. Circuit in confirming the Commission’s rulemaking authority over forty years ago: that “courts have stressed the advantages of efficiency and expedition which inhere in reliance on rule-making instead of adjudication alone,” including in providing businesses with greater certainty as to what business practices are not permissible.²⁵ Ironically, the D.C. Circuit made that statement in a case where the FTC fought vehe-

²¹ *Id.* at 257 n.23.

²² *Id.* at 257.

²³ *Id.* at 257 n.21.

²⁴ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Green Guides* (last visited Aug. 20, 2018), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/green-guides>.

²⁵ *Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. F.T.C.*, 482 F.2d 672, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).

mently—and the court agreed—for the authority to provide the very guidance they refuse to provide to the digital economy today. Congress *did* provide that rulemaking authority a year later, with the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975,²⁶ but also found it necessary to institute new procedural safeguards in 1980, after the FTC’s gross abuse of its rulemaking powers in the intervening five years,²⁷ which culminated in the agency being denounced as the “National Nanny” by *The Washington Post* editorial board.²⁸

Life after LabMD: Why the new Commissioners should encourage more empirical analysis, provide clearer guidance, and prevent improper reliance upon consent decrees.

In June 2018, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that the FTC’s approach to developing data security standards through vague consent decrees violates basic principles of due process.²⁹ Specifically, after years of litigation with the now defunct medical testing company LabMD, the appeals court found:

assuming *arguendo* that LabMD’s negligent failure to implement and maintain a reasonable data-security program constituted an unfair act or practice under Section 5(a), *the Commission’s cease and desist order is nonetheless unenforceable. [The consent decree] does not enjoin a specific act or practice. Instead, it mandates a complete overhaul of LabMD’s data-security program and says precious little about how this is to be accomplished.* Moreover, it effectually charges the district court with managing the overhaul. This is a scheme Congress could not have envisioned. We therefore grant LabMD’s petition for review and vacate the Commission’s order.³⁰

²⁶ The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement (Magnuson-Moss) Act, Pub.L.No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).

²⁷ The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 (Improvements Act), Pub.L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).

²⁸ Editorial, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION, 69–70 (1982); *see also* J. Howard Beales III, *Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that Advises the Present*, 8 n.37 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kidsand-ftc-regulatory-retrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf. (“Former FTC Chairman Pertschuk characterizes the Post editorial as a turning point in the Federal Trade Commission’s fortunes.”).

²⁹ *LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018); *see also* Justin Gus Hurwitz, *Meet the hero who fought the administrative state and won*, THE HILL (June 12, 2016), <http://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/391879-meet-the-hero-who-fought-the-administrative-state-and-won>.

³⁰ *LabMD, Inc.*, 894 F.3d at 1237 (emphasis added).

The FTC is effectively under a court order to heed, in the context of data security, the more general warning given by the D.C. Circuit over forty years ago; that means developing an approach to data security enforcement that utilizes “the advantages of efficiency and expedition which inhere in reliance on rule-making instead of adjudication alone.”³¹ As discussed in the next section, this requires, at a minimum, two key reforms to the FTC’s approach to developing its “common law” of data security.³² First, and perhaps most importantly, the *LabMD* case highlights the need for the FTC to utilize expert witnesses in future litigation that speak to the data security practices of companies of similar size and abilities as the defendant company. After six years of investigating LabMD—a Georgia small business of approximately 30 employees that ran a cancer testing lab—the FTC’s expert witness could only speak to the data security practices of Fortune 500 companies.³³ What the FTC considers a “reasonable” data security practice for a Fortune 500 company with vast resources, should not be what the FTC considers “reasonable” for a 30-employee medical testing company. As such, the FTC should recognize the practical realities of data breach cases—namely the varying resources available to companies and the realization that some hacks are unpreventable regardless of care taken—and apply a standard more akin to negligence than strict liability. Using common law negligence as a guide, the FTC should require businesses to “use that degree of care and caution” in its protection of consumers’ data as a reasonably prudent business with similar resources and under similar circumstances would.³⁴

Second, FTC should use these hearings to explore frameworks for how the Commission might approach quantitatively measuring “information injuries” consumers suffer from data breaches and estimate the risk of their occurrence. The FTC has, in fact, conducted such an inquiry, collected empirical data, and issued corresponding guidance based upon rigorous empirical analysis in another context: The Green Guides first issued for environmental marketing in 1992, and updated three times since then. Addressing these issues will allow American businesses and the FTC to work together as partners, not adversaries, to make certain that consumers’—both Americans and foreign consumers who patronize U.S. businesses—data and privacy are afforded the greatest respect and protection possible.

³¹ *Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n*, 482 F.2d at 675–76.

³² See Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, *Data Security and the FTC’s Uncommon Law*, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 955, 979 (2016).

³³ See Press Release, TechFreedom, LabMD Court Blocks FTC’s Approach to Data Security (June 6, 2018), <http://techfreedom.org/labmdftcdatasetsecurity/>.

³⁴ *Wolf v. St. Louis Indep. Water Co.*, 10 Cal. 541 (1858) (“The owner of a ditch is bound to use that degree of care and caution in its construction and management, to prevent injury to others, which ordinarily prudent men use in like instances, when the risk is their own.”).

5.b. Additional tools or authorities the FTC may need to adequately deter unfair and deceptive conduct related to privacy and data security.

The FTC's application of Section 5 to data security should be guided by the principles of negligence, not strict liability

Congress intentionally framed the FTC's authority under Section 5 in the general terms "unfair" and "deceptive" to ensure that the agency could protect consumers and competition throughout all trade and under changing circumstances.³⁵ The FTC's bedrock 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement (UPS) recognizes that:

The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time. As the Supreme Court observed as early as 1931, the ban on unfairness "belongs to that class of phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.'"³⁶

In 1994, Congress codified the UPS's required cost-benefit analysis in Section 5(n).³⁷ Yet, because the Commission has wielded its unfairness authority in the areas of data security and privacy without, essentially, any judicial review, there has been no "process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."³⁸ What then-Commissioner Josh Wright said in a 2013 speech of the Commission's unfair methods of competition authority remains true of its unfairness

³⁵ See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (observing if Congress "were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task").

³⁶ Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness>.

³⁷ 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also J. Howard Beales, Former Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: It's Rise, Fall, and Resurrection* (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection#N_6.

³⁸ Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness>; see also *Davidson v. New Orleans*, 96 U.S. 94, 104 (1878) ("But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded.").

consumer protection authority as well: “nearly one hundred years after the agency’s creation, the Commission has still not articulated what constitutes ... unfair... leaving many wondering whether the Commission’s Section 5 authority actually has any meaningful limits.”³⁹

Given the near-universal scope of the Commission’s authority, few industries are beyond the FTC’s reach; the FTC has met the broad statutory language with an equally broad exercise of its authority to enforce Section 5.⁴⁰ The FTC has brought data security and privacy actions against advertising companies, financial institutions, health care companies, and, perhaps most significantly, companies engaged in providing data security products and services.⁴¹ Companies are responsible for safeguarding not only their own data, but also for any data security failings of their third-party clients and vendors.⁴²

Companies targeted by such cyber-attacks are themselves victims. The reputational costs of such attacks can be enormous: customers are fearful of remaining loyal to companies who can’t protect their personal and financial information.⁴³ According to one study, 76% of customers surveyed said they “would move away from companies with a high record of data breaches,” with 90% responding that “there are apps and websites that pose risks to the protection and security of their personal information.”⁴⁴ Unquestionably, data security

³⁹ Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Federal Trade Comm’n, Section 5 Recast: Defining the Federal Trade Commission’s Unfair Methods of Competition Authority at the Executive Committee Meeting of the New York State Bar Association’s Antitrust Section, 2 (June 19, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/section-5-recast-defining-federal-trade-commissions-unfair-methods-competition-authority/130619section5recast.pdf.

⁴⁰ See Cho & Caplan, *Cybersecurity Lessons*; Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy by Design: New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity 12 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 227, 232 (2017) (discussing the FTC’s enforcement of “everything from funeral homes, vending machine companies, telemarketing and mail marketing schemes, credit reporting, and the healthcare industry.”) [hereinafter Pardau & Edwards, *New Legal Frontiers*].

⁴¹ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, 2016 Privacy & Data Security Update (Jan. 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016> (providing overview of various enforcement actions).

⁴² See *id.* (For example, the consent decree agreed to in the FTC’s enforcement action against Ashley Madison required the defendants to implement a comprehensive data-security program, including third-party assessments).

⁴³ See generally PONEMON INST. LLC, FOURTH ANNUAL STUDY: IS YOUR COMPANY READY FOR A BIG DATA BREACH? 1 (2016), <http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2016-experian-data-breach-preparedness-study.pdf>; see also *Data breaches cost US businesses an average of \$7 million – here’s the breakdown*, Business Insider (April 27, 2017), <http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million-2017-4> (providing that the average cost of a data security breach is \$7 million, with 76% of customers saying they would move away from companies with a high record of data breaches).

⁴⁴ See VANSONBOURNE, DATA BREACHES AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY REPORT (2015), <http://www.vansonbourne.com/client-research/18091501JD>.

is the cornerstone of the digital economy and digitization of the physical economy. As Naveen Menon, President of Cisco Systems for Southeast Asia, put it “[s]ecurity is what protects businesses, allowing them to innovate, build new products and services.”⁴⁵

The recent Equifax breach illustrates just how strongly reputational forces incentivize companies to invest in data security. In just four months, Equifax’s stock plummeted 30% since the company’s data breach in 2017, which made national headlines as the largest breach of its kind.⁴⁶ Given the enormous stakes for companies’ brands, it is not difficult to understand why—with no clear guidance from Congress or the FTC—companies have opted to settle and enter into consent decrees rather than risk further reputational damage and customer loss through embarrassing and costly public litigation.⁴⁷ Out of approximately 60 data security enforcement actions, only two defendants have dared challenge the FTC—an agency that can, because of the lack of judicial precedent on point, claim near absolute discretion as to the interpretation of “reasonable” data security practices. The first company, Wyndham Hotels, reportedly spent over \$5 million in the investigation phase alone—before the FTC even brought charges.⁴⁸ The second, LabMD, spent over seven years fighting the FTC before finally getting a court to rule on the merits of the case—and in that time, the company went out of business as a direct result of the ordeal.⁴⁹ Further, in LabMD the FTC’s expert witness could only speak to the data security practices of Fortune 500 companies, indicating that small businesses will be required to show their practices were the same as companies with vastly more resources.⁵⁰ These two incidents illustrate why companies are so reluctant to challenge the FTC in the first place.

Data security poses a unique challenge: unlike other unfairness cases, the company at issue is both the victim (of data breaches) and the culprit (for allegedly having inadequate data

⁴⁵ Naveen Menon, *There can be no digital economy without security*, World Economic Forum (May 8, 2017), <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/there-can-be-no-digital-economy-without-security/>.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., *Equifax Plummets After Huge Data Breach, Kroger Sinks on Profit drop, American Outdoor Brand Falls*, Yahoo Finance, Sept. 8, 2017, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/equifax-plummets-huge-data-breach-kroger-sinks-profit-drop-american-outdoor-brands-falls-144654294.html>.

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ See BERIN SZÓKA & GEOFFREY A. MANNE, *THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE* 57-60 (2016), <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20160524/104976/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-ManneG-20160524-SD004.pdf> [hereinafter *White Paper*] at 37; see also Brief for Amici Curiae TechFreedom, Int’l Center for Law and Econ. & Consumer Protection Scholars at 15, *FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), *aff’d*, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 2:13-cv-01887), 2013 WL 3739729 (“Wyndham, for example, has already received 47 document requests in this case and spent \$5 million responding to these requests.”).

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ See, *supra* notes 33-34.

security). In such circumstances, the FTC should apply unfairness as more of a negligence standard than strict liability. Consider both a company that has been hacked and a business owner whose business has burned down. In both situations, it is very likely that employees and customers lost items they consider to be precious—perhaps even irreplaceable. Additionally, it is equally likely that neither *wanted* this unfortunate event to occur. Finally, in both situations, prosecutors would investigate the accident to determine the cause and assess the damage and costs. However, under the FTC’s current approach to Section 5 enforcement, how each business owner would be judged for liability purposes would vary greatly despite these similarities.

Under the common law of torts, absent some criminal intent (*e.g.*, insurance fraud) the businessman whose office burned down would only be held liable if he acted negligently in some way. At common law, negligence involves an act that a *reasonable* person of similar resources under similar circumstances would know creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.⁵¹ Should a prosecutor or third party bring a lawsuit against the business owner, they would be required to put forth expert testimony and a detailed analysis showing exactly *how* and *why* the owner’s negligence—or failure to act as the reasonably prudent business owner would—caused the fire.

Conversely, despite all of the FTC’s rhetoric about “reasonableness”—which, as one might “reasonably” expect, should theoretically resemble a negligence-like framework—the FTC’s approach to assessing whether a data security practice is unfair under Section 5 actually more closely resembles a rule of strict liability.⁵² Indeed, rather than conduct any analysis showing that (1) the company owed a duty to consumers and (2) *how* that the company’s breach of that duty was the cause of the breach—either directly or proximately—which injured the consumer, instead, as one judge noted, the FTC “kind of take them as they come and decide whether somebody’s practices were or were not within what’s permissible from your eyes....”⁵³ The FTC’s approach also fails to consider whether a small business with limited resources should, or even could, implement data security practices similar to those of Fortune 500 companies, yet seems to require that they do.

No degree of prudence can avert *every* foreseeable harm. A crucial underpinning of calculating liability in civil suits is that some accidents are unforeseeable, some damages are not

⁵¹ See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965).

⁵² See Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, *When “Reasonable” Isn’t: The FTC’s Standard-Less Data Security Standard*, Journal of Law, Economics and Policy (Aug. 31, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041533.

⁵³ Transcript of Proceedings at 91, 94–95, *LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, No. 1:14-CV-810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2014).)).

recoverable because they cannot be linked to negligent conduct in a clear chain of causation, and mitigation does not always equal complete prevention. Thus, our civil jurisprudence acknowledges that no amount of care can prevent *all* accidents (fires, car crashes, *etc.*), or at least the standard of care required to achieve an accident rate near zero would be wildly disproportionate, paternalistic, and unrealistic to real-world applications (*e.g.*, setting the speed limit at 5 mph).

The types and extent of all data breaches cannot be predicted in advance. Thus, if the FTC wants to regulate data security using a "common law" approach, then it must be willing to accept that certain breaches are inevitable, and liability should only arise where the company was truly negligent. This is not simply a policy argument; it is the weighing of costs and benefits that Section 5(n) requires — at least in theory. Companies do not want to be hacked any more than homeowners want their houses to burn down. The FTC should begin its analysis of data security cases with that incentive in mind and ask whether the company has acted as a "reasonably prudent person" would.

This, then, presents the key question the FTC should address in these hearings: what constitutes "reasonably prudent" data security and privacy practices for purposes of avoiding liability under Section 5? To help answer this critical question, the Commission should focus on determining three key elements of this question: (1) the types of injuries that should merit the FTC's attention, especially the quantity and sensitivity of data exposed, (2) the analytical framework, built upon empirical research and investigations and taking into account the varying resources available to companies of varying sizes, which should determine what constitutes "reasonable" data security practices, and (3) the pleading requirements to determine the specificity with which the FTC must state its claim in the first instance.

The Green Guides as a Model for Empirically Driven Guidance

The FTC should use these hearings to pick up where then-acting-Chairman Ohlhausen left off last year in clarifying "information injury" — as she then explained:

This analysis raises several important questions. Is this list of injuries representative? When do these or other informational injuries require government intervention? Perhaps most importantly, how does this list map to our statutory deception and unfairness authorities?

These are critical and challenging questions. That's why I am announcing today that the FTC will host a workshop on informational injury on December 12 of this year [2017]. This workshop will bring stakeholders together to discuss these issues in depth. I have three goals for this workshop: First, better identify

the qualitatively different types of injury to consumers and businesses from privacy and data security incidents. Second, explore frameworks for how we might approach quantitatively measuring such injuries and estimate the risk of their occurrence. And third, better understand how consumers and businesses weigh these injuries and risks when evaluating the tradeoffs to sharing, collecting, storing, and using information. Ultimately, the goal is to inform our case selection and enforcement choices going forward.⁵⁴

Indeed, this is the kind of workshop the FTC should have held two decades ago — and several more times since. The FTC has, in fact, conducted such workshops, collected empirical data, and issued corresponding guidance based upon rigorous empirical analysis in another context: The Green Guides first issued for environmental marketing in 1992, and updated three times since then.⁵⁵ As discussed below, these offer an excellent model for how the Commission could begin to take a more substantive approach to defining the vague terms inherent in the FTC’s broad authority under Section 5, while also providing clearer guidance to industry.

As the FTC proceeds with these hearings, it should consider its own experience with the Green Guides as a model. The parallel is not exact: The Guides focus entirely on deception, and primarily on consumer expectations, while the FTC’s proposed “informational injuries” would involve both deception and unfairness. However, the Guides do still delve into substantiation of environmental marketing claims, and, thus, the underlying merits of what companies were promising their customers. FTC guidance on the meaning of “informational injuries” in the context of data security and privacy would necessarily cover wider ground, ultimately attempting to understand harms as well as “reasonable” industry practices under both deception and unfairness prongs. Still, the Guides’ emphasis on empirical substantiation would serve the FTC well in attempting to provide a clearer analytical basis for *why* a practice or action is deemed to have caused “informational injury” in certain cases, rather than merely stating *what* practices the FTC has determined to be likely to cause such harm.

⁵⁴ Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Painting the Privacy Landscape: Information Injury in FTC Privacy and Data Security Cases*, Address Before the Federal Communications Bar Association at 9 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1255113/privacy_speech_mkohlhausen.pdf [hereinafter Ohlhausen, *Informational Injury Speech*].

⁵⁵ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Environmental Friendly Products: FTC’s Green Guides* (last visited Sept. 24, 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/green-guides> (“The Green Guides were first issued in 1992 and were revised in 1996, 1998, and 2012. The guidance they provide includes: 1) general principles that apply to all environmental marketing claims; 2) how consumers are likely to interpret particular claims and how marketers can substantiate these claims; and 3) how marketers can qualify their claims to avoid deceiving consumers.”).

Though court guidance in this context may seem rarer than the birth of a giant panda,⁵⁶ the Third Circuit in *Wyndham* nonetheless provided some insight into the value of previous FTC guidance—namely the FTC’s 2007 guidebook titled “Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business”—in understanding harms and “reasonable” practices that constitute violations of Section 5.⁵⁷ Discussing this guidebook, which “describes a ‘checklist[]’ of practices that form a ‘sound data security plan,’” the court notably found that, because “[t]he guidebook does not state that any particular practice is required by [Section 5],” it, therefore, “could not, on its own, provide ‘ascertainable’ certainty” of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices fail [Section 5].⁵⁸ Despite this recognition, the court still noted that the guidebook did “counsel against many of the specific practices” alleged in that specific case, and thus, provided sufficient guidance in that very narrow holding to inform the defendant of “what” conduct was not considered reasonable.⁵⁹ Specifically, the court noted that the guidebook recommended:

[T]hat companies “consider encrypting sensitive information that is stored on [a] computer network ... [, c]heck ... software vendors’ websites regularly for alerts about new vulnerabilities, and implement policies for installing vendor-approved patches.” It recommends using “a firewall to protect [a] computer from hacker attacks while it is connected to the Internet,” deciding “whether [to] install a ‘border’ firewall where [a] network connects to the Internet,” and setting access controls that “determine who gets through the firewall and what they will be allowed to see ... to allow only trusted employees with a legitimate business need to access the network.” It recommends “requiring that employees use ‘strong’ passwords” and cautions that “[h]ackers will first try words like ... the software’s default password[] and other easy-to-guess choices.” And it recommends implementing a “breach response plan,” *id.* at 16, which includes “[i]nvestigat[ing] security incidents immediately and tak[ing] steps to close off existing vulnerabilities or threats to personal information.”⁶⁰

Most notably, nowhere in the court’s discussion did it identify a single instance of the FTC explaining *why* a certain practice is necessary or reasonable; instead the FTC had merely asserted that companies should just accept the FTC’s suggestions, without any consideration or analysis as to whether the immense costs that might be associated with implement-

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Ines Kagubare, ‘Little pink sausage’: Rare giant panda born in Belgium, REUTERS (June 2, 2016), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wildlife-panda-belgium-idUSKCN0YO0L1>.

⁵⁷ *Wyndham*, 799 F.3d at 256.

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 256 n.21.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 256-57.

⁶⁰ *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

ing many of these practices are in the consumers' best interest. This is far from the weighing of costs and benefits that Section 5(n) requires. By comparison, the Green Guides, while focused on deception, reflect a deep empiricism about substantiation of environmental marketing claims, informed by a notice and comment process and distilled into clear guidance accompanied by detailed analysis.

While multi-national corporations such as Wyndham *might* (arguably) possess the resources to blindly implement any and all suggestions the FTC makes, and to follow the FTC's pronouncements in each consent decree, the economic principle of scarcity will inevitably require smaller businesses with vastly fewer resources to make difficult decisions as to which practices they should utilize to provide the greatest security possible with its limited resources. For example, using the list above, would a company with limited resources be acting "reasonable" if it implemented a "breach response plan," but failed to check *every* software vendors' website regularly for alerts? Further, would a company be engaging in "deceptive" practices if it failed to notify customers that, due to limited resources, it could only implement half of the FTC's recommended practices? The answer to these questions matter and will undoubtedly have significant consequences on how competitive small businesses remain in this country. The polling data cited above clearly indicates that consumers are concerned (and understandably so) about how well a company protects their data. If a company is essentially required to choose between admitting that it lacks the resources to implement advanced security practices on par with large, established businesses, or risk an FTC action for "deception," how can any startup or small business expect to compete and grow in these polarizing circumstances? Policies that only serve to entrench large incumbents because of regulatory costs can quickly destroy innovation and further advances in technology.

Under the FTC's current enforcement standards, this all shows how easily small businesses may find themselves in a catch-22. On the one hand, if a small business wishes to pretend it has the resources to implement the same data security standards as multi-national corporations in order to attract and maintain customers weary of their data being hacked, the business will be acting "deceptively" in the eyes of the FTC, and will be open to the costly litigation, reputational damage, and massive fines that come with it. On the other hand, if the small business wishes to be open and readily admit that, due to resource constraints, its data security practices are anemic when compared to multi-national corporations, it will be open to the loss of customers and businesses invariably linked to such claims. As this illustrates, how can any startup or small business expect to compete without the FTC providing guidance as to best practices based on empirical research — including economies of scale?

Thus, to ensure the ability of businesses to compete and make sound decisions as to the allocation of their finite resources, it is imperative that the FTC not only endeavor to provide guidance as to *what* practices are sound, but also explain *why* such practices are necessary, as well as “how much” is necessary, especially in relation to a business’s size and available resources.

a. The Green Guides (1992-2012)

First published in 1992, the Guides represented the Commission’s attempt to better understand a novel issue before jumping in to case-by-case enforcement. By 1991, it was becoming increasingly common for companies to tout the environmental benefits of their products. In some ways, these claims were no different from traditional marketing claims: the FTC’s job was to make sure consumers “got the benefit of the bargain.” But in other ways, it was less clear exactly what that “benefit” was — such as regarding recycling content, recyclability, compostability, biodegradability, refillability, sourcing of products, etc. Rather than asserting how much of each of these consumers *should* get, the Commission sought to ground its understanding of these concepts in empirical data about what consumers actually expected. As the Commission summarized its approach in the Statement of Basis and Purpose for the 2012 update:

The Commission issued the Guides to help marketers avoid making deceptive claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Under Section 5, a claim is deceptive if it likely misleads reasonable consumers. Because the Guides are based on how consumers reasonably interpret claims, consumer perception data provides the best evidence upon which to formulate guidance. As EPA observed, however, perceptions can change over time. The Guides, as administrative interpretations of Section 5, are inherently flexible and can accommodate evolving consumer perceptions. Thus, if a marketer can substantiate that consumers purchasing its product interpret a claim differently than what the Guides provide, its claims comply with the law.⁶¹

Of course, as the Deception Policy Statement notes, “If the representation or practice affects or is directed primarily to a particular group, the Commission examines reasonableness from the perspective of that group.”⁶² Thus, the Commission immediately added the following:

⁶¹ Fed Trade Comm’n, Statement of Basis and Purpose (2012 Update), at 24-25, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides/greenguidesstatement.pdf> [hereinafter “Statement of Basis and Purpose”].

⁶² Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), at 1, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.

the Green Guides are based on marketing to a general audience. However, when a marketer targets a particular segment of consumers, such as those who are particularly knowledgeable about the environment, the Commission will examine how reasonable members of that group interpret the advertisement. The Commission adds language in Section 260.1(d) of the Guides to emphasize this point. Marketers, nevertheless, should be aware that more sophisticated consumers may not view claims differently than less sophisticated consumers. In fact, the Commission’s study yielded comparable results for both groups.⁶³

This bears emphasis because many speak of privacy-sensitive consumers as a separate market segment, and argue that we should apply deception in privacy cases based upon their expectations. But here, unlike in privacy, the Commission actually undertook empirical research — which turned out not to support an idea that probably seemed intuitively obvious: that more environmentally knowledgeable or “conscious” consumers had different interpretation of environmental marketing claims.

The Commission issued the first Green Guides in August 1992, thirteen months after two days of public hearings, including a 90-day public comment period in between. The Commission followed this process in issuing revised Green Guides in 1996, 1998, and 2012. So detailed was the Commission’s analysis, across so many different fact patterns, that, while the 2012 Green Guide Update ran a mere 12 pages in the Federal Register,⁶⁴ the underlying Statement of Basis and Purpose ran a staggering 314 pages.⁶⁵ In each update, the FTC explored how the previous version of the Guides addresses each issue, the FTC’s proposal for that issue, comments received on the proposal, and justification for the final rule. In short, the FTC was doing something a lot like rulemaking. Except, of course, the Guides are not themselves legally binding.

The FTC has never done anything even resembling this type of comprehensive guide for data security or privacy. Indeed, just this year, the FTC touted “a series of blog posts” as a grand accomplishment in the FTC’s “ongoing efforts to help businesses ensure they are taking reasonable steps to protect and secure consumer data.”⁶⁶ The FTC has regularly trumpeted its 2012 Privacy Report, but that document does something very different. Most notably, the Report calls on industry actors to self-police in the most general of terms, making

⁶³ See Statement of Basis and Purpose, at 25.

⁶⁴ 16 C.F.R. 260 (2012).

⁶⁵ See generally note 61.

⁶⁶ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Stick with Security: FTC to Provide Additional Insights on Reasonable Data Security Practices (July 21, 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/07/stick-security-ftc-provide-additional-insights-reasonable-data>.

statements like “to the extent that strong privacy codes are developed, the Commission will view adherence to such codes favorably in connection with its law enforcement work.”⁶⁷ Unlike the focus on substance and comprehensiveness of the Green Guides, the 2012 Privacy Report speaks in generalities, dictating “areas where the FTC will be active,” such as in monitoring Do Not Track implementation or promoting enforceable self-regulatory codes.⁶⁸ The lack of a Statement of Basis and Purpose akin to that issued in updating the Green Guides (the 2012 Statement totaled a whopping 314 pages) introduces unpredictability into the enforcement process, and chills industry action on data security and privacy.

In all, the Green Guides offer a clear, workable model for how the FTC could provide empirically grounded guidance on data security and privacy — even without any action by Congress. The key steps in issuing such guidance would be:

1. Study current industry practices across a wide range of businesses;
2. Gather data on consumer *expectations*, rather than making assumptions about consumer preferences;
3. Engage the Bureau of Economics and the FTC’s growing team of in-house technologists in analysis of the costs and benefits of practice; and
4. Issue (at least) biennial or triennial guidance to reflect the changing nature, degree, and applicability of data security and privacy regulations.

Short of rulemaking, this rulemaking-like approach offers the most clarity, comprehensibility, and predictability for both FTC enforcement staff and industry actors.

b. What the FTC Said in 2012 about Modifying the Guides

There is an obvious tension between conducting thorough empirical assessments to inform updating Commission guidance and how often that guidance can be updated: the more regular the update, the more difficult it will be to for the Commission to maintain methodological rigor in justifying that update. The 2012 Statement of Basis and Purpose noted requests that the Commission review and update the Guides every two or three years, but concluded:

Given the comprehensive scope of the review process, the Commission cannot commit to conducting a full-scale review of the Guides more frequently than

⁶⁷ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers* (March 2012), at 73, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf>. [hereinafter “2012 Privacy Report”].

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 72.

every ten years. The Commission, however, need not wait ten years to review particular sections of the Guides if it has reason to believe changes are appropriate. For example, the Commission can accelerate the scheduled review to address significant changes in the marketplace, such as a substantial change in consumer perception or emerging environmental claims. When that happens, interested parties may contact the Commission or file petitions to modify the Guides pursuant to the Commission's general procedures.⁶⁹

This strikes a sensible balance. Unfortunately, this is not at all how the Commission has handled modification of the 2012 Green Guides. Within a year, the FTC would modify the Green guides substantially with no such process for empirical substantiation to justify the new change. And this year, not five years after the issuance of the Guides, it modified the Guides yet again.

However imperfect the Commission's process for updating the Guides, they remain a useful model for the Commission to consider to inform regulated parties of its approach to the consumer protection issues raised by technological change — starting with data security.

⁶⁹ See Statement of Basis and Purpose, *at* 26-27.



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Restoring Congressional Oversight of the
Second National Legislature

AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

by Berin Szóka & Geoffrey A. Manne

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Report 2.0

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May 2016

Report 2.0 of the FTC: Technology & Reform Project

The “FTC: Technology & Reform Project” was convened by the International Center for Law & Economics and TechFreedom in 2013. It is not affiliated in any way with the FTC.

Executive Summary

Congressional reauthorization of the FTC is long overdue. It has been twenty-two years since Congress last gave the FTC a significant course-correction and even that one, codifying the heart of the FTC’s 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement, has not had the effect Congress expected. Indeed, neither that policy statement nor the 1983 Deception Policy Statement, nor the 2015 Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement Policy Statement, will, on their own, ensure that the FTC strikes the right balance between over- and under-enforcement of its uniquely broad mandate under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

These statements are not without value, and we support codifying the other key provisions of the Unfairness Policy Statement that were not codified in 1980, as well as codifying the Deception Policy Statement. In particular, we urge Congress or the FTC to clarify the

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meaning of “materiality,” the key element of Deception, which the Commission has effectively nullified.

But a shoring up of substantive standards does not address the core problem: ultimately, that the FTC’s *processes* have enabled it to operate with essentially unbounded discretion in developing the doctrine by which its three high level standards are applied in real-world cases.

Chiefly, the FTC has been able to circumvent judicial review through what it calls its “common law of consent decrees,” and to effectively circumvent the rulemaking safeguards imposed by Congress in 1980 through a variety of forms of “soft law”: guidance and recommendations that have, if indirectly and through amorphous forms of pressure, essentially regulatory effect.

At the same time, and contributing to the problem, the FTC has made insufficient use of its Bureau of Economics, which ought to be the agency’s crown jewel: a dedicated, internal think tank of talented economists who can help steer the FTC’s enforcement and policymaking functions. While BE has been well integrated into the Commission’s antitrust decision-making, it has long resisted applying the lessons of law and economics to its consumer protection work.

The FTC is, in short, in need of a recalibration. In this paper we evaluate nine of the seventeen FTC reform bills proposed by members of the Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade Subcommittee, and suggest a number of our own, additional reforms for the agency.

Many of what we see as the most needed reforms go to the lack of economic analysis. Thus we offer detailed suggestions for how to operationalize a greater commitment to economic rigor in the agency’s decision-making at all stages. Specifically, we propose expanding the proposed requirement for economic analysis of recommendations for “legislation or regulatory action” to include best practices (such as the FTC commonly recommends in reports), complaints and consent decrees. We also propose (and support bills proposing) other mechanisms aimed at injecting more rigor into the Commission’s decisionmaking, particularly by limiting its use of various sources of informal or overly discretionary sources of authority.

The most underappreciated aspect of the FTC’s processes is investigation, for it is here that the FTC wields incredible power to coerce companies into settling lawsuits rather than litigating them. Requiring that the staff satisfy a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for issuing consumer protection complaints would help, on the margin, to embolden some defendants not to settle. Other proposed limits on the aggressive use of remedies and on the allowable scope of the Commission’s consent orders would help to accomplish the same thing. Changing this dynamic even slightly could produce a significant shift in the agency’s model, by injecting more judicial review into the FTC’s evolution of its doctrine.

Commissioners themselves could play a greater role in constraining the FTC’s discretion, as well, keeping the FTC focused on advancing consumer welfare in everything it does. To-

gether with the Bureau of Economics, these two internal sources of constraint could partly substitute for the relative lack of external constraint from the courts.

We are not wholly critical of the FTC. Indeed, we are broadly supportive of its mission. And we support several measures to *expand* the FTC's jurisdiction to cover telecom common carriers and to make it easier for the FTC to prosecute non-profits that engage in for-profit activities. We enthusiastically support expansion of the FTC's Bureau of Economics. And we recommend expansion of the Commission's competition advocacy work into a full-fledged Bureau, so that the Commission can advocate at all levels of government — federal, state and local — on behalf of consumers and against legislation and regulations that would hamper the innovation and experimentation that fuel our rapidly evolving economy.

But most of all, Congress should not take the FTC's current processes for granted. Ultimately, the FTC reports to Congress and it is Congress's responsibility to regularly and carefully scrutinize how the agency operates. The agency's vague standards, sweeping jurisdiction, and its demonstrated ability to circumvent both judicial review and statutory safeguards on policy making make regular reassessment of the Commission through biennial reauthorization crucial to its ability to serve the consumers it is tasked with protecting.

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Considering that rules of the Commission may apply to any act or practice “affecting commerce”, and that the only statutory restraint is that it be unfair, **the apparent power of the Commission with respect to commercial law is virtually as broad as the Congress itself. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission may be the second most powerful legislature in the country....** All 50 State legislatures and State Supreme Courts can agree that a particular act is fair and lawful, but the five-man appointed FTC can overrule them all. **The Congress has little control over the far-flung activities of this agency short of passing entirely new legislation.**¹

Sens. Barry Goldwater & Harrison Schmitt, 1980

Within very broad limits, the agency determines what shall be legal. Indeed, the agency has been “lawless” in the sense that it has traditionally been beyond judicial control.²

Former FTC Chairman Tim Muris, 1981

The FTC’s investigatory power is very broad and is akin to an inquisitorial body. On its own initiative, it can investigate a broad range of businesses without any indication of a predicate offense having occurred.³

Prof. Chris Hoofnagle, 2016

Introduction

Only by the skin of its teeth did the Federal Trade Commission survive its cataclysmic confrontation with Congress in 1980. Today, the Federal Trade Commission remains the closest thing to a second national legislature in America. Its jurisdiction covers nearly every company in America. Its powers over unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) and unfair methods of competition (UMC) remain so inherently vague that the Commission retains unparalleled discretion to make policy decisions that are essentially legislative. The Commission increasingly wields these powers over high tech issues affecting not just the high tech sector, but, increasingly, every company in America. It has become the de facto

¹ S. Rep. No. 96-184, at 18 (1980), *available at*

<http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=417102>.

² Timothy J. Muris, *Judicial Constraints*, in *THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR*, 35, 49 (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, eds., 1981).

³ CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, *FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY* 102 (2016).

Federal *Technology* Commission — a moniker we coined,⁴ but which Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has embraced.⁵

For all this power, either by design or by neglect, the FTC is also “a largely unconstrained agency.”⁶ “Although appearing effective, most means of controlling Commission actions are virtually useless, owing to lack of political support and information, lack of interest on the part of those ostensibly monitoring the FTC, or FTC maneuvering.”⁷ At the same time, “[t]he courts place almost no restraint upon what commercial practices the FTC can proscribe....”⁸

The vast majority of what the FTC does is uncontroversial — routine antitrust, fraud and advertising cases. Yet, as the FTC has dealt with cutting-edge legal issues, like privacy, data security and product design, it has raised deep concerns not merely about the specific cases brought by the FTC, but also that the agency is drifting away from the careful balance it struck in its 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement (UPS)⁹ and its 1983 Deception Policy Statement (DPS).¹⁰

We applaud the Commerce, Manufacturing & Trade Subcommittee for taking up the issue of FTC reform, and for the seventeen bills submitted by members of both parties. Even if no legislation passes this Congress, active engagement by Congress in the operation of the Commission was crucial in the past to ensuring that the FTC does not stray from its mission of serving consumers. But active congressional oversight has been wanting for far too long.

⁴ Berin Szóka & Geoffrey Manne, *The Second Century of the Federal Trade Commission*, TECHDIRT (Sept. 26, 2013), available at <https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130926/16542624670/second-century-federal-trade-commission.shtml>; see also *Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission*, Report 1.0 of the FTC: Technology & Reform Project, 3 (Dec. 2013), available at http://docs.techfreedom.org/FTC_Tech_Reform_Report.pdf.

⁵ Kai Ryssdal, *The FTC is Dealing with More High Tech Issues*, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 7, 2016), available at <http://www.marketplace.org/2016/03/07/tech/ftc-dealing-more-high-tech-issues>.

⁶ *Part I: The Institutional Setting*, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970, *supra* note 2 at 11.

⁷ *Id.* at 11–12.

⁸ Timothy J. Muris, *Judicial Constraints*, in *id.* 35, 43.

⁹ *Letter from the FTC to the House Consumer Subcommittee*, appended to *In re Int'l Harvester Co.*, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1073 (1984) [“Unfairness Policy Statement” or “UPS”], available at <http://www.ftc.gov/ftc-policy-statement-on-unfairness>.

¹⁰ *Letter from the FTC to the Committee on Energy & Commerce*, appended to *Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.*, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) [“Deception Policy Statement” or “DPS”], available at <http://www.ftc.gov/ftc-policy-statement-on-deception>.

Not since 1996 has Congress reauthorized the FTC,¹¹ and not since 1994 has Congress actually substantially modified the FTC's standards or processes.¹²

The most significant thing Congress has done regarding the FTC since 1980 was the 1994 codification of the Unfairness Policy Statement's three-part balancing test in Section 5(n). But even that has proven relatively ineffective: The Commission pays lip service to this test, but there has been essentially none of analytical development promised by the Commission in the 1980 UPS:

The present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, **subject to judicial review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time.**

The Commission no doubt believes that it has carefully weighed (1) substantial consumer injury with (2) countervailing benefit to consumers or to competition, and carefully assessed whether (3) consumers could “reasonably have avoided” the injury, as Congress required by enacting Section 5(n). But whatever weighing the Commission has done in its internal decision-making is far from apparent from the outside, and it has not been done by the courts in any meaningful way.¹³ As former Chairman Tim Muris notes, “the Commission’s authority remains extremely broad.”¹⁴

The situation is little on better on Deception — at least, on the cutting edge of Deception cases, involving privacy policies, online help pages, and enforcement of other promises that differ fundamentally from traditional marketing claims. Just as the Commission has rendered the three-part Unfairness test essentially meaningless, it has essentially nullified the “materiality” requirement that it volunteered in the 1983 Deception Policy Statement. The Statement began by presuming, reasonably, that express *marketing* claims are always materi-

¹¹ Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-216, 110 Stat. 3019 (Oct. 1, 1996), available at <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/104/216.pdf>.

¹² Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691 (Aug. 26, 1994) available at <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/103/312.pdf>.

¹³ See *infra* at 39.

¹⁴ Statement of Timothy J. Muris, Hearing on Financial Services and Products: The Role of the Fed. Trade Commission in Protecting Customers, before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong. 2 (2010), 28, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/muris_senate_testimony_ftc_role_protecting_consumers_3-17-101.pdf.

al, but the Commission has extended that presumption (and other narrow presumptions of materiality in the DPS) to cover essentially *all* deception cases.¹⁵

Congress cannot fix these problems simply by telling the FTC to dust off its two bedrock policy statements and take them more seriously (as it essentially did in 1994 regarding Unfairness). Instead, Congress must fundamentally reassess the *process* that has allowed the FTC to avoid judicial scrutiny of how it wields its discretion.

The last time Congress significantly reassessed the FTC's *processes* was in May 1980, when it created procedural safeguards and evidentiary requirements for FTC rulemaking. These reforms were much needed, and remain fundamentally necessary (although we do, below, encourage the FTC to attempt a Section 5 rulemaking for the first time in decades in order to provide a real-world experience of how such rulemakings work and whether Congress might make changes at the margins to facilitate reliance on that tool).¹⁶

But these 1980 reforms failed to envision that the Commission would, eventually, find ways of exercising the vast discretion inherent in Unfairness and Deception through what it now proudly calls its “common law of consent decrees”¹⁷ — company-specific, but cookie-cutter consent decrees that have little to do with the facts of each case (and always run for twenty years). These consent decrees are bolstered by the regular issuance of recommended best practices in reports and guides that function as quasi-regulations, imposed on entire industries not by rulemaking but by the administrative equivalent of a leering glare. Together, these new tactics have allowed the FTC to effectively circumvent not only the process re-

¹⁵ See *infra* at 21.

¹⁶ See *infra* at 99.

¹⁷ “Together, these enforcement efforts have established what some scholars call ‘the common law of privacy’ in the United States.” Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Remarks to the Mentor Group Forum for EU-US Legal-Economic Affairs Brussels, April 16, 2013*, 3 (Apr. 16, 2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/remarks-mentor-group-forum-eu-us-legal-economic-affairs-brussels-belgium/130416mentorgroup.pdf (citing Christopher Wolf, *Targeted Enforcement and Shared Lawmaking Authority As Catalysts for Data Protection in the United States* (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8D438C53-82C8-4F25-99F8-E3039D40E4E4/26451/Consumer_WOLFDataProtectionandPrivacyCommissioners.pdf (FTC consent decrees have “created a ‘common law of consent decrees,’ producing a set of data protection rules for businesses to follow.”)). FTC Chairman Edith Ramirez said roughly the same thing in a 2014 speech:

I have expressed concern about recent proposals to formulate guidance to try to codify our unfair methods principles for the first time in the Commission’s 100 year history. While I don’t object to guidance in theory, I am less interested in prescribing our future enforcement actions than in describing our broad enforcement principles revealed in our recent precedent.

Quoted in Geoffrey Manne, *FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright gets his competition enforcement guidelines*, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Aug. 13, 2015), available at <https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/08/13/ftc-commissioner-joshua-wright-gets-his-competiton-enforcement-guidelines/> (speech video available at <http://masonlec.org/media-center/299>).

forms of May 1980 but also the substantive constraints volunteered by the FTC later that year in the Unfairness Policy Statement and, three years later, in the Deception Policy Statement.

Such process reforms are the focus of this paper. The seventeen bills currently before the Subcommittee would begin to address these problems — but only begin. In this paper we evaluate nine of the proposed bills in turn, offer specific recommendations, and also offer a slate of our own additional suggestions for reform.

Our most important point, though, is not any one of our proposed reforms, but this: The default assumption should not be that the FTC continues operating indefinitely without course corrections from Congress.

Justice Scalia put this point best in his 2014 decision, striking down the EPA’s attempt to “rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate,” when he said: “We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery.”¹⁸ The point is more, not less, important when a statute like Section 5 has been “deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion”: trusting the FTC to follow an “evolutionary process” *requires* regular, searching reassessments by Congress. This need is especially acute given that the “underlying criteria” have *not* “evolve[d] and develop[ed] over time” through the “judicial review” expected by both Congress and the FTC in 1980 — at least, not in any analytically meaningful way.

Reauthorization should happen at regular two-year intervals and it should never be a *pro forma* rubber-stamping of the FTC’s processes. Each reauthorization should begin from the assumption that the FTC is a uniquely important and valuable agency — one that can do enormous good for consumers, but also one whose uniquely broad scope and broad discretion require constant supervision and regular course corrections. Regular tweaks to the FTC’s processes should be expected and welcomed, not resisted.

The worst thing defenders of the FTC could do would be allowing the FTC to drift along towards the kind of confrontation with Congress that nearly destroyed the FTC in 1980.

The FTC’s History: Past is Prologue

It is no exaggeration to say that the 1980 compromise over unfairness saved the FTC from going the way of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which Congress began phasing out in 1978 under the leadership of Alfred Kahn, President Carter’s de-regulator-in-chief. President

¹⁸ Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014).

Carter signed the 1980 FTC Improvements Act even though he objected to some of its provisions because, as he noted, “the very existence of this agency is at stake.”¹⁹ Those reforms to the FTC’s rulemaking process, enacted in May 1980, were only part of what saved the FTC from oblivion.

Driven largely by outrage over the FTC’s attempt to regulate children’s advertising, Congress had allowed the FTC’s funding to lapse, briefly shuttering the FTC. As Howard Beales, then (in 2004) director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, noted, “shutting down a single agency because of disputes over policy decisions is almost unprecedented.”²⁰ In the mid-to-late 1970s, the FTC had interpreted “unfairness” expansively in an attempt to regulate everything from funeral home practices to labor practices and pollution. Beales and former FTC Chairman, Tim Muris, summarize the problem thusly:

Using its unfairness authority under Section 5, but unbounded by meaningful standards, in the 1970s the Commission embarked on a vast enterprise to transform entire industries. Over a 15-month period, the Commission issued a rule a month, usually without a clear theory of why there was a law violation, with only a tenuous connection between the perceived problem and the recommended remedy, and with, at best, a shaky empirical foundation.²¹

When the FTC attempted to ban the advertising of sugared cereals to children, the Washington Post dubbed the FTC the “National Nanny.”²² This led directly to the 1980 FTC Improvements Act — the one Sens. Goldwater and Schmitt endorsed in the quotation that opens this paper.

In early 1980, by a vote of 272-127, Congress curtailed the FTC’s Section 5 rulemaking powers under the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Act, imposing additional evidentiary and procedural safeguards.²³ But the FTC refused to narrow its doctrinal interpretation of unfairness until Congress briefly shuttered the FTC in the first modern government shutdown. In December, 1980, the FTC issued its Unfairness Policy Statement, promising to weigh (a) sub-

¹⁹ Jimmy Carter, *Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 Statement on Signing H.R. 2313 into Law* (May 28, 1980), available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44790>.

²⁰ J. Howard Beales III, *Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that Advises the Present*, 8 n.32 (2004), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kids-and-ftc-regulatory-retrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf.

²¹ J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, *Striking the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(B) of the FTC Act*, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 1, 1 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764456.

²² Editorial, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, *REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION*, 69–70 (1982); see also Beales, *supra* note 20, at 8 n.37 (“Former FTC Chairman Pertschuk characterizes the Post editorial as a turning point in the Federal Trade Commission’s fortunes.”).

²³ Federal Trade Commission Act Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (May 28, 1980), available at <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/96/252.pdf>.

stantial injury against (b) countervailing benefit and (c) to focus only on practices consumers could not reasonably avoid. Last year, the FTC finally adopted a Policy Statement on Unfair Methods of Competition that parallels the two UDAP statements.²⁴

In 1994, in Section 5(n), Congress codified the core requirements of the UPS, and further narrowed the FTC's ability to rely on its assertions of what constituted public policy. This was the last time Congress substantially modified the FTC Act — meaning that the Commission has operated since then without course-correction from Congress.²⁵ This is itself troubling, given that independent agencies are supposed to operate as creatures of Congress, not regulatory knights errant. But it is even more problematic given the extent of the FTC's renewed efforts to escape the bounds of even its minimal discretionary constraints.

The Inevitable Tendency Towards the Discretionary Model

To paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy, the FTC offers the “worst form of consumer protection and competition regulation — except for all the others.” Democracy, without constant vigilance and reform, will inevitably morph into the unaccountable exercise of power — what the Founders meant by the word “corruption” (literally, “decayed”). When Benjamin Franklin was asked, upon exiting the Constitutional Convention of 1787, “Well, Doctor, what have we got — a Republic or a Monarchy?,” he famously remarked “A Republic, if you can keep it.”²⁶

The same can be said for the FTC: an “evolutionary process... subject to judicial review,”²⁷ *if we can keep it*. Any agency given so broad a charge as to prohibit “unfair methods of competition... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices...” will inevitably tend towards the exercise of maximum discretion.

This critique is of a dynamic inherent in the FTC itself, not of particular Chairmen, Commissioners, Bureau Directors or other staffers. The players change regularly, each leaving their mark on the agency, but the agency has institutional tendencies of its own, inherent in the nature of the agency.

The Commission itself most clearly identified the core of the FTC's institutional nature in the Unfairness Policy Statement, in a passage so critical it bears quoting in full:

²⁴ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act* (Aug. 13, 2015) [“UMC Policy Statement”], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf.

²⁵ The 1996 FTC reauthorization was purely *pro forma*.

²⁶ Benjamin Franklin, *quoted in* Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, BARTLEBY.COM (last visited May 22, 2016), <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1593.html>

²⁷ UPS, *supra* note 9.

The **present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process.** The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial review, in **the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time.** As the Supreme Court observed as early as 1931, the ban on unfairness “belongs to that class of phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called ‘the **gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.**’”²⁸

In other words, Congress delegated vast discretion to the Commission from the very start because of the difficulties inherent in prescriptive regulation of competition and consumer protection. The Commission generally exercised that discretion primarily through case-by-case adjudication, but began issuing rules on its own authority in 1964,²⁹ setting it on the road that culminated in the cataclysm of 1980.

Indeed, given the essential nature of bureaucracies, it was probably only a matter of time before the FTC reached this point. It is no accident that it took just three years from 1975, when Congress affirmed the FTC’s claims to “organic” rulemaking power (implicit in Section 5), until the FTC was being ridiculed as the “National Nanny.” In short, the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Act created a monster, magnifying the effects of the FTC’s inherent Section 5 discretion with the ability to conduct statutorily sanctioned rulemakings. If it had not been then-Chairman Michael Pertschuk who pushed the FTC too far, it probably would have, eventually, been some other chairman. The power was simply too great for any government agency to resist using without some feedback mechanism in the system telling it to stop.

In that sense, we believe the rise of the Internet played a role analogous to the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Act, spurring the FTC to greater activity where it had previously been more restrained.³⁰

After 1980, the FTC ceased conducting new Section 5 rulemakings. Between 1980 and 2000, the FTC brought just sixteen unfairness cases, all of which fell into narrow categories of clearly “bad” conduct: “(1) theft and the facilitation thereof (clearly the leading category);

²⁸ UPS, *supra* note 9.

²⁹ Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964).

³⁰ Of course, we also recognize that other societal forces were at work, such as the Naderite consumer protection movement of the 1970s, and the growing privacy protection movement of the 1990s and 2000s. But the analogy still offers some value.

(2) breaking or causing the breaking of other laws; (3) using insufficient care; (4) interfering with the exercise of consumer rights; and (5) advertising that promotes unsafe practices.”³¹ Just how easy these cases were conveys in turn just how *cautious* the Commission was in using its unfairness powers — not only because it was chastened by the experience of 1980 but also because of Congress’s reaffirmation of the limits on unfairness in its 1994 codification of Section 5(n). In a 2000 speech, Commissioner Leary summarized the Commission’s restrained, “gap-filling” approach to unfairness enforcement over the preceding two decades:

The overall impression left by this body of law is hardly that policy has been created from whole cloth. Rather, the Commission has sought through its unfairness authority to challenge commercial conduct that under any definition would be considered wrong but which escaped or evaded prosecution by other means.³²

Yet even then Commissioner Leary noted his concerns about the burgeoning unfairness enforcement innovation in two of the Commission’s then-recent cases: *Touch Tone* (1999)³³ and *ReverseAuction* (2000). Tellingly, his concern was over the Commission’s failure to properly assess the substantiality of the amorphous privacy injuries alleged in those cases. Still, he concluded on a note of optimism:

The extent of the disagreement should not be exaggerated, however. The majority [in *Reverse Auction*] did not suggest that all privacy infractions are sufficiently serious to be unfair and the minority did not suggest that none of them are. The boundaries of unfairness, as applied to Internet privacy violations, remain an open question.

The Commission has so far used its unfairness authority in relatively few cases that involve the Internet. These cases, however, suggest that future application of unfairness will be entirely consistent with recent history. Internet technology is new, but we have addressed new technology before. I believe that the Commission will do what it can to prevent the Internet from becoming a lawless frontier, but it will also continue to avoid excesses of paternalism.

The lessons of the past continue to be relevant because the basic patterns of dishonest behavior continue to be the same. Human beings evolve much more slowly than their artifacts.³⁴

³¹ Stephen Calkins, *FTC Unfairness: An Essay*, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1962 (2000).

³² Thomas B. Leary, Former Commissioner of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Unfairness and the Internet*, II (Apr. 13, 2000), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2000/04/unfairness-and-internet>.

³³ *Id.* at II-C (“The unfairness count in *Touch Tone* also raised interesting questions about whether an invasion of privacy by itself meets the statutory requirement that unfairness cause “substantial injury.” Unlike most unfairness prosecutions, there was no concrete monetary harm or obvious and immediate safety or health risks. The defendants’ revenue came, not from defrauding consumers, but from the purchasers of the information who received exactly what they had requested.”).

³⁴ *Id.*, at III-IV.

The Commission began bringing cases in 2000 alleging that companies employed unreasonable data security practices. While these early cases alleged that the practices were “unfair and deceptive,” they were, in fact, pure deception cases.³⁵ In 2005, the FTC filed its first pure unfairness data security action, against BJ’s Warehouse. Unlike past defendants, BJ’s had, apparently, made no promise regarding data security upon which the FTC could have hung a deception action.³⁶ Since 2009, we believe the Commission has become considerably more aggressive in its prosecution of unfairness cases, not just about data security, but about privacy and other high tech issues like product design.

Yet it would be hard to pinpoint a single moment when the FTC’s approach changed, or to draw a clear line between Republican data security cases and Democratic ones. And this is precisely a function of the first of the two crucial attributes of the modern FTC with which we are concerned: Legal doctrine continues to evolve even in the absence of judicial decisions, its evolution just becomes less transparent and more amorphous. As Commissioner Leary remarked in a footnote that now seems prescient:

Because this case was settled, I cannot be sure that the other Commissioners agreed with this rationale.³⁷

Indeed, this is the crucial difference between the FTC’s pseudo common law and *real* common law. There is an observable directedness to the evolution of the real common law, which rests on a sort of ongoing conversation among the courts and the economic actors that appear before them. The FTC’s ersatz common law, however, has little of this directedness or openness, and the conversations that do occur are more like whispered tête-à-têtes in the corner that someone else occasionally overhears.

But the second point is actually the more important, although the two are related: In this institutional structure, how often individual Commissioners dissent and how much rigor they demand matters far, far less than the structure of the agency itself. There is only so much an individual can do to divert the path of an already-steaming ship.

This leads back to the point made above: that we should expect regulatory agencies, over time, to expand their discretion as much as the constraints upon the agency allow. In this, regulatory agencies resemble gases, which, when unconstrained, do not occupy a fixed volume (defined by a clear statutory scheme, as in the Rulemaking Model) but rather expand to

³⁵ See, e.g., FTC v. Rennert, Complaint, FTC File No. 992 3245, <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/iogcomp.htm> (2000); In re Eli Lilly, Complaint, File No. 012 3214, <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm> (2002).

³⁶ Complaint, In the Matter of BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., a corporation, Fed. Trade Comm’n Docket No. C-4148, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3160/bjs-wholesale-club-inc-matter>.

³⁷ Leary, *Unfairness and the Internet*, *supra* note 32, n.50.

fill whatever space they occupy. What ultimately determines the size, volume and shape of a gas is its container. So, too, with regulatory agencies: what ultimately determines an agency's scale, scope, and agenda are the external constraints that operate upon it.

The FTC has evolved the way it has because, most fundamentally, Section 5 offers little in the way of prescriptive, statutory constraints, and because the FTC's processes have enabled it to operate case-by-case with relatively little meaningful, ongoing oversight from the courts.

We distinguish this from two other models of regulation: (1) the **Rulemaking Model**, in which the agency's discretion is constrained chiefly by the language of its organic statute, procedural rulemaking requirements and the courts; and (2) the **Evolutionary Model**, in which the agency applies a vague standard case by case, but is constrained in doing so by its ongoing interaction with the courts.³⁸ By contrast, we call the FTC's current approach the **Discretionary Model**, in which the agency also applies a vague standard case-by-case, but in which it operates without meaningful judicial oversight, such that doctrine evolves at the Commission's discretion and with little of the transparency provided by published judicial opinions. (Dialogue between majority and minority Commissioners seldom approaches the analysis of judicial opinions.)

We believe there is an inherent tendency of agencies that begin with an Evolutionary Model — which is very much the design of the FTC — to slide towards the Discretionary Model, simply because all agencies tend to maximize their own discretion, and because the freedom afforded by the lack of statutory constraints on substance or the agency's case-by-case process enable these agencies to further evade judicial constraints. The only way to check this process, without, of course, simply circumscribing its discretion by substantive statute (i.e., amending section 5(a)(2)), is regular assessment and course-correction by Congress — not with the aim of its own micromanagement of the agency, but rather with the aim of invigorating the ability of the courts to exert their essential role in steering doctrine.

This is not to be taken as an admission of defeat or a condemnation of the Commission. There is no reason to think that the FTC was in every way ideally constituted from the start (or in 1980 or in 1994), that its model could perform exactly as intended and perfectly in the public interest no matter what changed around it. Rather, limited, thoughtful oversight by

³⁸ We derive the term “evolutionary” from the Unfairness Policy Statement itself, *supra* note 9:

The present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time.

Congress is simply in the nature of the beast. As Justice Holmes said (of the importance of free speech):

That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.³⁹

That, in a nutshell, is why regular reauthorization is critical for agencies like the FTC. As President Carter said, “[w]e need vigorous congressional oversight of regulatory agencies.” This is more true for the FTC — with its vast discretion, immense investigative power, and all-encompassing scope — than any other agency. As we wrote in the precursor to this report:

Thus, while the Congress of 1914 intended to create an agency better suited than itself to establish a flexible but predictable and consistent body of law governing commercial conduct, the modern trend of administrative law has relaxed the requirement that an agency’s output be predictable or consistent.

The FTC has embraced this flexibility as few other agencies have. Particularly in its efforts to keep pace with changing technology, the FTC has embraced its role as an administrative agency, and frequently sought to untether itself from ordinary principles of jurisprudence (let alone judicial review).⁴⁰

The Doctrinal Pyramid

One of the chief reasons the FTC has come to operate the way it does is that the vocabulary around its operations is deeply confused, particularly around the word “guidance” and the term “common law.” In an (admittedly first-cut) effort to introduce some concreteness, we view the various levels of “guidance” as steps in a Doctrinal Pyramid that looks something like the following, from highest to lowest degrees of authority:

1. **The Statute:** Section 5 (and other, issue-specific statutes)
2. **Litigated Cases:** Only these are technically binding on courts, thus they rank near the top of the pyramid, even though they are synthesized in, or cited by, the guidance summarized below. There are precious few of these on Unfairness or the key emerging issues of Deception
3. **Litigated Preliminary Injunctions:** Less meaningful than full adjudications of Section 5, these are, unfortunately, largely the only judicial opinions on Section 5.
4. **High-Level Policy Statements:** Unfairness, Deception, Unfair Methods of Competition

³⁹ *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).

⁴⁰ *Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High-Tech World*, *supra*, note 4.

5. **Lower-Level Policy Statements:** The now-rescinded Disgorgement Policy Statement, the (not-yet existent) Materiality Statement we propose, *etc.*
6. **Guidelines:** Akin to the several DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines, synthesizing past approaches to enforcement into discernible principles to guide future enforcement and compliance
7. **Consent Decrees:** Not binding upon the Commission and hinging (indirectly) upon the very low bar of whether the Commission has “reason to believe” a violation occurred, these provide little guidance as to how the FTC really understands Section 5
8. **Closing Letters:** Issued by the staff, these letters at times provide some limited guidance as to what the staff believe is *not* illegal
9. **Reports & Recommendations:** In their current form, the FTC’s reports do little more than offer the majority’s views of what companies should do to comply with Section 5, but carefully avoid any real legal analysis
10. **Industry Guides:** Issue-specific discussions issued by staff (*e.g.*, photo copier data security)
11. **Public Pronouncements:** Blog posts, press releases, congressional testimony, FAQs, *etc.*

In essence, under today’s Discretionary Model, the FTC puts great weight on the base of the pyramid, while doing little to develop the top. Under the Evolutionary Model, the full Commission would develop doctrine primarily through litigation, and do everything it possibly could to provide guidance at higher levels of the pyramid, such as by debating, refining and voting upon new Policy Statements on each of the component elements of Unfairness and Deception and Guidelines akin to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Instead, the FTC staff issues Guides and other forms of casual guidance. Yet not all “guidance” is of equal value. Indeed, much of the “guidance” issued by the FTC serves not to constrain its discretion, but rather to expand it by increasing the agency’s ability to coerce private parties into settlements — which begins the cycle anew.

Our Proposed Reforms

Seventeen bills have been introduced in the House Energy & Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade aimed at reforming the agency for the modern, technological age and improving FTC process and subject-matter scope in order to better protect consumers. Most of these will, we hope, be consolidated into a single FTC Reauthorization Act of 2016, passed in both chambers, and signed by the President.

With the hope of aiding this process, we describe and assess nine of these proposed bills, focusing in particular on whether and how well each proposal addresses the fundamental issues that define the problems of today’s FTC. In broad strokes, the proposed bills address the following areas:

- Substantive standards
- Enforcement and guidance
- Remedies

- Other process issues
- Jurisdictional issues
- Other issues

Our analysis addresses the bills within the context of these broad categories, and adds our own suggestions (and one additional category: Competition Advocacy) for both minor amendments and additional legislation in each category.

Despite our concerns, we remain broadly supportive of the FTC’s mission and we generally support expanding the agency’s jurisdiction, to the extent that doing so effectively addresses substantial, identifiable consumer harms or reduces the scope of authority for sector-specific agencies. Although the process reforms proposed in these bills are, we believe, relatively minor, targeted adjustments, taken together they would do much to make the FTC more effective in its core mission of maximizing consumer welfare. But these proposed reforms are only a beginning.

Even if all of these reforms were enacted immediately, they would not fundamentally, or even substantially, change the core functioning of the FTC — and the core problem at the FTC today: its largely unconstrained discretion.

The FTC loudly proclaims the advantages of its *ex post* approach of relying on case-by-case enforcement of UDAP and UMC standards rather than rigid *ex ante* rulemaking, especially over cutting-edge issues of consumer protection. And there is much to commend this sort of approach relative to the prescriptive regulatory paradigm that characterizes many other agencies — again, the Evolutionary Model. But under the FTC’s *Discretionary* Model, the Commission uses its “common law of consent decrees” (more than a hundred high-tech cases settled without adjudication, and with essentially zero litigated cases to guide these settlements) and a mix of other forms of soft law (increasingly prescriptive reports based on workshops tailored to produce predetermined outcomes, and various other public pronouncements), to “regulate” — or, more accurately, to try to steer — the evolution of technology.

The required balancing of tradeoffs inherent in unfairness and deception have little meaning if the courts do not review, follow or enforce them; if the Bureau of Economics has little role in the evaluation of these inherently economic considerations embodied in the enforcement decision-making of the Bureau of Consumer Protection or in its workshops; and if other Commissioners are able only to quibble on the margins about the decisions made by the FTC Chairman. Simply codifying these standards, as Congress codified the heart of the Unfairness Policy Statement in Section 45(n) back in 1994, and as the proposed CLEAR Act would finish doing, will not solve the problem: The FTC has routinely circumvented the rigorous analysis demanded by these standards, and the same processes would enable it to continue doing so.

To address these concerns, we also propose here a number of further process reforms that we believe would begin to correct these problems and ensure that the Commission’s process really does serve the consumers the agency was tasked with protecting.

Our aim is not to hamstring the Commission, but to ensure that it wields its mighty powers with greater analytical rigor — something that should inure significantly to the benefit of consumers. Ideally, the impetus for such rigor would be provided by the courts, through careful weighing of the FTC’s implementation of substantive standards in at least a small-but-significant percentage of cases. Those decisions would, in turn, shape the FTC’s exercise of its discretion in the vast majority of cases that will — and should, in such an environment — inevitably settle out of court. The Bureau of Economics and the other Commissioners would also have far larger roles in ensuring that the FTC takes its standards seriously. But reaching these outcomes requires adjustment to the Commission’s *processes*, not merely further codification of the standards the agency already purports to follow.

We believe that our reforms should attract wide bipartisan support, if properly understood, and that they would put the FTC on sound footing for its second century — one that will increasingly see the FTC assert itself as the Federal Technology Commission.

FTC Act Statutory Standards

Unfairness

The Statement on Unfairness Reinforcement & Emphasis (SURE) Act

Rep. Markwayne Mullin’s (R-OK) bill (H.R. 5115)⁴¹ further codifies promises the FTC made in its 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement — thus picking up where Congress left off in 1994, the last time Congress reauthorized the FTC in Section 5(n):

The Commission shall have no authority ... to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice [i] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers [ii] which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [iii] not outweighed by counter-vailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.⁴²

⁴¹ The Statement on Unfairness Reinforcement and Emphasis Act, H.R. 5115, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter SURE Act] *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5115/text>.

⁴² 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).

This effectively codified the core of the Unfairness Policy Statement, while barring the FTC from relying on public policy determinations alone.⁴³ The bill would add several additional clauses to Section 5(n), drawn from the Unfairness Policy Statement. Most importantly:

1. It would exclude “trivial or merely speculative” harm from the definition of “substantial” injury.⁴⁴
2. It would enhance the Act’s “countervailing benefits” language to require consideration of the “net effects” of conduct, including dynamic, indirect consequences (like effects on innovation).⁴⁵
3. It would prohibit the Commission from “second-guess[ing] the wisdom of particular consumer decisions,” and encourage it to ensure “the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”⁴⁶

These provisions in particular (along with the others included in the bill, to be sure) would codify core aspects of the economic trade-off embodied in the UPS. They would enhance the Commission’s administrative efficiency and direct its resources where consumers are most benefited. They would ensure that the FTC’s weighing of costs and benefits is as comprehensive as possible, avoiding the systematic focus on concrete, short-term costs to the exclusion of larger, longer-term benefits. And they would help to preserve the inherent benefits of consumer choice, and avoid the intrinsic costs of agency paternalism.

Codification of these provisions would benefit consumers. And because H.R. 5115’s language hews almost verbatim to the Unfairness Policy Statement, it should be uncontroversial. Effectively, it simply makes binding those parts of the UPS that Congress did not codify back in 1994.

⁴³ The Unfairness Policy Statement had said:

Sometimes public policy will independently support a Commission action. This occurs when the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the question of consumer injury, so there is little need for separate analysis by the Commission....

To the extent that the Commission relies heavily on public policy to support a finding of unfairness, the policy should be clear and well-established. In other words, the policy should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted by the courts, rather than being ascertained from the general sense of the national values. The policy should likewise be one that is widely shared, and not the isolated decision of a single state or a single court. If these two tests are not met the policy cannot be considered as an “established” public policy for purposes of the S&H criterion. The Commission would then act only on the basis of convincing independent evidence that the practice was distorting the operation of the market and thereby causing unjustified consumer injury.

UPS, *supra* note 9.

⁴⁴ SURE Act, *supra* note 41.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.*

VALUE OF THE BILL: Codifying the Unfairness Policy Statement Would Reaffirm its Value, Encouraging Dissents and Litigation

Codifying a policy statement, even if verbatim and only in part, does essentially four things:

1. Legally, it makes the policy binding upon the Commission, since Policy Statements, technically, are not. On the margin this should deter the FTC from bringing more-tenuous cases that may not benefit consumers but that it might otherwise have brought.
2. Practically, it confers greater weight on the codified text in the Commission's deliberations, empowering dissenting Commissioners to point to the fact that Congress has chosen to codify certain language and requiring the majority to respond.
3. Legally, it somewhat reduces the deference the courts will give the FTC when it applies the statute (under *Chevron*) relative to the stronger deference given to agencies applying their own policy statements (under *Auer*).⁴⁷
4. Perhaps most importantly, it gives defendants a stronger leg to stand on in court, thus increasing, on the margin, the number that will actually litigate rather than settle. That, in turn, benefits everyone by increasing the stock of judicial analysis of doctrine.

In all four respects, the FTC would greatly benefit from the H.R. 5115's further codification of the Unfairness Policy Statement. As a string of dissenting statements by former Commissioner Wright make lays bare, the FTC is not consistently taking the Unfairness Policy Statement seriously.⁴⁸ At most, it pays lip service even to the three core elements of unfairness set forth in Section 5(n) — and even less regard to those aspects of the UPS not codified in Section 5(n).⁴⁹

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any principled objection to codifying a document that the FTC already claims to observe carefully. And if the agency plans to bring unfairness cases that are *not* covered by the four corners of the Unfairness Policy Statement (yet somehow within Section 5(n)), that should be a matter of grave concern to Congress.

⁴⁷ Note that not everyone agrees that *Chevron* deference is weaker than *Auer* deference. See Sasha Volokh, *Auer and Chevron*, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 22, 2013), available at <http://volokh.com/2013/03/22/auer-and-chevron/>.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Apple, Inc., FTC File No. 1123108 (Jan. 15, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applestatementwright_0.pdf. See also Berin Szóka, *Josh Wright's Unfinished Legacy: Reforming FTC Consumer Protection Enforcement*, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Aug. 26, 2015), <https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/08/26/josh-wrights-unfinished-legacy/>.

⁴⁹ UPS, *supra* note 9.

RECOMMENDATION: Require a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard for Unfairness Complaints

As valuable as codification of the substantive standards of the Unfairness Policy Statement would be, mere codification, or even tweaking, is unlikely to change much about the FTC's apparent evasion of its obligation to adhere to those standards. Rather, unless the *process* of enforcement by which the FTC has evaded the limits of the Statement is adjusted, the Commission will remain free to avoid the rigor it contemplates.

Indeed, it is far from clear that even the 1994 codification of the heart the Unfairness Policy Statement has been effective in actually changing the FTC's approach to enforcement. It is certainly possible that, but for Section 5(n), the Commission would have taken an even more aggressive approach to unfairness, and done even less to analyze its component elements in enforcement actions.

The process reforms we propose below are intended either (a) to increase the likelihood that the FTC will actually litigate unfairness cases, thus gaining judicial development of the doctrine, (b) that the Commissioners themselves will better develop doctrine through debate, or (c) that FTC staff, particularly through the involvement of the Bureau of Economics, will do so. Some combination of these (and, doubtless, other) reforms is essential to giving effect to Section 5(n) in its current form, to say nothing of expanding 5(n).

But the reform that would make the biggest difference within 5(n) itself would be to amend the existing Section 5(n) as follows:

The Commission may not issue a complaint under this section unless the Commission demonstrates by a **preponderance of objective evidence** that an act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by counter-vailing benefits to consumers or to competition.

The preponderance of the evidence standard is certainly a higher standard than the FTC currently faces for bringing complaints, but only because that standard is so absurdly low under Section 5(b): “reason to believe that [a violation may have occurred]” and that “it shall appear to the Commission that [an enforcement action] would be to the interest of the public.”⁵⁰ The “preponderance of the evidence” standard is the same standard used in civil cases, simply requiring that civil plaintiffs provide evidence that their argument is “more likely than not” to get judgement against defendants. This standard is substantially less stringent than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases, or the “clear and convincing” standard used in habeas petitions, so it should be suitable for the FTC's unfairness work.

⁵⁰ 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).

Why should the FTC have a higher burden (than it does today) at this intermediate stage in its enforcement process, when it brings a complaint? The FTC has significant pre-complaint powers of investigation at its disposal; it will have had considerable opportunity to perform discovery *before* bringing its complaint. Unlike private plaintiffs, who must first survive a *Twombly/Iqbal* motion to dismiss before they can compel discovery, typically at their own expense, the FTC can do so (through its civil investigative demand power) — and impose all of its costs on potential defendants — *before* ever alleging wrongdoing.

As we discuss in more detail below,⁵¹ in order to justify the massive expense of this pre-complaint discovery process, it is not enough that it enables the Commission to engage in fishing expeditions to “uncover” possible violations of the law. Rather, if it is to be justified, and if its use by the Commission is to be kept consistent with its consumer-welfare mission, it must tend to lead to enforcement only when complaints can be justified by the weight of the evidence uncovered. A heightened burden is more likely to ensure this fealty to the consumer interest and to reduce the inefficient imposition of discovery costs on the wrong enforcement targets.

It is also important to note that, although we disagree strongly with their claims,⁵² several FTC Commissioners and commentators have asserted that the set of consent orders entered into by the Commission with various enforcement targets constitute a *de facto* common law: “Technically, consent orders legally function as contracts rather than as binding precedent. Yet, in practice, the orders function much more broadly....”⁵³ In making these claims, proponents, including the Commission’s current Chairwoman,⁵⁴ assert that “the trajectory and

⁵¹ See *infra* at 31.

⁵² See, e.g., Berin Szóka, *Indictments Do Not a Common Law Make: A Critical Look at the FTC’s Consumer Protection “Case Law,”* (2014 TPRC Conference Paper, Jul. 15, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418572; Geoffrey A. Manne & Ben Sperry, *FTC Process and the Misguided Notion of an FTC “Common Law” of Data Security*, available at http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/manne%20%26%20sperry%20-%20ftc%20common%20law%20conference%20paper.pdf.

⁵³ Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, *The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy*, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607 (2014).

⁵⁴ Address by FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, at 6, at the Competition Law Center at George Washington University School of Law (Aug. 13, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735411/150813section5speech.pdf (“As I have emphasized, I favor a common law approach to the development of Section 5 doctrine.”). The previous chairwoman held the same view. See Commissioner Julie Brill, *Privacy, Consumer Protection, and Competition*, speech given at 12th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-consumer-protection-andcompetition/120427loyolasymposium.pdf (“Yet our privacy cases are also more generally informative about data collection and use practices that are acceptable, and those that cross the line, under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act creating what some have referred to as a common law of privacy in this country.”).

development [of FTC enforcement] has followed a predictable set of patterns... [that amount to] the functional equivalent of common law.”⁵⁵

For these claims to be true or worthy, it would seem necessary, *at a minimum*, that the Commission’s consumer protection complaints, which are virtually always coupled with consent orders upon their release (because *there is no statutory standard for settling FTC enforcement actions*), be tied to substantive standards that go beyond the mere exercise of three commissioners’ discretion. And yet the FTC and the courts have consistently argued that the FTC Act’s “reason to believe” standard for issuance of complaints requires nothing more than this minimal exercise of discretion. As former Commissioner Tom Rosch put it,

[t]he “reason to believe” standard, however, is not a summary judgment standard: it is a standard that simply asks whether there is a reason to believe that litigation may lead to a finding of liability. That is a low threshold.... [T]he “reason to believe” standard is amorphous and can have an “I know it when I see it” feel.”⁵⁶

This creates a real problem for the claims that the Commission’s consent orders have any kind of precedential power:

In theory, the questions of whether to bring an enforcement action and whether a violation occurred are distinct; but in practice, when enforcement actions end in settlements (and when the two are often filed simultaneously), the two questions collapse into one. The FTC Act does not impose any additional requirement on the FTC to negotiate a settlement.... Thus, at best, the FTC’s decisions are roughly analogous not to court decisions on the merits, but to court decisions on motions to dismiss.... Or, perhaps even more precisely, the FTC’s decisions are analogous to reviews of warrants in criminal cases, as Commissioner Rosch has argued. It would be a strange criminal common law, indeed, that confused ultimate standards of guilt with the far lower standard of whether the police could properly open an investigation, yet this is essentially what the FTC’s “common law” of settlements does.⁵⁷

The incentives, discussed in more detail below,⁵⁸ that impel nearly every FTC consumer protection enforcement target to settle with the agency ensure that the only practical inflec-

⁵⁵ Solove & Hartzog, *supra* note 53, at 608.

⁵⁶ J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Remarks at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting*, 3–4 (Aug. 5, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/so-i-serve-both-prosecutor-and-judge-whats-big-deal/100805abaspeech.pdf.

⁵⁷ Berin Szóka, *Indictments Do Not a Common Law Make: A Critical Look at the FTC’s Consumer Protection “Case Law”* 7–8, available at http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Szoka%20for%20GMU%20FTC%20Workshop%20-%20May%202014.pdf.

⁵⁸ See *infra* at 31.

tion point at which the entire enforcement process is subject to any kind of “review,” is when the Commissioners vote to authorize the issuance of a formal complaint and, simultaneously, approve an already-negotiated settlement. That such a determination may be based solely on the effectively unreviewable⁵⁹ discretion of the Commission that the complaint — not the consent order — meets the current, low threshold is troubling.

As former FTC Chairman Tim Muris observed, “Within very broad limits, the agency determines what shall be legal. Indeed, the agency has been ‘lawless’ in the sense that it has traditionally been beyond judicial control.”⁶⁰ If meaningful judicial review is ever to be brought to bear on the final agency decisions embodied in consent orders, it is crucial that the complaints that give rise to those settlements be subject to a more meaningful standard that imposes some evidentiary and logical burden on the Commission beyond the mere exercise of its discretion. While a preponderance of the evidence standard would hardly impose an insurmountable burden on the agency, it would at least impose a standard that is more than purely discretionary, and thus reviewable by courts and subject to recognizable standards upon which such review could proceed. Most importantly, enacting such a standard should, on the margin, embolden defendants to resist settling cases, thus producing more judicial decisions, which could in turn constrain the FTC’s discretion.

None of our proposed reforms to the FTC’s investigation process⁶¹ would in any way undermine the FTC’s ability to gather information prior to issuing a complaint. The FTC would still be able to contact parties and investigate them through its 6(b) powers and use civil investigative demands if necessary to compel disclosure. But it is necessary to heighten the FTC’s standard for finally bringing a complaint since it can do significant investigation beforehand. It is not unreasonable to think they should have enough evidence to determine a violation of the law by a preponderance of the evidence by the point of complaint, especially since this is where most enforcement actions end in settlement.

Deception & Materiality

No Bill Proposed

The FTC’s 1983 Deception Policy Statement forms one of the two pillars of its consumer protection work. As with Unfairness, the purpose of the Deception power is to protect consumers from injury. But unlike Unfairness, Deception does not require the FTC to prove injury. Instead, the FTC need prove only materiality — as an evidentiary proxy for injury:

⁵⁹ See *FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.*, 449 U.S. 232 (1980).

⁶⁰ Muris, *supra* note 8, at 49.

⁶¹ See *infra* at 31.

[T]he representation, omission, or practice must be a “material” one. The basic question is whether the act or practice is likely to affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product or service. If so, the practice is material, and consumer injury is likely, because consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for the deception. **In many instances, materiality, and hence injury, can be presumed from the nature of the practice. In other instances, evidence of materiality may be necessary.** Thus, the Commission will find deception if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment....⁶²

A finding of materiality is also a finding that injury is likely to exist because of the representation, omission, sales practice, or marketing technique. Injury to consumers can take many forms. **Injury exists if consumers would have chosen differently but for the deception. If different choices are likely, the claim is material, and injury is likely as well. Thus, injury and materiality are different names for the same concept.**⁶³

Materiality is the *point* of the Deception Policy Statement. It is a shortcut by which the FTC can protect consumers from injury (*i.e.*, not getting the benefit of the bargain promised them) without having to establish injury (that failing to get this benefit actually harms them). A finding of materiality allows the FTC to presume injury because, in the traditional marketing context, a deceptive claim that is “material” enough to alter consumer behavior (which is the *point* of marketing, after all) may reasonably be presumed to do so in ways that a truthful claim wouldn’t (or else why bother making the misleading claim?).

Unfortunately, the FTC has effectively broken the logic of the materiality “shortcut” by extending a *second* set of presumptions: most notably, that all express statements are material. This presumption may make sense in the context of traditional marketing claims, but it breaks down with things like privacy policies and other non-marketing claims (like online help pages) — situations where deceptive statements certainly *may* alter consumer behavior, but in which such an effect can’t be presumed (because the company making the claim is not doing so in order to convince consumers to purchase the product).⁶⁴

The FTC has justified this presumption-on-top-of-a-presumption by pointing to this passage of the DPS (shown with the critical footnotes):

⁶² *DPS supra* note 10.

⁶³ *Id.* at 6 (emphasis added).

⁶⁴ Of course, even in the marketing context this presumption is one of administrative economy, not descriptive reality. While there is surely a correlation between statements intended to change consumer behavior and actual changes in consumer behavior, a causal assumption is not warranted. *See generally* Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, *Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication*, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609 (2005).

The Commission considers certain categories of information presumptively material.⁴⁷ First, the Commission presumes that express claims are material.⁴⁸ As the Supreme Court stated recently [in *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC*], “[i]n the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising.”

⁴⁷ The Commission will always consider relevant and competent evidence offered to rebut presumptions of materiality.

⁴⁸ Because this presumption is absent for some implied claims, the Commission will take special caution to ensure materiality exists in such cases.⁶⁵

In effect, the first two sentences have come to swallow the rest of the paragraph, including the logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Central Hudson*, the single most important case of all time regarding the regulation of commercial speech.⁶⁶ In particular, the FTC ignores the “absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise.”⁶⁷

When the Deception Policy Statement talked about “express claims,” it was obviously contemplating *marketing* claims, where the presumption of materiality makes sense: if a company buys an ad, anything it says in the ad is intended to convince the viewer to buy the product. The intention to advertise the product is simply the flipside of materiality — a way of inferring what reasonable buyers would think from what profit-maximizing sellers obviously intended. But this logic breaks down once we move beyond advertising claims.

We have written at length about this problem in the context of the FTC’s 2015 settlement with Nomi, the maker of a technology that allowed stores to track users’ movement on their premises, as well as a shopper’s repeat visits, in order to deliver a better in-store shopping experience, placement of products, etc.⁶⁸

The FTC’s complaint focused on a claim made in the privacy policy on Nomi’s website that consumers could opt out on the website or at “any retailer using Nomi’s technology.” Nomi failed to provide an in-store mechanism for allowing consumers to opt out of the tracking program, but it did provide one on the website — right where the allegedly deceptive claim was made. That Nomi did not, in fact, offer an in-store opt-out mechanism in violation of its express promise to do so is clear. Whether, taken in context, that failure was *material*, however, is not clear.

⁶⁵ *Id.* at 5.

⁶⁶ *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of NY*, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 567–68.

⁶⁸ See Geoffrey A. Manne, R. Ben Sperry & Berin Szóka, *In the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc.: The Dark Side of the FTC’s Latest Feel-Good Case* (ICLE Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program White Paper 2015-1), available at http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/icl-nomi_white_paper.pdf.

For the FTC majority, even though the website portion of the promise was fulfilled, Nomi's failure to comply with the in-store portion amounted to an actionable deception. But the majority dodged the key question: whether the evidence that Nomi accurately promised a website opt-out, and that consumers could (and did) opt-out using the website, rebuts the presumption that the inaccurate, in-store opt-out portion of the statement was material, and sufficient to render the statement *as a whole* deceptive.

In other words, the majority assumed that Nomi's express claim, in the context of a privacy policy rather than a marketing statement, affected consumers' behavior. But given the very different purposes of a privacy policy and a marketing statement (and the immediate availability of the website opt-out in the very place that the claim was made), that presumption seems inappropriate. The majority did not discuss the reasonableness of the presumption given the different contexts, which *should* have been the primary issue. Instead it simply relied on a literal reading of the DPS, neglecting to consider whether its underlying logic merited a different approach.

The Commission failed to demonstrate that, *as a whole*, Nomi's failure to provide in-store opt out was deceptive, in clear contravention of the Deception Policy Statement's requirement that all statements be evaluated in context:

[T]he Commission will evaluate the entire advertisement, transaction, or course of dealing in determining how reasonable consumers are likely to respond. Thus, in advertising the Commission will examine "the entire mosaic, rather than each tile separately."⁶⁹

Moreover, despite the promise in the DPS that the Commission would "always consider relevant and competent evidence offered to rebut presumptions of materiality," the FTC failed to do so in *Nomi*. As Commissioner Wright noted in his dissent:

[T]he Commission failed to discharge its commitment to duly consider relevant and competent evidence that squarely rebuts the presumption that Nomi's failure to implement an additional, retail-level opt out was material to consumers. In other words, the Commission neglects to take into account evidence demonstrating consumers would not "have chosen differently" but for the allegedly deceptive representation.

Nomi represented that consumers could opt out on its website as well as in the store where the Listen service was being utilized. Nomi did offer a fully functional and operational global opt out from the Listen service on its website. Thus, the only remaining potential issue is whether Nomi's failure to offer the represented in-store opt out renders the statement in its privacy policy deceptive. The evi-

⁶⁹ *DPS supra* note 10, at 4 n.31 (quoting *Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sterling Drug*, 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963)).

dence strongly implies that specific representation was not material and therefore not deceptive. Nomi’s “tracking” of users was widely publicized in a story that appeared on the front page of The New York Times, a publication with a daily reach of nearly 1.9 million readers. Most likely due to this publicity, Nomi’s website received 3,840 unique visitors during the relevant timeframe and received 146 opt outs — an opt-out rate of 3.8% of site visitors. This opt-out rate is significantly higher than the opt-out rate for other online activities. This high rate, relative to website visitors, likely reflects the ease of a mechanism that was immediately and quickly available to consumers at the time they may have been reading the privacy policy.

The Commission’s reliance upon a presumption of materiality as to the additional representation of the availability of an in-store opt out is dubious in light of evidence of the opt-out rate for the webpage mechanism. Actual evidence of consumer behavior indicates that consumers that were interested in opting out of the Listen service took their first opportunity to do so. To presume the materiality of a representation in a privacy policy concerning the availability of an additional, in-store opt-out mechanism requires one to accept the proposition that the privacy-sensitive consumer would be more likely to bypass the easier and immediate route (the online opt out) in favor of waiting until she had the opportunity to opt out in a physical location. Here, we can easily dispense with shortcut presumptions meant to aid the analysis of consumer harm rather than substitute for it. The data allow us to know with an acceptable level of precision how many consumers — 3.8% of them — reached the privacy policy, read it, and made the decision to opt out when presented with that immediate choice. The Commission’s complaint instead adopts an approach that places legal form over substance, is inconsistent with the available data, and defies common sense.⁷⁰

The First Circuit’s recent opinion in *Fanning v. FTC* compounds the FTC’s error. First, it holds (we believe erroneously) that the DPS’s presumptions aren’t limited to the marketing milieu:

There is no requirement that a misrepresentation be contained in an advertisement. The FTC Act prohibits ‘deceptive acts or practices,’ and we have upheld the Commission when it imposed liability based on misstatements not contained in advertisements.⁷¹

In addition, the *Fanning* decision would allow the FTC to go even a step further. Citing the language from the Deception Policy Statement that “claims pertaining to a central charac-

⁷⁰ Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc., at 3-4 (Apr. 23, 2015) (emphasis added), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/638371/150423nomiwrightstatement.pdf.

⁷¹ *Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, No. 15-1520, slip op. at 13 (May 9, 2016), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/051816jerkopinion.pdf> (citing *Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC*, 481 F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (1st Cir. 1973) (finding FTC Act violation based on company’s practice of sending customers excess merchandise and using “a fictitious collection agency to coerce payment”)).

teristic of the product about ‘which reasonable consumers would be concerned,’” are material, the First Circuit shifted the burden of proof to Fanning to prove that its promises were *not* material.

Of course, the DPS strongly suggests that this “central characteristic” language is also applicable only in the marketing context — in the context, that is, of claims made about a product’s “central characteristics” in the service of *selling* that product — and that it is fact-dependent:

Depending on the facts, information pertaining to the central characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material. Information has been found material where it concerns the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost, of the product or service. Information is also likely to be material if it concerns durability, performance, warranties or quality.⁷²

Much like *Nomi*, the effect of the First Circuit’s decision could be far-reaching. If the FTC may simply assert that claims relate to the central characteristic of a product, receive a presumption of materiality on that basis, and then shift the burden the defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary, it may *never* need to offer any evidence of its own on materiality. Combined this with the reluctance of the FTC to actually consider evidence rebutting the presumption (as illustrated in *Nomi*), we could see cases where the FTC presumes materiality on the basis of mere allegation and ignores all evidence to the contrary offered in rebuttal, despite its promise to “always consider relevant and competent evidence offered to rebut presumptions of materiality.”⁷³ This would lead to an outcome that the drafters of the Deception Policy Statement plainly did not intend: that effectively every erroneous or inaccurate word ever publicly disseminated by companies may be presumed to injure consumers and constitute an actionable violation of Section 5.

In short, if the courts will defer to the FTC even as it reads the materiality requirement out of the Deception Policy Statement, this is not a vindication of the FTC’s reading; it is merely a reminder of the vastness of the deference paid to agencies in interpreting ambiguous statutes. And it should be a reminder to Congress that only through legislation can Congress ultimately reassert itself — if only to keep the FTC on the path the agency itself laid out decades ago.

RECOMMENDATION: Codify the 1983 Deception Policy Statement

Congress should codify the Deception Policy Statement in a new Section 5(o), just as it codified the core part of the Unfairness Policy Statement in 1994, and just as the SURE Act would codify the rest of the UPS today. Fully codifying both statements (all *three* statements,

⁷² *DPS supra* note 10, at 5.

⁷³ *Id.* at n.47.

including the UMC Enforcement Policy Statement) is a good idea if only because the FTC is somewhat more likely to take them seriously if they are statutory mandates. But, as we have emphasized, codification alone will not do much to change the institutional structures and processes that are at the heart of the statements' relative ineffectiveness in guiding the FTC's discretion.

In codifying the DPS, Congress should be mindful of the problems we discuss above. It should also modify the DPS' operative language to mitigate the interpretative problems arising from its inevitable ambiguity. Without specifying precise language here, a few guidelines for drafting such language come readily to mind:

1. Defer to the DPS drafters: they could never have meant for the exceptions (presumptions) to subsume the rule (the materiality requirement), and the codified language should endeavor to reflect this.
2. Acknowledge that there are differences between marketing language and language used in other contexts, including, importantly, today's ubiquitous privacy policies and website terms of use — settings that weren't contemplated by the DPS drafters.
3. Clarify what evidentiary burden is required to demonstrate materiality in contexts where it shouldn't simply be inferred, and, after *Fanning*, clarify whether, and when, the burden should shift from the FTC to defendants.

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify that Legally Required Statements Cannot Be Presumptively Material

Particularly given the increasing importance of privacy policies in the FTC's deception enforcement practice, it is also important to clarify whether legally mandated language should be presumed material. We believe that the DPS' exception for "factors that would distort the decision to advertise" includes a legal mandate to say something, which unequivocally "distorts" the decision to proffer such language. Thus, in most cases, privacy policies — required by California law⁷⁴ — ought not be treated as presumptively material. This would not preclude the FTC from proving that they *are* material, of course. It would simply require the Commission to *establish* their materiality in each particular case — which, again, was the point of the Deception Policy Statement in the first place.

RECOMMENDATION: Delegate Reconsideration of Other Materiality Presumptions

Unfortunately, it will be difficult for Congress to address the other aspects of the FTC's interpretation of materiality by statute, because each is highly fact-specific. But, ultimately, ensuring that the FTC's implementation of the Deception Policy Statement's requirement of

⁷⁴ See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 22575, available at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=bpc&group=22001-23000&file=22575-22579>.

a rigorous assessment of trade-offs doesn't require specification of outcomes; it requires some institutional rejigging ensure that the Bureau of Consumer Protection is motivated to do so by some combination of the courts, the commissioners, and the Bureau of Economics.

Instead of trying to address these issues directly, Congress could, for example, direct the FTC to produce a Policy Statement on Materiality in which the Commission attempts to clarify these issues on its own. Thus, for example, the Commission could describe factors for determining whether and when an online help center should be considered a form of marketing that merits the presumption. Or, as we have previously proposed, Congress could delegate this and other key doctrinal questions to a Modernization Commission focused on high-tech consumer protection issues like privacy and data security, parallel to the Antitrust Modernization Commission.⁷⁵

RECOMMENDATION: Require Preponderance of the Evidence in Deception Cases

Above, we explain that among our top three priorities for additional reforms — indeed, for reforms overall — is adding a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for unfairness cases by expanding upon Section 5(n).⁷⁶ We urge Congress to include the same standard in a new Section 5(o) for non-fraud deception cases. Again, this standard should be easy for the FTC to satisfy.

Unfair Methods of Competition

No Bill Proposed

The Commission's unanimous adoption last year of a “Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ‘Unfair Methods of Competition’” was a watershed moment for the agency.⁷⁷ The adoption of the Statement marked the first time in the Commission's 100-year history

⁷⁵ Comments of TechFreedom & International Center for Law and Economics, In the Matter of Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, Docket No. 140514424–4424–01, at 4 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/tf-icle_ntia_big_data_comments.pdf (“A Privacy Law Modernization Commission could do what Commerce on its own cannot, and what the FTC could probably do but has refused to do: carefully study where new legislation is needed and how best to write it. It can also do what no Executive or independent agency can: establish a consensus among a diverse array of experts that can be presented to Congress as, not merely yet another in a series of failed proposals, but one that has a unique degree of analytical rigor behind it and bipartisan endorsement. If any significant reform is ever going to be enacted by Congress, it is most likely to come as the result of such a commission's recommendations.”).

⁷⁶ See *supra* note 18.

⁷⁷ Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Aug. 13, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf.

that the FTC issued enforcement guidelines for cases brought under the Unfair Methods of Competition (“UMC”) provisions of Section 5 of the FTC Act.⁷⁸

Enforcement principles for UMC actions were in desperate need of clarification at the time of the Statement’s adoption. Without any UMC standards, the FTC had been essentially completely free to leverage its costly adjudication process into settlements (or short-term victories), and to leave businesses in the dark as to what sorts of conduct might trigger enforcement. Through a series of un-adjudicated settlements, UMC unfairness doctrine (such as it is) has remained largely within the province of FTC discretion and without judicial oversight. As a result, and either by design or by accident, UMC never developed a body of law encompassing well-defined goals or principles like antitrust’s consumer-welfare standard. Several important cases had seemingly sought to take advantage of the absence of meaningful judicial constraints on UMC enforcement actions to bring standard antitrust cases under the provision.⁷⁹ And more than one recent Commissioner had explicitly extolled the virtue of the unfettered (and unprincipled) enforcement of antitrust cases the provision afforded the agency.⁸⁰ The new Statement makes it official FTC policy to reject this harmful dynamic.

The UMC Statement is deceptively simple in its framing:

In deciding whether to challenge an act or practice as an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 on a standalone basis, the Commission adheres to the following principles:

- the Commission will be guided by the public policy underlying the antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of consumer welfare;
- the act or practice will be evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason, that is, an act or practice challenged by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications; and

⁷⁸ It should be noted that the Statement represents a landmark victory for Commissioner Joshua Wright, who has been a tireless advocate for defining the scope of the Commission’s UMC authority since before his appointment to the FTC in 2013. *See, e.g.,* Joshua D. Wright, *Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust*, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 241 (2012).

⁷⁹ For a succinct evaluation of these cases (including, *e.g., Intel* and *N-Data*), see Geoffrey A. Manne & Berin Szóka, *Section 5 of the FTC Act and monopolization cases: A brief primer*, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Nov. 26, 2012), <https://truthonthemarket.com/2012/11/26/section-5-of-the-ftc-act-and-monopolization-cases-a-brief-primer/>.

⁸⁰ *See, e.g.,* Statement of Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch, In the Matter of Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341, 1, *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/568601/091216intelchairstatement.pdf (“[I]t is more important than ever that the Commission actively consider whether it may be appropriate to exercise its full Congressional authority under Section 5.”).

- the Commission is less likely to challenge an act or practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if enforcement of the Sherman or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from the act or practice.⁸¹

Most importantly, the Statement espouses a preference for enforcement under the antitrust laws over UMC when both might apply, and brings the weight of consumer-welfare-oriented antitrust law and economics to bear on such cases.

RECOMMENDATION: Codify the Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under a New Section 5(p) of the FTC Act

As beneficial as the Statement is, it necessarily reflects compromise. In particular, the third prong is expressed merely as a *preference* for antitrust enforcement rather than an obligation. And, of course, such statements are not binding on the Commission, no matter how strongly worded they may be, and no matter how much “soft law” may be brought to bear on the Commissioners charged with following it.

For these reasons, Congress should codify the most important aspects of the Statement — much as it did with the Unfairness Policy Statement’s consumer-injury unfairness test — by adding the following language in a new Section 5(p):

The Commission *shall not* challenge an act or practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if the alleged competitive harm arising from the act or practice is subject to enforcement under the Sherman or Clayton Act.

An act or practice challenged by the Commission as an unfair method of competition must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications.

This language is taken directly from the UMC Statement, with the small tweak highlighted above *requiring* application of the antitrust laws instead of UMC in appropriate cases, rather than merely expressing a preference for doing so.

Such language would harmonize enforcement of all anticompetitive practices under the antitrust laws’ consumer-welfare standard, while still permitting the few cases not amenable to Sherman or Clayton Act jurisdiction (*e.g.*, invitations to collude) to be brought by the Commission. Importantly, language such as this, which would make enforcement under the antitrust laws *obligatory* where both UMC and antitrust could apply, would transform the Statement’s expression of agency preference into an enforceable statutory requirement.

⁸¹ Statement of UMC Enforcement Principles, *supra* note 77.

Enforcement & Guidance

The FTC is commonly labeled a “law enforcement agency,” but in reality it is an administrative agency that regulates primarily through enforcement rather than rulemaking:

As an administrative agency, the FTC’s primary form of regulation involves administrative application of a set of general principles — a “law enforcement” style function that, practically speaking, operates as administrative regulation....⁸²

This administrative enforcement model puts significant emphasis on the agency’s investigative power, and it is the investigatory aspect of its enforcement process that has become the agency’s most powerful — and least overseen — tool. As one commentator notes, “[t]he FTC possesses what are probably the broadest investigatory powers of any federal regulatory agency.”⁸³

The Commission’s investigatory process is also the heart of the mechanism by which the agency largely bypasses judicial oversight:

[Not even] the courts have... been a significant factor in deterring FTC investigation. Indeed, the bulk of court cases appear to affirm the agency’s authority to obtain information pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Thus, any constraints placed upon the FTC’s ability to obtain information must lie elsewhere.⁸⁴

By overly compelling companies to settle enforcement actions when they are little more than investigations, the investigative process inevitably leads, on the margin, to less-well-targeted investigations, increased discovery burdens on (even blameless) potential defendants, inefficiently large compliance expenditures throughout the economy, under-experimentation and innovation by firms, doctrinally questionable consent orders, and a relative scarcity of judicial review of Commission enforcement decisions.

More than any other aspect of the FTC Act or the FTC’s operations, it is here that reinvigorated congressional oversight is needed. Even Chris Hoofnagle, who has long advocated that the FTC be far more aggressive on privacy and data security, warns, in his new treatise on privacy regulation at the agency, that

⁸² *Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission*, *supra* note 4, at 12.

⁸³ Stephanie W. Kanwit, 1 Federal Trade Commission § 13:1 at 13-1 (West 2003).

⁸⁴ Darren Bush, *The Incentive and Ability of the Federal Trade Commission to Investigate Real Estate Markets: An Exercise in Political Economy*, 20-21, available at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/517c.pdf>.

the FTC’s investigatory power is very broad and is akin to an inquisitorial body. On its own initiative, it can investigate a broad range of businesses without any indication of a predicate offense having occurred.⁸⁵

In competition cases, the entire Commission must vote to authorize CIDs in each matter and also vote to close investigations once compulsory process is issued. But in the consumer protection context, the Commission issues standing orders — “omnibus resolutions” (ORs) — authorizing extremely broad, industry-wide investigations that authorize the subsequent issuance of CIDs with the consent of only a single Commissioner. For instance, there is a standing Commission order authorizing staff to investigate telemarketing fraud cases.⁸⁶ Thus, if staff wants to issue a CID to investigate a specific telemarketer or any of a wide range of companies that may be supporting telemarketers, it need seek approval for the CID from only a single Commissioner. These requests are frequent (to the best of our knowledge amounting to many dozens *per week*), and routinely granted.

The staff’s ability to rely upon Omnibus Resolutions in this manner bypasses an important aspect of how the FTC’s enforcement approach is structured on paper. The FTC Operating Manual draws a clear line between initial phase investigations (initiated and run by the staff at their own discretion for up to 100 hours in consumer protection cases) and full investigations. The decision to upgrade an investigation can be made by the Bureau Director on delegated authority, but at least this creates some potential for involvement of other Commissioners. It also requires written analysis by the staff⁸⁷ — something other Commissioners could ask to see. But most relevant to the immediate discussion is the Commission’s policy that

Compulsory procedures are not ordinarily utilized in the initial phase of investigations; therefore, facts and data which cannot be obtained from existing sources must be developed through the use of voluntary procedures.⁸⁸

Relying on ORs, however, the staff may make use of compulsory process even when it would not otherwise be appropriate to do so.

At the same time, the Commission may (if it so chooses) bring its Section 5 cases (those relatively few that don’t settle) in its own administrative tribunal, whose decisions are appealed to the Commission itself. Only after the Commission’s review (or denial of review) may a

⁸⁵ HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY, *supra* note 3, at 102.

⁸⁶ Resolution No. 0123145, “Resolution Directing the Use of Compulsory Process in a Nonpublic Investigation of Telemarketers, Sellers, Suppliers, and Others” Technically the Telemarketing Resolution expired in April 2016. But it authorizes continuing investigation subject to already-issued CIDs as long as necessary. Although no further CIDs will be issued, the investigation continues.

⁸⁷ Federal Trade Commission, *Operating Manual*, 3.5.1.2 [hereinafter *Operating Manual*].

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 3.2.3.2.

party bring its case before an Article III court. Needless to say, this adds an extremely costly layer of administrative process to enforcement, as former Commissioner Wright explains:

[T]he key to understanding the threat of Section 5 is the interaction between its lack of boundaries and the FTC's administrative process advantages.... Consider the following empirical observation that demonstrates at the very least that the institutional framework that has evolved around the application of Section 5 cases in administrative adjudication is quite different than that faced by Article III judges in federal court in the United States. The FTC has voted out a number of complaints in administrative adjudication that have been tried by administrative law judges ("ALJs") in the past nearly twenty years. In each of those cases, after the administrative decision was appealed to the Commission, the Commission ruled in favor of FTC staff. In other words, **in 100 percent of cases where the ALJ ruled in favor of the FTC, the Commission affirmed; and in 100 percent of the cases in which the ALJ ruled against the FTC, the Commission reversed.** By way of contrast, when the antitrust decisions of federal district court judges are appealed to the federal courts of appeal, plaintiffs do not come anywhere close to a 100 percent success rate. Indeed, the win rate is much closer to 50 percent.⁸⁹

The net effect of these procedural circumstances is stark. Wright continues:

The combination of institutional and procedural advantages with the vague nature of the Commission's Section 5 authority gives the agency the ability, in some cases, to elicit a settlement even though the conduct in question very likely may not [violate any law or regulation]. This is because firms typically prefer to settle a Section 5 claim rather than going through lengthy and costly administrative litigation in which they are both shooting at a moving target and have the chips stacked against them. Significantly, such settlements also perpetuate the uncertainty that exists as a result of the ambiguity associated with the Commission's [Section 5] authority by **encouraging a process by which the contours of Section 5 are drawn without any meaningful adversarial proceeding or substantive analysis of the Commission's authority.**⁹⁰

Further, the Commission currently enjoys a nearly insurmountable presumption that its omnibus resolutions are proper — a fact that places subjects of investigations at a severe disadvantage when trying to challenge the Commission's often intrusive investigative process.

Whether issued under an Omnibus Resolution or otherwise, the Commission's CIDs allow the agency to impose enormous costs on potential defendants before even a single Commis-

⁸⁹ Joshua Wright, *Recalibrating Section 5: A Response to the CPI Symposium*, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Nov. 2013 (2)), at 4 (emphasis added), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/recalibrating-section-5-response-cpi-symposium/1311section5.pdf.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 5 (emphasis added).

sioner — let alone the entire Commission or a court of law — determines that there is even a “reason to believe” that the party being investigated has violated any law.

The direct costs of compliance with these extremely broad CIDs can be enormous. Unlike discovery requests in private litigation, reimbursement of costs associated with CID compliance is not available, even if a defendant prevails. Among other things, CID recipients will be required to incur the expense of performing electronic and offline searches for copious amounts of information (which may require the hiring of outside vendors), interviewing employees, the business costs of lost employee and management time, and attorneys’ fees. Moreover, there may be several CIDs issued to a single company. And, sometimes of greatest importance, in many cases publicly traded companies will be required to disclose receipt of a CID in its SEC filings. This can have significant immediate effects on a company’s share price and do lasting damage to its reputation among consumers.

The experience of Wyndham Hotels is illustrative. The company became the first to challenge an FTC data security enforcement action following more than twelve years of FTC data security settlements. Even before it finally had recourse to an Article III court, Wyndham had already incurred enormous costs, as we noted in our amicus brief in support of Wyndham’s 2013 motion to dismiss:

Burdensome as settlements can be, *not* settling can be even costlier. Wyndham, for example, has already received 47 document requests in this case and spent \$5 million responding to these requests. The FTC’s compulsory investigative discovery process and administrative litigation both consume the most valuable resource of any firm: the time and attention of management and key personnel.⁹¹

And it is difficult for CID recipients to challenge a CID on the basis of cost. As the Commission notes in a ruling denying one such request:

WAM [West Asset Management] has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating compliance with the CID would be unduly burdensome.... WAM has not cited, and the Commission is unaware of, any cases to support WAM’s minimize-disruption standard. “Thus courts have refused to modify investigative subpoenas unless compliance threatens to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.” As in *Texaco* the breadth of the CID is a reflection of the comprehensiveness of the inquiry being undertaken and the magnitude of WAM’s business operations.⁹²

⁹¹ Amici Curiae Brief Of TechFreedom, International Center for Law and Economics & Consumer Protection Scholars, *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, No. 2:13-cv-01887 (3d Cir. 2013) at 13.

⁹² Request for Review of Denial of Petition to Limit Civil Investigative Demand, File No. 0723006 (Jul. 2, 2008), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/petitions-quash/west-asset-management-inc./080702westasset.pdf> (citing *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc.*, 555 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).

High costs, as long as they don't threaten a company's viability, will be insufficient to quash or even minimize the scope of a CID. But even expenses that don't threaten viability can be extremely large and extremely burdensome. And, of course, broader costs (*e.g.*, on stock price and market reputation) are extremely difficult to measure and unaccounted for in the FTC's assessment of a CID's burden.

It should be noted that, unlike complaints (before adjudication) and consent orders, CIDs are directly reviewed by courts at times. For better or worse, however, courts are prone to give the Commission an extreme degree of deference when reviewing CIDs. "The standard for judging relevancy in an investigatory proceeding is more relaxed than in an adjudicatory one... The requested material, therefore, need only be relevant to the investigation — the boundary of which may be defined quite generally."⁹³ Thus, the Commission has "extreme breadth' in conducting ... investigations."⁹⁴

But high *direct* costs aren't even the most troubling part. The indirect, societal cost of overly broad CIDs is the increased propensity of companies to settle to avoid them. For reasons we also discuss elsewhere, an excessive tendency toward settlements imposes costs throughout the economy. Among other things:

- It reduces the salutary influence of judicial review of agency enforcement actions;
- It reduces the stock of judicial decisions from which companies, courts and the FTC would otherwise receive essential guidance regarding appropriate enforcement theories and the propriety of ambiguous conduct;
- It induces companies that haven't violated the statute to be saddled with remedies nonetheless, and thereby induces other, similarly-situated companies to incur inefficient costs to avoid the same fate;
- It incentivizes the FTC to impose remedies via consent order that a court might not sustain; and
- It may induce companies that would be found by a court not to have violated the statute to admit liability.

These largely hidden, underappreciated effects are, collectively, enormously distorting. And they feedback into the process, reinforcing the institutional dynamics that lead to such outcomes in the first place. In short, the FTC's discovery process greatly magnifies its already vast discretion to make substantive decisions about the evolution of Section 5 doctrine (or quasi-doctrine).

⁹³ *Invention Submission*, 965 F.2d at 1090 (emphasis in original, internal citations omitted) (citing *Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Carter*, 636 F.2d 781, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and *Texaco*, 555 F.2d at 874 & n.26).

⁹⁴ *Re: LabMD, Inc.'s Petition to Limit or Quash the Civil Investigative Demand; and Michael J. Daugherty's Petition to Limit or Quash the Civil Investigative Demand* (Apr. 20, 2012), 5, available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/petitions-quash/labmd-inc./102-3099-lab-md-letter-ruling-04202012.pdf>.

At the same time, there is reason to believe that the rate of CID issuance, and the scope of CIDs issued, are (far) greater than optimal.

In order to issue a CID pursuant to an OR, staff need not present the authorizing Commissioner with a theory of the case or anything approaching “probable cause” for the CID; rather, the OR effectively takes care of that (although without anything like the specificity required of, say, a subpoena), and staff need only assert that the CID is in furtherance of an OR. The other Commissioners do not have an opportunity to vote on the issuance of the CID and would not likely even know about the investigation. Even if dissenting staff members attempt to notify Commissioners,⁹⁵ it may be difficult, at this early stage, for Commissioners to recognize the doctrinal or practical significance of the cases the staff is attempting to bring, and thus to provide any meaningful check upon the discretion of the staff to use the discovery process to coerce settlements.

Thus, because of omnibus resolutions, a great number of investigations — encompassing a great number of costly CIDs — are not presented to the other Commissioners to determine whether the investigation is an appropriate use of the agency’s resources or whether the legal basis for the case is sound. In many cases, the other Commissioners may not even see the case until a settlement has been negotiated as a *fait accompli*.

The bar for issuing CIDs pursuant to an omnibus resolution is extremely low. Nominally the CID request must fall within the agency’s authority and be relevant to the investigation that authorizes it. But the FTC has enormous discretion in determining whether a specific compulsory demand is relevant to an investigation, and it need not have “a justifiable belief that wrongdoing has actually occurred.”⁹⁶

For example, the Commission’s telemarketing resolution authorized compulsory process

[t]o determine whether unnamed telemarketers, sellers, or others assisting them have engaged in or are engaging in: (1) unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and/or (2) deceptive or abusive telemarketing acts or practices in violation of the Commission’s Telemarketing Sales Rule, including but not limited to the provision of substantial assistance or support — such as mailing lists, scripts, merchant accounts, and other information, products, or services — to telemarketers engaged in unlawful practices. The investigation is also to determine

⁹⁵ Operating Manual § 3.5.1.1 (“Dissenting staff recommendations regarding compulsory process, compliance, consent agreements, proposed trade regulation rules or proposed industrywide investigations should be submitted to the Commission by the originating offices, upon the request of the staff member.”).

⁹⁶ *United States v. Morton Salt Co.*, 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).

whether Commission action to obtain redress for injury to consumers or others would be in the public interest.⁹⁷

Pursuant to this OR, the Commission issued a CID to Western Union. Western Union challenged the CID on the grounds that it was unrelated to the OR (among other things). The FTC, in denying the motion to quash, claimed that “[t]he resolution... includes investigations of telemarketers or sellers as well as entities such as Western Union who may be providing substantial assistance or support to telemarketers or sellers.” While the OR does mention “assistance or support,” it doesn’t specify any companies by name and doesn’t specify that payment processors provide the sort of support it contemplates. In fact, it is fairly clear from even the impressively broad characterization of these in the OR — “mailing lists, scripts, merchant accounts, and other information, products, or services” — that the ancillary processing of payment transactions by legitimate companies was not really contemplated.

Nevertheless, the standard of review for the relevance of CIDs — in the rare instance that they are challenged at all — is extremely generous to the agency. As the Commission notes in its *Western Union* decision:

In the context of an administrative CID, “relevance” is defined broadly and with deference to an administrative agency’s determination. An administrative agency is to be accorded “extreme breadth” in conducting an investigation. As the D.C. Circuit has stated, the standard for judging relevance in an administrative investigation is “more relaxed” than in an adjudicatory proceeding. As a result, the agency is entitled to the documents unless the CID recipient can show that the agency’s determination is “obviously wrong” or the documents are “plainly irrelevant” to the investigation’s purpose. We find that Western Union has not met this burden.⁹⁸

Finally, administrative challenges to CIDs are public proceedings, which itself presents a substantial bar to their review. Companies subject to investigations by the FTC are, not surprisingly, reluctant to reveal the existence of such an investigation publicly. While the immense breadth and vagueness of the ORs authorizing compulsory process in an investigation, the ease with which CIDs are issued, and the lack of a “belief of wrongdoing” requirement certainly mean that no wrongdoing *should* be inferred from the existence of an investigation or a CID, unfortunately public perception may not track these nuances. In the

⁹⁷ *Resolution Directing Use of Compulsory Process in a Nonpublic Investigation of Telemarketers, Sellers, Suppliers, or Others*, File No. 0123145 (Apr. 11, 2011), quoted in *In the Matter of December 12, 2012 Civil Investigative Demand Issue to the Western Union Company*, File No. 012 3145 (Mar. 4, 2013), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/petitions-quash/unnamed-telemarketers-others/130404westernunionpetition.pdf> (Citations omitted).

⁹⁸ *In the Matter of December 12, 2012 Civil Investigative Demand Issue to the Western Union Company* at 8. (Citing cases).

case of some publicly traded companies, the mere issuance of a CID may require disclosure.⁹⁹ But for other publicly traded companies and for all private companies such disclosure is not required. This means that, for these companies, there is an added deterrent to challenging a CID because doing so will cause it to be disclosed publicly when it otherwise would not be.

The combination of an exceedingly deferential standard of review, the need to exhaust administrative process before the very agency that issued the OR and CID *before* gaining access to an independent Article III tribunal, the risk of reputational harms, and the massive compliance costs combine to ensure that very few CIDs are ever challenged. This only reinforces FTC staff's incentives to issue CIDs, and to do so with an increasingly tenuous relationship to the Commission-approved resolution authorizing them.

The absence of effective oversight on this process creates a further problem. FTC staff have the power to issue Voluntary Access Letters requesting the same documents as a CID without *any* Commissioner involvement — or even (at least on paper) the possibility that a dissenting staff member can notify a Commissioner of her objections.¹⁰⁰ While these requests are nominally voluntary, the omnipresent threat of compelled discovery means that recipients virtually always comply with these requests, although they do often initiate a discussion between staff and recipients that may result in a narrowing of the requests' scope. Voluntary Access Letters are subject to even less scrutiny than CIDs, and there is virtually no way for any of the FTC's oversight bodies (Congress, the courts, the public, the executive branch, etc.) to monitor their use.

Investigations and Reporting on Investigations

The Clarifying Legality & Enforcement Action Reasoning (CLEAR) Act

While identifying the problems with the Commission's investigation and CID process is fairly straightforward, identifying solutions is not so straightforward. A critical first step, however, would be imposing greater transparency requirements on the Commission's investigation practices.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Deborah S. Birnbach, *Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investigation?*, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 21, 2016), <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/09/do-you-have-to-disclose-a-government-investigation/>.

¹⁰⁰ Again, Operating Manual Section 3.3.5.1.1 requires that “[d]issenting staff recommendations... be submitted to the Commission by the originating offices, upon the request of the staff member,” but does not include voluntary assistance letters in the list of covered subjects, only “compulsory process.”

Rep. Brett Guthrie’s (R-KY) proposed CLEAR Act (H.R. 5109)¹⁰¹ would require the FTC to report annually to Congress on the status of its investigations, including the legal analysis supporting the FTC’s decision to close some investigations without action. This requirement would not require the Commission to identify its targets, thus preserving the anonymity of the firms in question.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Better Reporting of FTC Enforcement Trends

The FTC used to provide somewhat clearer data on the number of enforcement actions it took every year, classifying each by product and “type of matter.”¹⁰² The FTC’s recent “Annual Highlights” reports do not include even this level of data on its enforcement actions.¹⁰³ But neither includes the basic data required by the CLEAR Act on the number of investigations commenced, closed, settled or litigated. Without hard data on this, it is difficult to assess how the FTC’s enforcement approach works, the relationship between the agency’s investigations and enforcement actions, and how these has changed over time. While the bill does not specifically mention consent decrees among the items that must be reported to Congress, it does require that the report include “the disposition of such investigations, if such investigations have concluded and resulted in official agency action,” which would include consent decrees.

RECOMMENDATION: Add Discovery Tools to the Required Reporting

The bill omits, however, one of the most important aspects of the FTC’s operations, which is very easily quantifiable: the FTC’s use of its various discovery tools. The FTC should, in addition, have to produce aggregate statistics on its use of discovery tools, excluding the specific identity of the target, but including, for example:

- The source of the investigation (*e.g.*, Omnibus Resolution, consumer complaint, etc.);
- The volume of discovery requested;
- The volume of discovery produced;
- The time elapsed between the initiation of the investigation and the request(s);
- The time elapsed between the request(s) and production;
- Estimated cost of compliance (as volunteered by the target);

¹⁰¹ The Clarifying Legality and Enforcement Action Reasoning Act, H.R. 5109, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter CLEAR Act] available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5109/text>.

¹⁰² See, *e.g.*, 1995 Annual Report at 49, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/annual-report-1995/ar1995_0.pdf.

¹⁰³ Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Annual Reports, <https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/ftc-annual-reports>.

- The specific tool(s) used to authorize the investigation and production request(s) (*e.g.*, Omnibus Resolution, CID, Voluntary Access Letter, etc.);
- Who approved the investigation and production request(s) (*e.g.*, a single Commissioner, the full Commission, the Bureau Director, the staff itself, etc.);
- The approximate size (number of employees) and annual revenues of the target business (to measure effects on small businesses); and
- The general nature of the issue(s) connected to the investigation and production request(s).

This reporting could be largely automated from the FTC database used to log investigations, discovery requests and resulting production of documents. And, of course, the FTC should have such a flexible and usable database if it does not already. Once created, it should be relatively easy to make the data public, as it will require little more than obscuring the identity of the target, putting the size of the company in ranges, and ensuring that the metadata identifying the relevant issues is sufficiently high level (*e.g.*, “data security” rather than “PED skimming”).

VALUE OF THE BILL: What is Not Prohibited Is a Crucial Form of Guidance

Clarity as to what the law does *not* prohibit may be a more important hallmark of the Evolutionary Model (the *true* common law), than is specificity as to what the law does prohibit.

The FTC used to issue closing letters regularly but stopped providing meaningful guidance at least since the start of this Administration. The FTC Operating Manual already requires staff to produce a memo justifying closure of any investigation that has gone beyond the initial stage, thus requiring the approval of the Bureau Directors to expand into a full investigation, that “summarize[s] the results of the investigation, discuss[es] the methodology used in the investigation, and explain[s] the rationale for the closing.”¹⁰⁴

In other words, the staff already, in theory, does the analysis that would be required by the bill (at least for cases that merit being continued beyond the 100 hours allowed for initial phase consumer protection investigations);¹⁰⁵ they simply do not share it. Thus, at most, the bill would require (i) greater rigor in the memoranda that staff already writes, (ii) that some version of memoranda be included in the annual report, edited to obscure the company’s identity, and (iii) that *some* analysis be written for initial phase cases that may be closed without any internal memoranda. And this last requirement should not be difficult for the staff to satisfy, since cases that did not merit full investigations ought to raise simpler legal issues.

¹⁰⁴ Operating Manual § 3.2.4.1.1 (consumer protection) & § 3.2.4.1.2 (competition)

¹⁰⁵ Operating Manual § 3.2.2.1.

For example, in 2007, the FTC issued a no-action letter closing its investigation into Dollar Tree Stores that offers a fair amount of background on the issue: “PED skimming,” the tampering with of payment card PIN entry devices (PEDs) used at checkout that allowed hackers to steal customers’ card information and thus make fraudulent purchases.¹⁰⁶ The FTC explained its decision to close the Dollar Tree Stores investigation at length, listing the factors considered by the FTC:

the extent to which the risk at issue was reasonable foreseeable at the time of the compromise; the nature and magnitude of the risk relative to other risks; the benefits relative to the costs of protecting against the risk; Dollar Tree’s overall data security practices, the duration and scope of the compromise; the level of consumer injury; and Dollar Tree’s prompt response to the incident.¹⁰⁷

The letter went on to note:

We continue to emphasize that data security is an ongoing process, and that as risks, technologies, and circumstances change over time, companies must adjust their information security programs accordingly. The staff notes that, in recent months, the risk of PED skimming at retail locations has been increasingly identified by security experts and discussed in a variety of public and business contexts. We also understand that some businesses have now taken steps to improve physical security to deter PED skimming, such as locking or otherwise securing PERs in checkout lanes; installing security cameras or other monitoring devices; performing regular PED inspections to detect tampering, theft, or other misuse; and/or replacing older PEDs with newer tamper-resistant and tamper-evident models. We hope and expect that all businesses using PEDs in their stores will consider implementing these and/or other reasonable and appropriate safeguards to secure their systems.¹⁰⁸

The FTC has issued only one closing letter in standard data security cases since its 2007 letter in *Dollar Tree Stores* — and, apparently, about the same issue. In 2011, the FTC issued a letter closing its investigation of the Michaels art supply store chain.¹⁰⁹ The letter offers essentially no information about the investigation or analysis of the issues involved — in marked contrast to the *Dollar Tree Stores* letter. But based on press reports from 2011, the issue appears to have been the same as in *Dollar Tree Stores*: “crooks [had] tampered with PIN

¹⁰⁶ Letter from Joel Winston, Associate Director of Fed. Trade Comm’n to Michael E. Burke, Esq., Counsel to Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (June 5, 2001) *available at* http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/dollar-tree-stores-inc./070605doltree.pdf.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director of Fed. Trade Comm’n to Lisa J. Sotto, Counsel to Michael’s Stores, Inc. (June 5, 2001) *available at* http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/michaels-stores-inc./120706michaelsstorescltr.pdf.

pads in the Michaels checkout lanes, allowing them to capture customers' debit card and PIN numbers.”¹¹⁰

Once again, the FTC has become increasingly unwilling to constrain its own discretion, even in the issuance of closing letters that do not bar the FTC from taking future enforcement actions. This underscores not only the value of the CLEAR Act, but also of the challenge in getting the FTC to take seriously the bill's requirement that annual reports include, “for each such investigation that was closed with no official agency action, a description sufficient to indicate the legal analysis supporting the Commission's decision not to continue such investigation, and the industry sectors of the entities subject to each such investigation.”¹¹¹

RECOMMENDATION: Require the Bureau of Economics to Be Involved

Wherever possible, Congress should specify that the Bureau of Economics be involved in the making of important decisions, and in the production of important guidance materials. Absent that instruction, the FTC, especially the Bureau of Consumer Protection, will likely resist fully involving the Bureau of Economics in its processes. The simplest way to make this change is as follows:

For each such investigation that was closed with no official agency action, a description sufficient to indicate the legal *and economic* analysis supporting the Commission's decision not to continue such investigation, and the industry sectors of the entities subject to each such investigation.

Of course, there will be many cases where the economists have essentially nothing to say. The point is not that each case merits detailed economic analysis. Rather, the recommendation is intended to ensure that, at the very least, the *opportunity* to produce and disseminate a basic economic analysis by the BE is built into the enforcement process.

Moreover, if an economic analysis is deemed appropriate, the determination of what constitutes an appropriate *level* of analysis should be made by the Bureau of Economics alone. For example, in the *Dollar Tree Stores* letter quoted above, it would have been helpful if the letter had provided *some* quantitative analysis as to the factors mentioned in the letter. To illustrate this point, one might ask the following questions about the factors identified in *Dollar Tree Stores*:

- “the extent to which the risk at issue was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the compromise” and “the nature and magnitude of the risk relative to other

¹¹⁰ Elisabeth Leamy, *Debit Card Fraud Investigation Involving Michaels Craft Stores PIN Pads Spreads to 20 US States*, ABC NEWS (May 13, 2011) available at <http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ConsumerNews/debit-card-fraud-michaels-crafts-customers-info-captured/story?id=13593607>.

¹¹¹ CLEAR Act, *supra* note 101.

risks” — *How widely known was the vulnerability generally at that time? How fast was awareness spreading among similarly situated companies? How likely was the vulnerability to occur?*

- “the benefits relative to the costs of protecting against the risk” — *Given the impossibility of completely eradicating risk, how much ex ante “protection” would have been sufficient? Given the ex ante uncertainty of any particular risk occurring, how much would it have cost to mitigate against all such risks, not just the one that actually materialized?*
- “Dollar Tree’s overall data security practices” — *How much did the company spend? How else do its practices compare to its peers? How can good data security be quantified?*
- “the duration and scope of the compromise” — *How long? How many users?*
- “the level of consumer injury” — *Can this be quantified specifically to this case? Or can injury be extrapolated from reliably representative samples of similar injury?*
- “Dollar Tree’s prompt response to the incident” — *Just how prompt was it, in absolute terms? And relative to comparable industry practice?*

Given the general scope of the FTC’s investigations, it likely already collects the kind of data that could allow it to answer some, if not all, of these questions (and others as well). It may even have performed some of the requisite analysis. Why should the Commission’s economists not have a seat at the table in writing the closing analysis? This could be perhaps the greatest opportunity to begin bringing the analytical rigor of law and economics to consumer protection.

Of course, the Commission may be (quite understandably) reluctant to include this data in company-specific closing letters — for the same reasons that investigations are supposed to remain confidential. But therein lies one of the chief virtues of the CLEAR Act: Instead of writing company-specific letters, the FTC could aggregate the information, obscure the identity of the company at issue in each specific case, and thus speak more freely about the details of its situation. Although the tension between the goals of providing analytical clarity and maintaining confidentiality for the subjects of investigation is obvious, it is not an insurmountable conflict, and thus no reason not to require more analysis and disclosure, in principle.

Finally, it is worth noting that if BE is to be competent in its participation in these investigations and the associated reports, it will need a larger staff of economists. Thus, as we discuss below, Congress should devote additional resources to the Commission that are specifically earmarked for hiring additional BE staff.¹¹²

¹¹² See *infra* note 123.

RECOMMENDATION: Attempt to Make the FTC Take the Analysis Requirement Seriously

We recommend that Congress emphasize *why* such reporting is important with something like the following language, added either to Congressional findings or made clear in the legislative history around the bill:

- Guidance from the Commission as to what is *not* illegal may be the most important form of guidance the Commission can offer; and
- To be truly useful, such guidance should hew closely the FTC’s applicable Policy Statements.

We further recommend that Congress carefully scrutinize the FTC’s annual reports issued under the CLEAR Act in oral discussions at hearings and in written questions for the record. Indeed, *not* doing so will indicate to the FTC that Congress is not really serious about demanding greater analytical rigor.

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that the Commission Organizes These Reports in a Useful Manner

The legal analysis section of the bill is markedly different from the other three sections. The first two sections require simple counts of investigations commenced and closed with no action. The third section (“disposition of such investigations, if such investigations have concluded and resulted in official agency action”) can be satisfied with a brief sentence for each (or less). But the fourth section requires long-form analysis, which could run many pages for each case.

At a minimum, the FTC should do more than it does today to make it easy to identify which closing letters are relevant. Today, the Commission’s web interface for closing letters is essentially useless. Letters are listed in reverse chronological order with no information provided other than the name, title and corporate affiliation of the person to whom the letter is addressed. There is no metadata to indicate what the letter is about (e.g., privacy, data security, advertising, product design) or what doctrinal issues (e.g., unfairness, deception, material omissions, substantiation) the letter confronts. Key word searches for, say, “privacy” or “data security” produce zero results.

The CLEAR Act offers Congress a chance to demand better of the Commission. Congress should communicate what a *useful* discussion of closing decisions might look like — whether by including specific instructions in legislation, by addressing the issue in legislative history, or simply (and probably least effectively in the long term) by raising the issue regularly with the FTC at hearings. For instance, the text in the FTC’s reports to Congress could be made publicly available in an online database tagged with metadata to make it easier for users to search for and find relevant closing letters.

Ideally, this database would be accessed through the same interface envisioned above for transparency into the FTC’s discovery process, and would include the same metadata and

search tools. Thus, a user might be able to search for FTC enforcement actions and discovery inquiries regarding, say, data security practices in small businesses, in order to get a better sense of how the FTC operates in that area.

RECOMMENDATION: Require the FTC to Synthesize Closing Decisions and Enforcement Decisions into Doctrinal Guidelines

When the FTC submitted the Unfairness Policy Statement to Congress, it noted, in its cover letter:

In response to your inquiry we have therefore undertaken a review of the decided cases and rules and have synthesized from them the most important principles of general applicability. Rather than merely reciting the law, we have attempted to provide the Committee with a concrete indication of the manner in which the Commission has enforced, and will continue to enforce, its unfairness mandate. In so doing we intend to address the concerns that have been raised about the meaning of consumer unfairness, and thereby attempt to provide a greater sense of certainty about what the Commission would regard as an unfair act or practice under Section 5.¹¹³

This synthesis is what the FTC needs to do now — and could get close to doing, in part, through better organized reporting on its closing decisions — only on a more specific level of the component elements of each of its Policy Statements. This is essentially what the various Antitrust Guidelines issued jointly by the DOJ and the FTC’s Bureau of Competition do. These are masterpieces of thematic organization. Consider, for example, from the 2000 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, this sample of the table of contents:

- 3.34 Factors Relevant to the Ability and Incentive of the Participants and the Collaboration to Compete
 - 3.34(a) Exclusivity
 - 3.34(b) Control over Assets
 - 3.34(c) Financial Interests in the Collaboration or in Other Participants
 - 3.34(d) Control of the Collaboration’s Competitively Significant Decision Making
 - 3.34(e) Likelihood of Anticompetitive Information Sharing
 - 3.34(f) Duration of the Collaboration
- 3.35 Entry
- 3.36 Identifying Procompetitive Benefits of the Collaboration
 - 3.36(a) Cognizable Efficiencies Must Be Verifiable and Potentially Procompetitive

¹¹³ UPS, *supra* note 9.

3.36(b) Reasonable Necessity and Less Restrictive Alternatives
3.37 Overall Competitive Effect¹¹⁴

The guidelines are rich with examples that illustrate the way the agencies will apply their doctrine. As noted in the introduction, these guidelines are one level down the Doctrinal Pyramid: They explain how the kind of concepts articulated at the high conceptual level of, say, the FTC’s UDAP policy statements, can actually be applied to real world circumstances.¹¹⁵

One obvious challenge is that the antitrust guidelines synthesize litigated cases, of which the FTC has precious few on UDAP matters. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the FTC to do *precisely* the same thing on UDAP matters as the antitrust guidelines do. But that does not mean the FTC could not benefit from writing “lessons learned” retrospectives on its past enforcement efforts and closing letters.

Importantly, publication of these guidelines would not actually be a constraint upon the FTC’s discretion; it would merely require the Commission to better explain the rationale for what it has done in the past, connecting that arc across time. Like policy statements and consent decrees, guidelines are not technically binding upon the agency. Yet, in practice, they would steer the Commission in a far more rigorous way than its vague “common law of consent decrees [or of congressional testimony or blog posts].” It would allow the FTC to build doctrine in an analytically rigorous way as a second-best alternative to judicial decision-making — and, of course, as a supplement to judicial decisions, to the extent they happen.

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that Defendants Can Quash Subpoenas Confidentially

Among the biggest deterrents to litigation today is companies’ reluctance to make public investigations aimed at them. But a company wishing to challenge the FTC’s overly broad investigative demands effectively must accede to public disclosure because the FTC has the discretion to make such fights public.

Specifically, FTC enforcement rules currently allow parties seeking to quash a subpoena to ask for confidential treatment for their motions to quash, but the rules also appear to set public disclosure as the default:

¹¹⁴ FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS ii (Apr. 2000), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.

¹¹⁵ *See supra* note 12.

(d) **Public disclosure.** All petitions to limit or quash Commission compulsory process and all Commission orders in response to those petitions shall become part of the public records of the Commission, except for information granted confidential treatment under § 4.9(c) of this chapter.¹¹⁶

The referenced general rule on confidentiality gives the FTC's General Counsel broad discretion in matters of confidentiality:

(c) Confidentiality and in camera material.

(1) Persons submitting material to the Commission described in this section may designate that material or portions of it confidential and request that it be withheld from the public record. All requests for confidential treatment shall be supported by a showing of justification in light of applicable statutes, rules, orders of the Commission or its administrative law judges, orders of the courts, or other relevant authority. **The General Counsel or the General Counsel's designee will act upon such request with due regard for legal constraints and the public interest.**¹¹⁷

Setting the default to public disclosure for such disputes is flatly inconsistent with the FTC's general policy of keeping investigations nonpublic:

While investigations are generally nonpublic, Commission staff may disclose the existence of an investigation to potential witnesses or other third parties to the extent necessary to advance the investigation.¹¹⁸

This is the right balance: Commission staff should *sometimes* be able to disclose aspects of an investigation. It should *not* be able to coerce a company into settling, or complying with additional discovery, in order to avoid bad press. Even if a company calculates that bad press is inevitable, if the FTC seems determined to extract a settlement, disclosing the investigation earlier can increase the direct expenses and reputational costs incurred by the company by stretching out the total length of the fight with the Commission for months or years longer.

¹¹⁶ 16 C.F.R. § 2.10(d).

¹¹⁷ 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(c)(1).

¹¹⁸ 16 C.F.R. § 2.6; *See also* Federal Trade Commission, *Operating Manual*, Section 3.3.1 (To promote orderly investigative procedures and to protect individuals or business entities under investigation from premature adverse publicity, the Commission treats the fact that a particular proposed respondent is under investigation and the documents and information submitted to or developed by staff in connection with the investigation as confidential information that can be released only in the manner and to the extent authorized by law and by the Commission. In general, even if a proposed respondent in a nonpublic investigation makes a public disclosure that an investigation is being conducted, Commission personnel may not acknowledge the existence of the investigation, or discuss its purpose and scope or the nature of the suspected violation.)

We propose that the default be switched, so that motions to quash are generally kept under seal except in exceptional circumstances.

Economic Analysis of Investigations, Complaints, and Consent Decrees

No Bill Proposed

The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics' (BE) role as an independent and expert analyst is one of the most critical features of the FTC's organizational structure in terms of enhancing its performance, expanding its substantive capabilities, and increasing the critical reputational capital the agency has available to promote its missions.¹¹⁹

Former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright, 2015

Commissioner Wright wrote as a veteran of both the Bureau of Economics and the Bureau of Competition. He was only the fourth economist to serve as FTC Commissioner (following Jim Miller, George Douglas and Dennis Yao) and the first JD/PhD. His 2015 speech, "On the FTC's Bureau of Economics, Independence, and Agency Performance," marked the beginning of an effort to bolster the role of the Bureau of Economics in the FTC's decision-making, especially in consumer protection matters. Wright warned, pointedly, that the FTC has "too many lawyers, too few economists," calling this "a potential threat to independence and agency performance."¹²⁰

Unfortunately, this was only a beginning: shortly after delivering this speech, Wright resigned from the Commission to return to teaching law and economics. For now, at least, the task of bolstering economic analysis at the Commission falls to Congress.

The RECS Act's proposal that BE be involved in any recommendation for new legislation or regulatory action is an important step towards this goal, but it is too narrow.¹²¹ It does not address the need to bolster the FTC's role in the institutional structure of the agency, or its role in enforcement decisions. The following chart (from Wright's speech) ably captures the first of these problems:


Number of Attorneys to Economists at the FTC from 2003 to 2013¹²²

¹¹⁹ Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, On the FTC's Bureau of Economics, Independence, and Agency Performance, at 1 (Aug. 6, 2015), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/695241/150806bestmtwright.pdf.

¹²⁰ *Id.* at 5.

¹²¹ *See infra* at 54.

¹²² Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, On the FTC's Bureau of Economics, Independence, and Agency Performance, *supra* note 119, at 6.



RECOMMENDATION: Hire More Economists

Wright recommends:

Hiring more full-time economists is one obvious fix to the ratio problem. There are many benefits to expanding the economic capabilities of the agency. Many cases simply cannot be adequately staffed with one or two staff economists. **Doubling the current size of BE** would be a good start towards aligning the incentives of the Commission and BE staff with respect to case recommendations. While too quickly increasing the size of BE staff might dilute quality, a gradual increase in staffing coupled with a pay increase and a commitment to research time should help to keep quality levels at least constant.¹²³

We wholeheartedly endorse former Commissioner Wright's recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION: Require BE to Comment Separately on Complaints and Consent Orders

In the case of complaints and consent orders issued by the Commission, we recommend that Congress require the Commission to amend its Rules of Practice to require that the Bureau of Economics provide a *separate* economic assessment of the complaint or consent order in conjunction with each. This proposal is consistent with former Commissioner Wright's similar recommendation:

¹²³ Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, On the FTC's Bureau of Economics, Independence, and Agency Performance, *supra* note 119, at 11.

I suggest the FTC consider interpreting or amending FTC Rule of Practice 2.34 to mandate that BE publish, in matters involving consent decrees, and as part of the already required “explanation of the provisions of the order and the relief to be obtained,” a separate explanation of the economic analysis of the Commission’s action. The documents associated with this rule are critical for communicating the role that economic analysis plays in Commission decision-making in cases. In many cases, public facing documents surrounding consents in competition cases simply do not describe well or at all the economic analysis conducted by staff or upon which BE recommended the consent.¹²⁴

In order to perform its desired function, this “separate explanation” would be authored and issued by the Bureau of Economics, and not subject to approval by the Commission. The document would express BE’s independent assessment (approval or rejection) of the Commission’s proposed complaint or consent order, provide a high-level description of the specific economic analyses and evidence relied upon in its own recommendation or rejection of the proposed consent order, and offer a more general economic rationale for its recommendation.

Requiring BE to make public its economic rationale for supporting or rejecting a complaint or consent decree voted out by the Commission would offer a number of benefits. In general, such an analysis would both inform the public and demand rigor of the Commission. As former Commissioner Wright noted,

First, it offers BE a public avenue to communicate its findings to the public. Second, it reinforces the independent nature of the recommendation that BE offers. Third, it breaks the agency monopoly the FTC lawyers currently enjoy in terms of framing a particular matter to the public. The internal leverage BE gains by the ability to publish such a document... will also provide BE a greater role in the consent process and a mechanism to discipline consents that are not supported by sound economics..., minimizing the “compromise” recommendation that is most problematic in matters involving consent decrees.¹²⁵

Wright explains this “compromise recommendation” problem in detail that bears extensive quotation and emphasis here:

Both BC attorneys and BE staff are responsible for producing a recommendation memo. The asymmetry is at least partially a natural result of the different nature of the work that lawyers and economists do. But it is important to note that one consequence of this asymmetry, whatever its cause, is that it creates the potential to weaken BE’s independence. BE maintains a high level of integrity and independence over core economic tasks – e.g., economic modeling and framing, statistical analyses, and assessments of outside economic work – yet when it comes

¹²⁴ *Id.* at 11-12.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 11.

to the actual policy recommendation, **I think it is fair to raise the question whether the Commission always receives unfiltered recommendations when BE dissents from the recommendation of BC or BCP staff.**

One example of this phenomenon is the so-called “compromise recommendation,” that is, a BE staff economist might recommend the FTC accept a consent decree rather than litigate or challenge a proposed merger when the underlying economic analysis reveals very little actual economic support for liability. In my experience, **it is not uncommon for a BE staff analysis to convincingly demonstrate that competitive harm is possible but unlikely, but for BE staff to recommend against litigation on those grounds, but in favor of a consent order.** The problem with this compromise approach is, of course, that a recommendation to enter into a consent order must also require economic evidence sufficient to give the Commission reason to believe that competitive harm is likely. This type of “compromise” recommendation in some ways reflects the reality of BE staff incentives. Engaging in a prolonged struggle over the issue of liability with BC and BC management is exceedingly difficult when the economist is simply outmanned. It also ties up already scarce BE resources on a matter that the parties are apparently “willing” to settle.¹²⁶

The ability of BC or BCP staff to dilute the analysis of BE staffers in a combined compromise recommendation renders moot this provision of the operating manual:

Dissenting staff recommendations regarding compulsory process, compliance, consent agreements, proposed trade regulation rules or proposed industrywide investigations should be submitted to the Commission by the originating offices, upon the request of the staff member.¹²⁷

For this provision to have any effect, there must be a separate dissenting staff recommendation that can be seen by Commissioners — and, ideally, also made public.

RECOMMENDATION: Require BE to Comment on Upgrading Investigations

Similarly, we recommend enhancing BE’s role earlier in the investigation process: at the point where the Bureau Director decides whether to upgrade an initial (Phase I) investigation to a full investigation. This is a critical inflection point in the FTC’s investigative process for three reasons:

1. In principle, the staff is not supposed to negotiate consent decrees during the initial investigation phase;
2. In principle, the staff is not supposed to use compulsory discovery process during the initial investigation phase, meaning a target company’s cooperation until this point is at least theoretically voluntary; and

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 7-8.

¹²⁷ Operating Manual § 3.3.5.1.1.

3. Either the decision to open a formal investigation or the subsequent issuance of CIDs may trigger a public company's duty to disclose the investigation in its quarterly securities filings.

It is also likely the point at which the staff determines (or at least begins to seriously consider) whether or not the Commission is likely to approve a staff recommendation to issue a complaint against any of the specific targets of the investigation.

For all these reasons, converting an initial investigation to a full investigation gives the staff enormous power to coerce a settlement. This decision deserves far more rigorous analysis than it currently seems to receive.

When the BC or BCP staff proposes to their Bureau director that an initial investigation be expanded into a full investigation, the FTC Operating Manual requires a (confidential) memorandum justifying a decision, but does *not* formally require the Bureau of Economics, or require that the analysis performed by any FTC staff correspond to two of the three requirements of Section 5(n) or the materiality requirement of the Deception Policy Statement:

3.5.1.4 Transmittal Memorandum

The memorandum requesting approval for full investigation should clearly and succinctly explain the need for approval of the full investigation, including a discussion of relevant factors among the following:

- (1) A description of the practices and their impact on consumers and/or on the marketplace;
- (2) Marketing area and volume of business of the proposed respondent and the overall size of the market;
- (3) Extent of consumer injury inflicted by the practices to be investigated, the benefits to be achieved by the Commission action and/or the extent of competitive injury;
- (4) When applicable, an explanation of how the proposed investigation meets objectives and, where adopted, case selection criteria or the program to which it has been assigned;
- (5) When applicable, responses to the policy protocol questions (see OM Ch. 2);¹²⁸

We recommend modifying this in two ways. First, while approving a complaint or a consent decree should absolutely require a separate recommendation from the Bureau of Economics, requiring such a recommendation merely to convert an initial investigation to a full investigation might well pose too great a burden on BE's already over-taxed resources. But that is no reason why the FTC rules should not at least give BE the *opportunity* to write a

¹²⁸ Operating Manual § 3.3.5.1.4 (emphasis added).

separate memorandum if it so desires. Having this written recommendation shared with Commissioners would serve as an early warning system, alerting them to potentially problematic cases being investigated by BCP or BC staff *before* the staff has extracted a consent decree — something that regularly has effectively happened by the time the Commission votes on whether to authorize a complaint. Thus, giving BE the opportunity to be involved at this early stage may be critical to scrutinizing the FTC’s use of consent decrees.

Second, there is no reason that the memorandum prepared by either BC or BCP staff should not correspond to the doctrinal requirements of the relevant authority. The Operating Manual falls well short of this by merely requiring some analysis of the “[e]xtent of consumer injury.” Why not countervailing benefit and reasonable avoidability, too, for Unfairness cases? And materiality in Deception cases? And the various other factors subsumed in the consumer welfare standard of the rule of reason, for Unfair Methods of Competition Cases?

That this would be only an *initial* analysis that will remain confidential under the Commission’s rules is all the more reason it should not be a problem for the Staff to produce.

Economic Analysis in Reports & “Recommendations”

The Revealing Economic Conclusions for Suggestions (RECS) Act

Rep. Mike Pompeo’s (R-KS) bill (H.R. 5136)¹²⁹ would require the FTC to include, in “any recommendations for legislative or regulatory action,” analysis from the Bureau of Economics including:

[T]he rationale for the Commission’s determination that private markets or public institutions could not adequately address the issue, and that its recommended legislative or regulatory action is based on a reasoned determination that the benefits of the recommended action outweigh its costs.

Valuable as this is, the bill should be expanded to encompass other Commission pronouncements that aren’t, strictly, “recommendations for legislative or regulatory action.”

VALUE OF THE BILL: Bringing Rigor to FTC Reports, Testimony, etc.

The lack of economic analysis in support of “recommendations for legislative or regulatory action” has grown more acute with time — not only in the FTC’s reports but also in its testimony to Congress.

Section 6(b) of the FTC Act gives the Commission the authority “to conduct wide-ranging economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose” and to require the

¹²⁹ The Revealing Economic Conclusions for Suggestions Act, H.R. 5136, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter RECS Act] available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5136/text>.

filing of “annual or special ... reports or answers in writing to specific questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals” of any company over which the FTC has jurisdiction, except insurance companies. This section is a useful tool for better understanding business practices, particularly those undergoing rapid technological change. But it is only as valuable as the quality of the analyses these 6(b) reports contain. And typically they are fairly short on economic analysis, especially concerning consumer protection matters.

The FTC has consistently failed to include any apparent, meaningful role for the Bureau of Economics in its consumer protection workshops or in the drafting of the subsequent reports. Nor has the FTC explored the adequacy of existing legal tools to address concerns raised by its reports. For example, the FTC’s 2014 workshop, “Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?,” included not a single PhD economist or BE staffer.¹³⁰ The resulting 2016 report includes essentially just two footnotes on economics.¹³¹ Commissioner Ohlhau-
sen dissented, noting that

Concerns about the effects of inaccurate data are certainly legitimate, but policymakers must evaluate such concerns in the larger context of the market and economic forces companies face. Businesses have strong incentives to seek accurate information about consumers, whatever the tool. Indeed, businesses use big data specifically to increase accuracy. Our competition expertise tells us that if one company draws incorrect conclusions and misses opportunities, competitors with better analysis will strive to fill the gap....

To understand the benefits and risks of tools like big data analytics, we must also consider the powerful forces of economics and free-market competition. If we give undue credence to hypothetical harms, we risk distracting ourselves from genuine harms and discouraging the development of the very tools that promise new benefits to low income, disadvantaged, and vulnerable individuals. Today’s report enriches the conversation about big data. My hope is that future participants in this conversation will test hypothetical harms with economic reasoning and empirical evidence.¹³²

¹³⁰ Fed. Trade Comm’n, Public Workshop: Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? (Sep. 15, 2014), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/09/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion>.

¹³¹ FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES FTC REPORT (2016), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf>

¹³² *Id.* at A-1 to A-2.

The Commission's 2016 PrivacyCon conference did include several economists on a panel devoted to the "Economics of Privacy & Security."¹³³ But, as one of the event's discussants, Geoffrey Manne, noted:

One of the things I would say is that it's a little bit unfortunate we don't have more economists and engineers talking to each other. As you might have gathered from the last panel, an economist will tell you that merely identifying a problem isn't a sufficient basis for regulating to solve it, nor does the existence of a possible solution mean that that solution should be mandated. And you really need to identify real harms rather than just inferring them, as James Cooper pointed out earlier. And we need to give some thought to self-help and reputation and competition as solutions before we start to intervene....

So we've talked all day about privacy risks, biases in data, bad outcomes, problems, but we haven't talked enough about beneficial uses that these things may enable. So deriving policy prescriptions from these sort of lopsided discussions is really perilous.

Now, there's an additional problem that we have in this forum as well, which is that the FTC has a tendency to find justification for enforcement decisions in things that are mentioned at workshops just like these. So that makes it doubly risky to be talking [] about these things without pointing out that there are important benefits here, and that the costs may not be as dramatic as it seems [just] because we're presenting these papers describing them.¹³⁴

As Manne notes, as a practical matter, these workshops and reports are often used by the Commission either to make legislative recommendations or to define FTC enforcement policy by recommending industry best practices (which the agency will effectively enforce). But, again, because they lack much in the way of economically rigorous analysis, these recommendations may not be as well-founded as they may be presumed to be.

In its 2000 Report to Congress, for example, the FTC called for comprehensive baseline legislation on privacy and data security.¹³⁵ Congress has not passed such legislation, but the FTC repeated the recommendation in its 2012 Privacy Report.¹³⁶ While that Report called

¹³³ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Conference: PrivacyCon* (Jan. 14, 2016), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/01/privacycon>.

¹³⁴ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Transcript of the Remarks of Geoffrey A. Manne*, 19 (Jan. 14, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/videos/privacycon-part-5/ftc_privacycon_transcript_segment_5.pdf#page=18.

¹³⁵ FED. TRADE COMM'N, *PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE* (2000), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf>.

¹³⁶ FED. TRADE COMM'N, *PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS* (2012), available at

(cont.)

for significantly stricter legislation, less tied to consumer harm, it did *not* include any economic analysis by the FTC's Bureau of Economics. Indeed, by rejecting the harms-based model of the 2000 Report,¹³⁷ the 2012 report essentially dismisses the *relevance* of economic analysis, either in the report itself or in case-by-case adjudication.

In his dissent, Commissioner Rosch warned about the Report's reliance on unfairness rather than deception, noting that "'Unfairness' is an elastic and elusive concept. What is 'unfair' is in the eye of the beholder...."¹³⁸ In effect, Rosch, despite his long-standing hostility to economic analysis,¹³⁹ was really saying that the Commission had failed to justify its *analysis* of unfairness. Rosch objected to the Commission's invocation of unfairness against harms that have not been clearly analyzed:

That is not how the Commission itself has traditionally proceeded. To the contrary, the Commission represented in its 1980, and 1982 [sic], Statements to Congress that, absent deception, it will not generally enforce Section 5 against alleged intangible harm. In other contexts, the Commission has tried, through its advocacy, to convince others that our policy judgments are sensible and ought to be adopted.¹⁴⁰

Rosch contrasted the Report's reliance on unfairness with the Commission's Unfair Methods of Competition doctrine, which he called "self-limiting" because it was tied to analysis of market power.¹⁴¹ Rosch lamented that,

There does not appear to be any such limiting principle applicable to many of the recommendations of the Report. If implemented as written, many of the Report's recommendations would instead apply to almost all firms and to most information collection practices. It would install "Big Brother" as the watchdog over these practices not only in the online world but in the offline world. That is not only paternalistic, but it goes well beyond what the Commission said in the early 1980s that it would do, and well beyond what Congress has permitted the Commission to do under Section 5(n). I would instead stand by what we have said

<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf>.

¹³⁷ PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, *supra* note 135.

¹³⁸ PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, *supra* note 136, at C-3.

¹³⁹ See e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, *Litigating Merger Challenges: Lessons Learned* (June 2, 2008), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/litigating-merger-challenges-lessons-learned/080602litigatingmerger.pdf ("any kind of economic analyses that require the use of mathematical formulae are of little persuasive value in the courtroom setting;" "when I see an economic formula my eyes start to glaze over."); See generally Joshua Wright, *Commissioner Rosch v. Economics, Again*, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Oct. 7, 2008), available at <https://truthonthemarket.com/2008/10/07/commissioner-rosch-v-economics-again/>.

¹⁴⁰ PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, *supra* note 136, at C-4.

¹⁴¹ *Id.* at C-5.

and challenge information collection practices, including behavioral tracking, only when these practices are deceptive, “unfair” within the strictures of Section 5(n) and our commitments to Congress, or employed by a firm with market power and therefore challengeable on a stand-alone basis under Section 5’s prohibition of unfair methods of competition.¹⁴²

The proposed bill would help to correct these defects, and to ensure that FTC Reports, at least those containing legislative or rulemaking recommendations, are based on the rigorous analysis that should be expected of an expert investigative agency’s policymaking — especially one that has arguably the greatest pool of economic talent found anywhere in government in America.

RECOMMENDATION: Require Analysis of Recommended Industry Best Practices

In this regard the proposed bill would be enormously beneficial, but it could, and should, do significantly more.

First and foremost, the term “recommendations for legislative or regulatory action” would not encompass the most significant FTC recommendations: those included in “industry best practices” publications and reports produced by the Commission. These documents purport to offer expert suggestions for businesses to follow in order to help them to protect consumer welfare and to better comply with the relevant laws and regulations. But the FTC increasingly treats these recommendations as soft law, not merely helpful guidance, in at least two senses:

1. The FTC uses these recommendations as the basis for writing its 20-year consent-decree requirements, including ones unrelated, or only loosely related, to the conduct at issue in an enforcement action; and
2. The FTC uses these recommendations as the substantive basis for enforcement actions — for example, by pointing to a company’s failure to do something the FTC recommended as evidence of the unreasonableness of its practices.

Former Chairman Tim Muris notes this about the “voluntary” guidelines issued by the FTC in 2009 in conjunction with three other federal agencies, comparing them to the FTC’s efforts to ban advertising to children:

The FTC has been down this road before. Prodded by consumer activists in the late 1970s, the Commission sought to stop advertising to children...

One difference between the current proposal and the old rulemaking — called Kid Vid — is that this time the agencies are suggesting that the standards be adopted “voluntarily” by industry. Yet can standards suggested by a government

¹⁴² *Id.*

claiming the power to regulate truly be “voluntary”? Moreover, at the same workshop that the standards were announced, a representative of one of the same activist organizations that inspired the 1970s efforts speculated that a failure to comply with the new proposal would provoke calls for rules or legislation.¹⁴³

Regulation by leering glare is still regulation.

Informed by the trauma of its near-fatal confrontation with Congress at the end of the Carter administration, the FTC was long skittish about making recommendations for businesses in its reports, beyond high level calls for attention to issues like data security. That changed in 2009, however. The FTC has since issued a flurry of reports recommending best practices like “privacy by design” and “security by design,” first generally, and then across a variety of areas, from Big Data to facial recognition.¹⁴⁴

The FTC’s recommendations to industry in its 2005 report on file-sharing were admirably circumspect:

Industry should decrease risks to consumers through technological innovation and development, industry self-regulation (including risk disclosures), and consumer education.¹⁴⁵

This is not to say that the FTC could not or should not have done more to address the very real problem of inadvertent online file-sharing. Indeed, one of the authors of this report has lauded the (Democratic-led) FTC for bringing its 2011 enforcement action against Frostwire¹⁴⁶ for designing its peer-to-peer file-sharing software in a way that deceived users into unwittingly sharing files.¹⁴⁷ Rather, it is simply to say that the FTC, in 2005, understood that a report was not a substitute for a rulemaking — *i.e.*, not an appropriate place to make “recommendations” for the private sector that would have any force of law.

By 2012 the FTC had lost any such scruples. Its Privacy Report, issued that year, is entitled “Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers.” The title says it all: The FTC di-

¹⁴³ *Statement of Timothy J. Muris, supra* note 14, at 11-13.

¹⁴⁴ BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION, *supra* note 131; FED TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES (2012), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-common-uses-facial-recognition-technologies/121022facialtechrpt.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ FED. TRADE COMM’N, PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ISSUES (2005), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/peer-peer-file-sharing-technology-consumer-protection-and-competition-issues/050623p2prpt.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Frostwire LLC, FTC File No. 112 3041, <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/112-3041/frostwire-llc-angel-leon> (2011).

¹⁴⁷ *Prepared Statement of Berin Szóka, President of TechFreedom: Hearing Before the H. Energy & Commerce Comm. 112th Cong. (2012), 23, available at* https://techliberation.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Testimony_CMT_03.29.12_Szoka.pdf.

rected its sweeping recommendations for “privacy by design” to both the companies it regulates and the elected representatives the FTC supposedly serves:

The final privacy framework is intended to articulate best practices for companies that collect and use consumer data. These best practices can be useful to companies as they develop and maintain processes and systems to operationalize privacy and data security practices within their businesses. The final privacy framework contained in this report is also intended to assist Congress as it considers privacy legislation.¹⁴⁸

Of course, the FTC added:

To the extent the framework goes beyond existing legal requirements, the framework is not intended to serve as a template for law enforcement actions or regulations under laws currently enforced by the FTC.¹⁴⁹

Also noteworthy is the contrast between the two reports in their analytical rigor. The file sharing report noted:

The workshop panelists and public comments did not provide a sufficient basis to conclude whether the degree of risk associated with P2P file-sharing programs is greater than, equal to, or less than the degree of risk when using other Internet technologies.¹⁵⁰

The 2012 report shows no such modesty, as Commissioner Rosch lamented in his dissent (“There does not appear to be any such limiting principle applicable to many of the recommendations of the Report.”).¹⁵¹

In 2015, Commissioner Wright expressed dismay at this same problem in his dissent from the staff report on the Internet of Things Workshop:

I dissent from the Commission’s decision to authorize the publication of staff’s report on its Internet of Things workshop (“Workshop Report”) because the Workshop Report includes a lengthy discussion of industry best practices and recommendations for broad-based privacy legislation without analytical support to establish the likelihood that those practices and recommendations, if adopted, would improve consumer welfare....

First..., merely holding a workshop — without more — should rarely be the sole or even the primary basis for setting forth specific best practices or legislative recommendations....

¹⁴⁸ PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, *supra* note 136, at iii.

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at vii.

¹⁵⁰ PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY, *supra* note 145, at 12.

¹⁵¹ PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, *supra* note 136, at C-5.

Second, the Commission and our staff must actually engage in a rigorous cost-benefit analysis prior to disseminating best practices or legislative recommendations, given the real world consequences for the consumers we are obligated to protect....

The most significant drawback of the concepts of “security by design” and other privacy-related catchphrases is that they do not appear to contain any meaningful analytical content.... An economic and evidence-based approach sensitive to [] tradeoffs is much more likely to result in consumer-welfare enhancing consumer protection regulation. To the extent concepts such as security by design or data minimization are endorsed at any cost — or without regard to whether the marginal cost of a particular decision exceeds its marginal benefits — then application of these principles will result in greater compliance costs without countervailing benefit. Such costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or less useful products, as well as potentially deter competition and innovation among firms participating in the Internet of Things.¹⁵²

The point illustrated by comparing these examples is the difficulty inherent in trying to require greater rigor from the FTC in recommendations to businesses when those recommendations can be either high level and commonsensical (as in 2005) or sweeping and effectively regulatory (as in 2012 and 2015). Thus, we recommend the following simple amendment to the proposed bill:

[The FTC] shall not submit any *proposed industry best practices, industry guidance or* recommendations for legislative or regulatory action without [analysis]....

This wording would not apply to the kind of “recommendation” that the FTC made occasionally before 2009, as exemplified by the 2005 report. In any event, the bill’s requirement is easily satisfied: essentially the FTC need only give the Bureau of Economics a role in drafting the report. Because this recommendation would not hamstring the FTC’s enforcement actions, nor tie the FTC up in court, it should not be controversial, even if applied to proposed industry best practices and guidance.

Our proposed amendment would be simpler than attempting to broaden the definition of “regulatory action” beyond just rulemakings (which is how the FTC would likely limit its interpretation of the bill as drafted now) to include the kind of “regulatory action” that matters most: its use of reports to indicate how it will regulate through case by case enforcement, *i.e.*, its “common law of consent decrees.”

¹⁵² Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, *Issuance of The Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World Staff Report* (Jan. 27, 2015) (emphasis added), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/620701/150127iotjdwtmt.pdf.

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify the Bill's Language to Ensure It Applies to All FTC Reports

Another important difference between the 2000 and 2012 privacy reports is that the 2000 report is labelled “A Report to Congress,” while the 2012 report is not and, indeed, barely mentions Congress. This reflects a little-noticed aspect of the way Section 6(f) is currently written, with subsection numbers added for clarity:

(f) Publication of information; reports

To [i] make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest; and to [ii] make annual and special reports to the Congress and to submit therewith recommendations for additional legislation; and to [iii] provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use.¹⁵³

In other words, the Commission has shifted from relying upon 6(f)(ii) to 6(f)(i) and (iii). This distinction may seem unimportant, but it may cause the bill as drafted to be rendered meaningless, because the way it is worded could be read to apply only to 6(f)(ii). The bill would amend the existing proviso in Section 6(f) as follows:

Provided [t]hat the Commission shall not submit any recommendations for legislative or regulatory action without an economic analysis by the Bureau of Economics....

The use of the words “submit” and “recommendations” clearly tie this proviso to 6(f)(ii). Thus, the FTC could claim that it need not include the analysis required by the bill unless it is specifically submitting recommendations to Congress, which it simply does not do anymore.

Instead we propose the following slight tweak to the bill's wording, to ensure that it would apply to the entirety of Section 6(f):

Provided [t]hat the Commission shall not *make* any recommendations for legislative or regulatory action without an economic analysis by the Bureau of Economics...

This would require the participation of the Bureau of Economics in *all* FTC reports (that make qualifying recommendations), whatever their form. It would also require BE's participation in at least two other contexts where such recommendations are likely to be made: (i) Congressional testimony and (ii) the competition advocacy filings the Commission makes with state and local regulatory and legislative bodies, and with other federal regulatory

¹⁵³ 15 U.S.C. § 46(f)

agencies. This is a feature, not a bug: participation by BE is not something to be minimized; it should be woven into the fabric of *all* of the FTC’s activities. As we have noted previously:

The most important, most welfare-enhancing reform the FTC could undertake is to better incorporate sound economic- and evidence-based analysis in both its substantive decisions as well as in its process. While the FTC has a strong tradition of economics in its antitrust decision-making, its record in using economics in other areas is mixed.¹⁵⁴

Because the bill does not in any way create a cause of action against the FTC for failing to comply with the requirement, it will not hamstring the FTC if the agency fails to take the bill’s requirements seriously. That, if anything, is a weakness of the bill, but it is largely inevitable. It will always be up to the discretion of the Commission itself (subject, of course, to congressional oversight) to decide how much “economic analysis” is “sufficient” under the bill.

RECOMMENDATION: Require a Supermajority of Commissioners to Decide What Analysis is “Sufficient”

As written, the bill might do little more than shame the Chairman into involving the Bureau of Economics somewhat more in the writing of reports and the workshops that lead to them — if only because the bill might embolden a single Commissioner to object to the FTC’s lack of analysis, as Commissioner Wright objected to the FTC’s Internet of Things report.¹⁵⁵ This change in incentives for the Chairman and other commissioners, alone, may not significantly improve the analytical quality of the FTC’s reports, given the hostility of the Bureau of Consumer Protection to economic analysis, although having *any* involvement by BE would certainly be an improvement.

Again, the question of “sufficiency” is inherently something that will be left to the Commission’s discretion, but there is no principled reason that it has to be resolved through simple majority votes. On the other hand, giving a single Commissioner the right to veto an FTC “recommendation” as lacking a “sufficient” analytical basis might go too far.

We recommend striking a balance by requiring a supermajority (majority plus one, except in the case of a three-member Commission) of Commissioners to approve of the sufficiency of the analysis — essentially that this vote be taken, or at least recorded, separately from the vote on the issuance of the report itself. (The “sufficiency” vote would not stop the FTC from issuing a report.) At the same time, we recommend that the outcome of the “sufficien-

¹⁵⁴ Geoffrey A. Manne, *Humility, Institutional Constraints and Economic Rigor: Limiting the FTC’s Discretion*, ICLE White Paper 2014-1 (Feb. 28, 2014) at 4, available at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20140228/101812/HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-ManneG-20140228-SD002.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ See *Issuance of The Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World Staff Report*, *supra* note 152, at 4.

cy” vote be disclosed on the first page of all reports or other documents containing recommendations.

Such a mechanism would effectively expand the set of options for which Commissioners could vote, enabling them to express subtler degrees of preference without constraining them, as now, into making the binary choice between approving or rejecting a recommendation *in toto*. In other words, while the cost of expressing disapproval today, in the form of a dissent from a report, may be too high in some cases (especially for Commissioners in the majority party), the cost of expressing disapproval for the sufficiency of analysis without vetoing an entire report would be much lower. Allowing such a vote, and publishing its results, would offer important information to the public. It would also increase the leverage of commissioners most concerned with ensuring that FTC recommendations are supported by sufficient rigor to influence the content and conclusions of FTC reports and similar documents.

In cases where the three-member majority feels the two-member minority’s objections to analytical rigor are merely a pretense for objections to the recommendations themselves, the bill as we envision it would do nothing to stop the majority from issuing its recommendations anyway, of course; the “sufficiency” vote in this sense may sometimes be merely an expression of preference. Nonetheless, the majority Commissioners would likely be compelled to do more to explain why they believe the analysis included in support of a recommendation is sufficient, and why the minority is conflating its own policy views with the question of analytical sufficiency. These would also be valuable additions to the public’s understanding of the basis for Commission recommendations

The virtue of our proposed approach is that it would further lower the bar for the Commission to do something it ought to do anyway: involve the Bureau of Economics in its decision-making.

RECOMMENDATION: Codify Congress’s Commitment to Competition Advocacy

As we propose amending the RECS Act, consistent with the spirit with which we believe the bill is intended, BE would also have to be involved in any competition advocacy filings made by the FTC. Again, we believe this is all for the good. But it might, on the margin, discourage the FTC from issuing such filings in the first place — something we believe the FTC already does not do enough of. Thus, as discussed below, we recommend that Congress do more to encourage competition advocacy filings by the FTC.¹⁵⁶ At minimum, this means amending Section 6 to provide specific statutory authority for competition advocacy, something the FTC only vaguely divines from the Section today. As the text stands today, this authority is far from apparent, especially because the current Section 6 makes reference

¹⁵⁶ See *infra* note 87.

to “recommendations” only with respect to *Congress* in what we above refer to as Section 6(f)(ii).

Other Sources of Enforcement Authority (Guidelines, etc.)

The Solidifying Habitual & Institutional Explanations of Liability & Defenses (SHIELD) Act

Rep. Mike Pompeo’s (R-KS) bill (H.R. 5118)¹⁵⁷ clarifies what is already black letter law: agency guidelines do not create any binding legal obligations, either upon regulated companies or the FTC. This means the FTC can bring enforcement actions outside the bounds of its Unfairness and Deception Policy Statements, its Unfair Methods of Competition Enforcement Policy Statement, and its regulations promulgated under other statutes enforced by the Commission (*e.g.*, the “Safeguards Rule,” promulgated under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)¹⁵⁸ unless Congress codifies the Statements in the statute. The only substantively operative provision of the bill is section (B), which provides that:

Compliance with any guidelines, general statement of policy, or similar guidance issued by the Commission may be used as evidence of compliance with the provision of law under which the guidelines, general statement of policy, or guidance was issued.

This does not create a formal safe harbor; it merely allows companies targeted by the FTC to cite FTC’s past guidance in their defense. This should be uncontroversial.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Increasing Legal Certainty and Decreasing the Coercive Regulatory Effect of the FTC’s Soft Law

The bill would accomplish two primary goals. First, it would formally bar the FTC from doing something it has likely been doing in practice for some time: treating its own informal guidance as quasi-regulatory. To the extent that the Commission actually does so, it would effectively be circumventing the safeguards Congress imposed in 1980 upon the FTC’s Section 5 rulemaking powers by amending the FTC Improvement Act of 1975 (commonly called “Magnuson-Moss”).¹⁵⁹ But of course, for exactly this reason, the Commission would

¹⁵⁷ Solidifying Habitual and Institutional Explanations of Liability and Defenses Act, H.R. 5118, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter SHIELD Act], *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5118/text>.

¹⁵⁸ Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.

¹⁵⁹ The term Magnuson-Moss is inapt for two reasons. First, as former Chairman Muris explains, “Although within the Commission these procedures are uniformly referred to as ‘Magnuson Moss,’ in fact, the procedures are contained within Title II of the Magnuson Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975. Only Title I involved the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act...” *Statement of Timothy J. Muris, supra* note

(cont.)

never *admit* that this is what it is doing when its enforcement agenda just happens to line up with its previous recommendations.

More clear and more troubling is that, in the *LabMD* case, the Commission argued that the company, a small cancer testing lab, had committed an unfair trade practice sometime between 2006 and 2008 by failing to take “reasonable” measures to prevent the installation and operation of peer-to-peer file-sharing software on its network, which made patient billing information accessible to Tiversa, a company with specialized tools capable of scouring P2P networks for sensitive information. Crucial to the FTC’s Complaint was its allegation that:

Since at least 2005, security professionals and others (including the Commission) have warned that P2P applications present a risk that users will inadvertently share files on P2P networks.¹⁶⁰

The Commission was referring, obliquely, to its 2005 report,¹⁶¹ which offered this rather unhelpful suggestion to affected companies:

Industry should decrease risks to consumers through technological innovation and development, industry self-regulation (including risk disclosures), and consumer education.

Not until January 2010 did the FTC issue “Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business”¹⁶² — about the same time, it appears, that the FTC undertook its investigation of LabMD. The SHIELD Act would clearly bar the FTC from pointing to its own past guidance as creating a legal trigger for liability. The Commission’s assessment of “reasonableness” would have to be proven through other factors; indeed, since “reasonable” is found nowhere in Section 5 or even in the Unfairness Policy Statement, the Commission would have to prove the underlying elements of unfairness, without shortcutting this analysis by oblique reference to its own past reports.

A related concern is the Commission’s application of rules promulgated in one context, in which they have binding authority, to other contexts in which they do not. The most striking example of this practice is the Commission’s use of the Safeguards Rule, which “applies to the handling of customer information by all financial institutions over which the [FTC]

14, at 22, n. 44. Second, the safeguards at issue were adopted in 1980, not 1975, when “Mag-Moss” was passed.

¹⁶⁰ Complaint, In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., Docket No. 9357 at 4, *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/130829labmdpart3.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY, *supra* note 145.

¹⁶² Fed. Trade, Comm’n, *Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business* (Jan. 2010), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-business>.

has jurisdiction,”¹⁶³ to define unfair data security practices, and the remedies applied by the FTC in consent decrees, outside the financial sector. Although the Safeguards Rule has regulatory authority for financial institutions, its authority is no different than informal guidance (or recommended “best practices”) the Commission offers for everyone else. Nevertheless, the Commission has imposed remedies virtually identical to the Safeguards Rule in nearly every data security consent order into which it has entered.

[T]he majority of the FTC’s [data security] cases, regardless of cause of action or facts, impose the same remedy: the set of security standards laid out in the FTC’s Safeguards Rule. Most notably, this is true regardless of whether the respondents were financial institutions (to which the Safeguards Rule directly applies) or not (to which the Rule has no direct application), and regardless of whether the claim is generally one of deception or unfairness.¹⁶⁴

Second, the SHIELD Act would allow companies to raise their compliance with FTC guidance as part of their defense. This would, at a minimum, help encourage companies to resist settling legally questionable or analytically unsupported enforcement actions.

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify that Consent Decrees, Reports, and FTC Best Practices are not Binding

We propose expanding the bill’s language slightly to ensure that it achieves its intended goal:

No guidelines, general statements of policy, *consent decrees, settlements, reports, recommended best practices*, or similar guidance issued by the Commission shall confer any right.

As should be clear by now, these other forms of soft law are the most important aspects of the FTC’s discretionary model, especially given the paucity of policy statements (building upon the three major ones, such as on materiality, for example) or issue-specific “Guides.”

Specifically, the Commission regularly applies its recommended best practices (grouped under catchphrases like “privacy by design” and “security by design”) as mandatory company-specific regulations in consent decrees that are themselves applied, in cookie-cutter fashion, across enforcement actions brought against companies that differ greatly in their circumstances, and regardless of the nature or extent of the injury or the specific facts of their case.

Second, the *LabMD* case provides at least one clear example wherein the FTC has treated its own previous reports, making vague recommendations about the need for better industry data security practices (regarding peer-to-peer file-sharing), as a critical part of the trigger for

¹⁶³ 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(b).

¹⁶⁴ Manne & Sperry, *supra* note 52, at 20.

legal liability.¹⁶⁵ We suspect this is the tip of the iceberg — that the FTC in fact does this kind of thing quite often, but usually does not have to admit it, because it is able to settle cases without revealing its legal arguments. Only in the *LabMD* case (one of the first (of two) data security cases to be litigated after more than a decade of FTC consent decrees in this area) did the Commission have to make the connection between its previous “recommendations” and its application of Section 5. Even here, in its *LabMD* Complaint, it should be noted, the Commission did not specifically cite its 2005 P2P file-sharing report, but instead vaguely alluded to it — suggesting that even FTC staff were wary of revealing this connection.

RECOMMENDATION: Specify When a Defendant May Raise Evidence of Its Compliance with FTC Guidance

The bill does not currently specify *when* in the enforcement process evidence of compliance may be cited. It is important that a defendant be able to raise a compliance defense as early as possible. Without such an opportunity, the Commission can drag out an investigation that should have been terminated early, as when the subject of the investigation acted in good faith reliance upon the Commission’s own statements. Ideally, this would occur during motions to quash CIDs.

Further, it would help if the FTC amended its rule on such motions, 16 C.F.R. § 2.10, to specify that this defense could be raised at part of a motion to quash. And, as we noted above,¹⁶⁶ it is critical that these challenges be permitted to remain confidential, as many companies may choose to avoid the risk the public exposure that comes with challenging CIDs.

At a minimum, the defendant should be able to raise this defense in a way that is communicated to Commissioners *before* the Commission’s vote on whether to issue a complaint.

RECOMMENDATION: Encourage the FTC to Issue More Policy Statements & Guides

As the proposed SHIELD Act reflects, while there is some risk of ossification from over-reliance on *ex ante* guidelines and policy statements, the absence of such guidance documents can leave consumers and economic actors with insufficient notice of FTC enforcement principles and practices. Absent meaningful constraints on the Commission’s discretionary authority, the costs of over-enforcement may be as great or greater than the costs of over-regulation. For these reasons, the bill should require the FTC to issue substantive

¹⁶⁵ See *supra* note 66 and note 161.

¹⁶⁶ See *supra* at 46.

guidelines, allow private parties to petition the FTC to issue guidelines, or allow a single Commissioner to force the issue.

A good place to start would be privacy regulation, where the Commission has issued no meaningful guides.¹⁶⁷ The Commission has done better on data security, with guides, for example, on photocopier data security (2010),¹⁶⁸ P2P software (2010),¹⁶⁹ and mobile app security (2013).¹⁷⁰ But none of these, and even the particularly thorough “Start with Security: A Guide for Business” (2015),¹⁷¹ does the kind of thing the various antitrust guidelines do: expand upon the *analytical framework* by which the Commission determines how much security is enough. This must be grounded in the component elements of Section 5, not the Commission’s policy agenda or technical expertise.

More important than issue-specific guides would be guidance one step up the Doctrinal Pyramid, explaining how concepts like materiality, weighing injury with benefits, and measuring reasonable avoidability will be measured.¹⁷² Such a document would greatly enhance the value of issue-specific guides by allowing regulated companies to understand not just what the Commission might demand in the future, but the doctrinal legal basis for doing so.

Remedies

Appropriate Tailoring of Remedies

No Bill Proposed

The FTC has, perhaps predictably, also pushed the envelope with regard to the sorts of remedies it seeks against a broader category of targets. Initially, the Commission was given authority to pursue permanent injunctions under Section 13(b) as part of its ongoing mission to curb outright fraud.¹⁷³ Over time, however, the FTC has expanded its use of Section 13(b)

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks* (Dec. 2012), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/federal-trade-commission-enforcement-us-eu-us-swiss-safe-harbor>

¹⁶⁸ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Copier Data Security: A Guide for Businesses* (Nov. 2010), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/copier-data-security-guide-businesses>

¹⁶⁹ *Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business*, *supra* note 162.

¹⁷⁰ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Mobile App Developers: Start with Security* (Feb. 2013), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-app-developers-start-security>

¹⁷¹ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Start with Security: A Guide for Business* (Jun. 2015), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/start-security-guide-business>

¹⁷² See *supra* note 12.

¹⁷³ See generally Beales & Muris, *supra* note 21.

in order to target companies that engage in conduct that implicates issues from substantiation claims to product design — all far from fraudulent territory.¹⁷⁴

For instance, Apple, Google, and Amazon have all been targets of the Commission for issues related to the design and function of their respective mobile app stores.¹⁷⁵ Amazon, one of the rare parties to proceed to full litigation on a Section 5 unfairness case, recently lost a summary judgment motion on a claim that its in-app purchasing system permitted children to make in-app purchases without parental “informed consent,” thus engaging in an “unfair practice.”¹⁷⁶ As part of its case the Commission sought a permanent injunction under Section 13(b) against Amazon on the basis of the Commission’s claim that it was “likely to continue to injure consumers, reap unjust enrichment, and harm the public interest.”¹⁷⁷

This practice, called “fencing-in,”¹⁷⁸ may be appropriate for the inveterate fraudsters — against whom it is authorized under Section 19 of the Act:

If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is **one which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent**, the court may grant... such relief as the court finds necessary.¹⁷⁹

The FTC — in the past — indeed viewed Section 13(b) as a tool to police clearly fraudulent practices. “Consistent with the limitations in Section 19, the agency used Section 13(b) for a narrow class of cases involving fraud, near fraud, or worthless products.”¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, courts, for their part, “blessed this limited expansion of FTC authority,” and still see the appropriate scope of Section 13(b) as a limited one.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁷⁵ See Geoffrey A. Manne, *Federal Intrusion: Too Many Apps for That*, WALL STR. J. (Sep. 16, 2014), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/geoffrey-manne-federal-intrusion-too-many-apps-for-that-1410908397>.

¹⁷⁶ Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. C14-1038-JCC, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wash 2016), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160427amazonorder.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ *Id.* at 10.

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission V. RCA Credit Services, LLC, Case No. 8:08-CV-2062-T-27AEP. (M.D. Fla. Jul 21, 2010) at 20 (“Courts also have discretion to include ‘fencing-in’ provisions that extend beyond the specific violations at issue in the case to prevent Defendants from engaging in similar deceptive practices in the future.”).

¹⁷⁹ 15 U.S.C. § 57(b)-(a)(2) and -(b).

¹⁸⁰ Beales & Muris, *supra* note 21, at 22.

But the argument for extending fencing-in beyond the fraud context is extremely weak. Nevertheless, the FTC has more recently, as in the *Amazon* case, sought to use 13(b) against legitimate companies, dramatically expanding its scope — and its *in terrorem* effect.¹⁸¹

Such broad “fencing in” relief (imposition of behavioral requirements that are more extensive than required [in order] to avoid future violations) goes well beyond prior FTC practice and may be aimed at “encouraging” other firms in similar industries to adopt costly new testing.¹⁸²

Effectively, from the Commission’s perspective, Amazon — with its app store that satisfied the needs of a huge number of consumers — was legally equivalent to “defendants engaged in continuous, fraudulent practices [who] were deemed likely to reoffend based on the ‘systemic nature’ of their misrepresentations.”¹⁸³ This could not have been what Congress intended.

The courts, when they are presented with the opportunity to review this approach (as they sometimes are in Deception cases and as they virtually never are in Unfairness cases, given the lack of litigation) have been less than receptive. Although Amazon lost its motion for summary judgment, it prevailed on the question of whether Section 13(b) presented an appropriate remedy for its alleged infractions.

While permanent injunctions are often awarded in cases where liability under the FTC Act is determined, Amazon correctly distinguishes those cases from the facts of this case... [C]ases in which a permanent injunction has been entered involved deceptive, ongoing practices.¹⁸⁴

The court properly noted that it was incumbent upon the Commission to “establish, with evidence, a cognizable danger of a recurring violation.”¹⁸⁵

Similarly, in *FTC v. RCA Credit* (a Deception case), the court rejected the FTC’s use of 13(b) — in that case, accepting the permanent injunction but questioning the expansion of its scope:

The undisputed facts demonstrate that this is a proper case for permanent injunctive relief. However, the Court will defer ruling on the appropriate scope of an injunction (including whether, as the FTC requests, the injunction should include a

¹⁸¹ *Id.* at 4 (“The FTC now threatens to expand the use of the Section 13(b) program beyond fraud cases, suggesting that it may use Section 13(b) to seek consumer redress even against legitimate companies.”).

¹⁸² Alden Abbott, *Time to Reform FTC Advertising Regulation*, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum #140 on Regulation (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/time-to-reform-ftc-advertising-regulation#_ftnref21.

¹⁸³ Amazon case at 11.

¹⁸⁴ Amazon case at 11.

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 11.

broad fencing-in provision enjoining misrepresentations of material fact in connection with the sale of any goods and services) until after hearing evidence on the issue.¹⁸⁶

The reluctance of some courts to abet the FTC's expansion of its use of fencing-in remedies to reach legitimate companies is reassuring — and affirms our belief as to what Congress intended in Section 13(b). Unfortunately, however, most parties do not proceed to ruinously expensive litigation with the Commission, and will accede to the demands of a consent order. This creates undue costs of both the first order (companies agreeing to remedies that are larger or more invasive than what a court would impose) and the second order (the systemic cost of companies settling cases they might otherwise litigate, all regulated entities losing the benefit of litigation, and the FTC having to do less rigorous analysis).

The FTC's ability to threaten a permanent injunction, or to dramatically extend its scope beyond the practices at issue in a case, gives parties an inefficiently large incentive to settle in order to avoid the risk of the more draconian remedy. But, in doing so, parties end up opting in to consent orders that allow the FTC to evade any judicially enforced limits on the remedies it imposes, which is what the Commission *really* wants. Whatever the benefits to the agency from permanent injunctions, it arguably receives even more benefit from the ability to impose more detailed behavioral remedies than a court might permit (and to do so in the context of a consent order, the violation of which is subject to the lower burden of proving contempt rather than an initial violation).

The Commission's general resistance to constraints upon its remedial discretion was aptly illustrated by its abrupt revocation, in 2012,¹⁸⁷ of its 2003 Policy Statement On Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (commonly called the Disgorgement Policy Statement).¹⁸⁸ As Commissioner Ohlhausen noted in her dissent from the withdrawal of the policy:

Rescinding the bipartisan Policy Statement signals that the Commission will be seeking disgorgement in circumstances in which the three-part test heretofore utilized under the Statement is not met, such as where the alleged antitrust violation

¹⁸⁶ RCA Credit case at 24.

¹⁸⁷ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *FTC Withdraws Agency's Policy Statement on Monetary Remedies in Competition Cases; Will Rely on Existing Law* (Jul. 31, 2012), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/07/ftc-withdraws-agencys-policy-statement-monetary-remedies>.

¹⁸⁸ Fed. Trade Comm'n, Policy Statement On Monetary Equitable Remedies — Including in Particular Disgorgement and Restitution, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION COMPETITION CASES ADDRESSING VIOLATIONS OF THE FTC ACT, THE CLAYTON ACT, OR THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ACT (2003), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/07/policy-statement-monetary-equitable-remedies-including-particular>.

is not clear or where other remedies would be sufficient to address the violation.¹⁸⁹

Not only does this mean that parties in general are more likely to settle, but it also means that parties that are facing novel, untested antitrust theories are more likely to settle. This allows the Commission to expand its antitrust enforcement authority beyond judicially recognized conduct without risk of reversal by the courts.

Section 13(b) and the Commission's disgorgement powers represent tremendous weapons to wield over the heads of investigative targets. Their expanding use to impose expansive or draconian remedies in cases involving non-fraudulent, legitimate companies and questionable legal theories is extremely troubling. Not only is this bad policy, it is also inconsistent with the spirit of the FTC Act, which was designed to find and punish actively fraudulent conduct, and to deter anticompetitive behavior that is not countervailed by pro-consumer benefits. But most of all, this gives the FTC greater ability to coerce companies that might otherwise litigate into settlements, pushing us further away from the Evolutionary Model and towards the Discretionary Model.

To correct these problems, at least two things should be done:

RECOMMENDATION: Limit Injunctions to the “Proper Cases” Intended by Congress

First, the Commission's use of Section 13(b) remedies should be reevaluated in light of the law's original purpose:

[O]ne class of cases clearly improper for awarding redress under Section 13(b): traditional substantiation cases, which typically involve established businesses selling products with substantial value beyond the claims at issue and disputes over scientific details with well-regarded experts on both sides of the issue. In such cases, the defendant would not have known *ex ante* that its conduct was “dishonest or fraudulent.” Limiting the availability of consumer redress under Section 13(b) to cases consistent with the Section 19 standard strikes the balance Congress thought necessary and ensures that the FTC's actions benefit those that it is their mission to protect: the general public.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, *Commission's Decision to Withdraw its Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases* (Jul. 31, 2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commissioner-maureen-k.ohlhausen/120731ohlhausenstatement.pdf.

¹⁹⁰ Beales & Muris, *Striking the Proper Balance*, *supra* note 21, at 6.

¹⁹⁰ 15 U.S.C. § 57(b)-(a)(2) and -(b).

¹⁹⁰ Beales & Muris, *Striking the Proper Balance*, *supra* note 21, at 6–7.

This same logic applies to a host of other types of cases, as well, including the Commission’s recent product design cases.¹⁹¹ Thus the tailoring of the Commission’s Section 13(b) powers should not stop merely with substantiation cases, but should extend, as a general principle, to any party that had not intentionally or recklessly engaged in conduct it should have known was dishonest or fraudulent. As Josh Wright noted in his dissent in the Apple product design case:

The economic consequences of the allegedly unfair act or practice in this case — a product design decision that benefits some consumers and harms others — also differ significantly from those in the Commission’s previous unfairness cases.

The Commission commonly brings unfairness cases alleging failure to obtain express informed consent. These cases invariably involve conduct where the defendant has intentionally obscured the fact that consumers would be billed. Many of these cases involve unauthorized billing or cramming – the outright fraudulent use of payment information. Other cases involve conduct just shy of complete fraud — the consumer may have agreed to one transaction but the defendant charges the consumer for additional, improperly disclosed items. Under this scenario, the allegedly unfair act or practice injures consumers and does not provide economic value to consumers or competition. In such cases, the requirement to provide adequate disclosure itself does not cause significant harmful effects and can be satisfied at low cost.

However, the particular facts of this case differ in several respects from the above scenario.¹⁹²

The same logic that undergirds former Commissioner Wright’s objection to the majority’s aggressive application of the UPS in *Apple* applies equally to the aggressive 13(b) remedies sought in similar cases.

RECOMMENDATION: Narrow Overly Broad “Fencing-in” Remedies

Similarly, the imposition of unreasonable behavioral demands — “fencing-in” of conduct beyond that at issue in the case — upon parties subject to FTC enforcement is problematic.

¹⁹¹ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *FTC Alleges Amazon Unlawfully Billed Parents for Millions of Dollars in Children’s Unauthorized In-App Charges* (Jul. 10, 2014), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/07/ftc-alleges-amazon-unlawfully-billed-parents-millions-dollars>; In the Matter of Apple Inc., FTC File No 112 3108, <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/112-3108/apple-inc> (2014); Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Google to Refund Consumers at Least \$19 Million to Settle FTC Complaint It Unlawfully Billed Parents for Children’s Unauthorized In-App Charges* (Sept. 4, 2014), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/google-refund-consumers-least-19-million-settle-ftc-complaint-it>.

¹⁹² Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Apple, Inc., FTC File No. 1123108, at 3 (Jan. 15, 2014), available at <https://goo.gl/0RCC9E>.

For instance, in *Fanning v. FTC*, the Commission imposed upon defendant John Fanning a requirement that the First Circuit characterized as “not reasonably related to [the alleged] violation.”¹⁹³ In 2009, Fanning founded jerk.com, a social networking website that controversially enabled users to nominate certain persons to be “jerks.”¹⁹⁴ In issuing a variety of challenges to jerk.com’s business practices — including an alleged failure of the site to facilitate paid customers’ removal of negative information — the Commission additionally applied a “compliance monitoring” provision aimed directly at Fanning.¹⁹⁵ This provision required that Fanning “notify the Commission of... his affiliation with any new business or employment,” and submit information including the new business’s “address and telephone number and a description of the nature of the business” for a period of ten years.¹⁹⁶ Under the Commission’s cease and desist order, it did not matter whether Fanning engaged in reputation work, or started social media sites, or not — the requirement applied regardless of what type of work Fanning did and for whom he did it.¹⁹⁷

The First Circuit rebuked the Commission on this point:

When asked at oral argument, the Commission conceded that this provision would ostensibly require Fanning to report if he was a waiter at a restaurant. The only explanation offered by the Commission for this breadth is that it has traditionally required such reporting.¹⁹⁸

Moreover, the Commission cited a string of district court cases upholding similar provisions which the court characterized as “almost entirely bereft of analysis that might explain the rationale for such a requirement.”¹⁹⁹ While it is encouraging that the First Circuit saw fit to rein in the Commission, it is also apparent that the FTC frequently receives an extraordinary degree of deference from district courts, even when creating punitive provisions that bear little or no connection to challenged subject matter.

In order to deter the Commission from taking advantage of this frequent judicial deference by imposing such disconnected “fencing-in” remedies in non-fraud cases — which, of course, is compounded by the fact that most cases are never reviewed by courts at all — Congress should consider imposing some sort of minimal requirement that provisions in

¹⁹³ *Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, FTC File No. 15-1520, slip op. at 13 (May 9, 2016), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/051816jerkopinion.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ *Id.* at 2-3.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 21-22.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.* at 22.

¹⁹⁷ Final Order, *Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, FTC File No. 15-1520 (March 13, 2015), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150325jerkorder.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ *Id.* at 23-24.

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 24.

proposed orders and consent decrees be (i) reasonably related to challenged behavior, and (ii) no more onerous than necessary to correct or prevent the challenged violation.

This reform is also important to minimizing the daisy-chaining of consent decrees discussed in the next Section.²⁰⁰ As we note there, the ability of the Commission to bring a second enforcement action not premised on Section 5, but rather on the terms of a consent decree that is vaguely related to the challenged conduct creates several problems. The Commission's ability to do this is magnified if the initial consent order already contains provisions that reach a broad range of conduct or that include a host of difficult conduct remedies that the company may even inadvertently violate.

RECOMMENDATION: Revive the 2003 Disgorgement Policy

Second, Congress should consider requiring the Commission to return to its previous disgorgement policy, or to propose targeted amendments to it. At a minimum, the Commission should be required to perform *some* process to examine the issue and take public comment on it. As Commissioner Ohlhausen noted in her dissent, objecting to the vote to rescind the Policy Statement:

I am troubled by the seeming lack of deliberation that has accompanied the withdrawal of the Policy Statement. Notably, the Commission sought public comment on a draft of the Policy Statement before it was adopted. That public comment process was not pursued in connection with the withdrawal of the statement. I believe there should have been more internal deliberation and likely public input before the Commission withdrew a policy statement that appears to have served this agency well over the past nine years.²⁰¹

Consent Decree Duration & Scope

The Technological Innovation through Modernizing Enforcement (TIME) Act

Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael C. Burgess, M.D.'s (R-TX) bill (H.R. 5093)²⁰² would, in non-fraud cases, limit FTC consent orders to eight years — instead of the 20 years the FTC usually imposes. If the term runs five years or more, the FTC must reassess the decree after five years under the same factors required for setting the length of the consent decree from the outset:

²⁰⁰ See *infra* at 76.

²⁰¹ *Id.* at 2.

²⁰² The Technological Innovation through Modernizing Enforcement Act, H.R. 5118, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter TIME Act], available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5093/text>.

1. The impact of technological progress on the continuing relevance of the consent order.
2. Whether there is reason to believe that the entity would engage in activities that violate this section without the consent order 8 years after the consent order is entered into by the Commission.

Shortening the length of consent decrees will do much to address the abuse of consent decrees, but it will not fix the underlying problems, as we discuss below.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Reducing the Abuse of Consent Decrees as De Facto Regulations

This reform is critical to reducing the FTC's use of consent decrees as effectively regulatory tools. It is entire commonplace for the FTC to impose the same twenty-year consent decree term and the same conditions (drawn from its quasi-regulatory reports) on every company, regardless of the facts of the case, the size of the company etc. Limiting the duration of consent decrees would not entirely stop abuse of consent decrees as a way to circumvent Section 5 rulemaking safeguards (because each consent decree is effectively a mini-rulemaking, which implements the FTC's pre-determined policy agenda), but it would at least limit the damage, and clear overly broad consent decrees more quickly.

The bill would also make it less likely that the FTC could daisy-chain additional enforcement actions — that is, bring a second enforcement action not premised on Section 5 (and therefore not even paying lip service to its requirements) but on the terms of a consent decree that is only vaguely related to the subsequent conduct. Such daisy-chaining has allowed enormous leverage in forcing settlements, since the FTC Act gives the Commission civil penalty authority only for violations of consent decrees (and rules), not Section 5 itself. Thus, the FTC gains the sledgehammer of potentially substantial monetary fines the second time around. It also allows the FTC to further extend the term of the consent decree beyond the initial 20 years — and potentially keep a company operating under a consent decree forever.

This is essentially what the FTC did to Google. First, in 2011, the FTC and Google settled charges that Google had committed an unfair trade practice in 2010 in by opting Gmail users into certain features of its new (and later discontinued) Buzz social network.²⁰³ A year later, the FTC imposed a \$22.5 million penalty against Google in settling charges that Google had violated the 2011 consent decree by misleading consumers by, essentially, failing to update an online help page that told users of Apple's Safari browser that they did not need to take further action to avoid being tracked, after a technical change made *by Apple*

²⁰³ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network* (Mar. 30, 2011), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz>.

had rendered this statement untrue.²⁰⁴ The FTC’s Press Release boasted “Privacy Settlement is the Largest FTC Penalty Ever for Violation of a Commission Order.”²⁰⁵ The case raised major questions about the way the FTC understood its deception authority,²⁰⁶ none of which were dismissed because (a) Google, already being under the FTC’s thumb and facing a potentially even-larger monetary penalty, was eager to settle the case, and (b) the FTC technically did not have to prove the normal elements of deception, such as the materiality of a help page seen by a tiny number of users, because it was enforcing the consent decree, not Section 5.

Perhaps most disconcertingly, the Commission’s 2012 action against Google had precious little to do with the conduct that gave rise to its 2011 consent order. To be sure, the 2011 order was written in the broadest possible terms, arguably covering nearly every conceivable aspect of Google’s business. But this just underscores the regulation-like nature of the Commission’s consent orders, as well as the FTC’s propensity to treat cases with dissimilar facts and dissimilar circumstances essentially the same. While that kind of result might be expected of a regulatory regime, it is inconsistent with the idea of case-by-case adjudication, which also puts paid to the idea that of a “common law of data security consent decrees”:

In this sense the FTC’s data security settlements aren’t an evolving common law — they are a static statement of “reasonable” practices, repeated about 55 times over the years and applied to a wide enough array of circumstances that it is reasonable to assume that they apply to *all* circumstances. This is consistency. But it isn’t the common law. The common law requires consistency of application — a consistent theory of liability, which, given different circumstances, means *inconsistent* results. Instead, here we have consistent results which, given inconsistent facts, means [] *inconsistency* of application.²⁰⁷

RECOMMENDATION: Allow Petitions for Appeal of Mooted Consent Decrees

Noticeably *not* addressed by this bill is the situation in which the FTC has found a company in violation of Section 5 for some practice (and imposed a consent decree for the violation), then lost in court on essentially the same doctrinal point. At a minimum, part of the reassessment of any consent decree should include assessing whether court decisions have called into question whether the original allegation actually violated Section 5. Ideally, the bill

²⁰⁴ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Google Will Pay \$22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser* (Aug. 9, 2012) available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented>.

²⁰⁵ *Id.*

²⁰⁶ See, e.g., *FTC’s Google Settlement a Pyrrhic Victory for Privacy and the Rule of Law*, International Center for Law & Economics (Aug. 9, 2012), available at <http://www.laweconcenter.org/component/content/article/84-ftcs-google-settlement-a-pyrrhic-victory-for-privacy-and-the-rule-of-law.html>.

²⁰⁷ Manne & Sperry, *supra* note 52, at 13.

should also include a procedure by which the company subject to a consent decree could petition for review of its consent decree on these grounds.

Such an amendment should not be controversial, given that the FTC so rarely (if ever) litigates its consumer protection cases.

Other Process Issues

Open Investigations

The Start Taking Action on Lingerin Liabilities (STALL) Act

Rep. Susan Brooks' (R-IN) bill (H.R. 5097)²⁰⁸ would automatically terminate investigations six months after the last communication from the FTC. Commission staff can keep an investigation alive either by sending a new communication to the target or the Commissioners can vote to keep the investigation open (without alerting the target). Current FTC rules allow the staff to inform targets that their investigation has ended, but does *not* require them to do so.²⁰⁹

VALUE OF THE BILL: Good Housekeeping, Reduces *In Terrorem* Effects of Lingerin Investigations

This should be among the least controversial of the pending bills. It is simply a good housekeeping measure, ensuring that companies will not be left hanging in limbo after initial investigation-related communications from the FTC.

Closing open investigations could have several benefits.

First, in some circumstances, publicly traded companies may conclude that they are required to disclose the FTC's inquiry in their SEC filings.²¹⁰ That, in turn, can spark a media frenzy that could be as damaging to the company as whatever terms the FTC might impose in a consent decree — or at least seem to be less costly to managers who are more incentivized to care about the immediate performance of the company than the hassle of being sub-

²⁰⁸ Start Taking Action on Lingerin Liabilities Act, H.R. 5097, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter STALL Act], available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5097/text>.

²⁰⁹ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Operating Manual: Chapter 3: Investigations*, 46 (last visited May 20, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch03investigations_0.pdf (providing, in .3.7.4.5, that "[i]n investigations which have been approved by Bureau Directors, closing letters are ordinarily sent to both the applicant and the proposed respondent, with copies to their attorneys, if any[,] but not requiring such letters in any case).

²¹⁰ See, e.g., Deborah S. Birnbach, *Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investigation?*, *supra* note 99.

ject to an FTC consent decree for the next 20 years.²¹¹ Making such disclosures can be particularly problematic if management intends to shop the company around for acquisition.

Presumably, a company that feels compelled to disclose an investigation in an SEC filing would, today, *eventually* feel justified in modifying the disclosure to indicate its belief that the investigation has concluded, given a long enough period of silence from the Commission. But this could take years, during which time the “lingering liability” could continue to damage the company. The bill (if it includes our proposed amendment, below) would give companies a clear indication whether or not they can modify their quarterly disclosures and inform shareholders and the general public that an investigation has concluded.

Second, giving subject companies repose after six months of silence from the FTC would allow management to focus on running their businesses. This could be especially critical for small companies.

Third, giving companies greater certainty in this way would reduce the leverage that staff may have to coerce companies into settling cases that might otherwise not be brought at all, or that companies might litigate. That means, in the first instance, moving closer to the optimal number of cases settled and, in the second instance, increasing the potential for litigation where it is warranted, which benefits everyone by allowing “the underlying criteria [of Section 5] to evolve and develop over time” through “judicial review,” as the Unfairness Policy Statement explicitly intends.²¹²

Fourth, holding target companies *in terrorem* may have other indirect costs besides driving companies to settle questionable cases. The longer an investigation lingers, or the longer it *could* linger (before the company can safely assume it is over), the more likely the company is to treat the FTC’s “recommended” best practices as effectively mandatory, regulatory requirements. This regulation-by-terror is impossible to quantify, but it is a very real concern. To the extent it happens, it contributes to transforming the FTC’s “inquisitorial powers” into a tool by which the FTC may treat its workshops and reports as *de facto* rulemakings, thus at least partially circumventing the Section 5 rulemaking safeguards.

Finally, the bill makes it harder for FTC staff to circumvent Bureau Director oversight — and thus avoid any possibility of alerting Commissioners. Current FTC rules allow an Initial Phase Investigation to be conducted for up to 100 hours of staff time, after which Staff must

²¹¹ Notably, this also includes the potential for the FTC to bring additional enforcement actions premised on violating the terms of the consent decree, however attenuated the subsequent enforcement action might be, which is even easier than bringing an enforcement action premised directly on Section 5 (in that the FTC need not even purport to satisfy the requirements of Section 5). *See e.g.*, *United States v. Google, Inc.*, Case 5:12-cv-04177-HRL (N.D.Ca. 2012), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented>.

²¹² UPS, *supra* note 9.

draft a memo and obtain approval from the Bureau Director to continue the investigation.²¹³ Today, the staff may be able to shoehorn a new investigation into an old investigation for which they have already received Director approval, thus avoiding or forestalling having to seek new approval from the Bureau Director. One can imagine that this would be particularly appealing if the Commission's majority — and thus also its Bureau Directors, who are appointed by the Chairman — has switched parties. This shoehorning may be very easy to do given the breadth of the FTC's investigations: one inquiry about questionable data security could very easily morph into another, potentially years later. The proposed bill would reduce this possibility by reducing the menu of available investigations from which staff could pick and choose. In other words, it would help to draw lines between old investigations and new ones. While this should not be a significant burden for the Staff, it should help to ensure that other internal decisionmaking safeguards are respected.

RECOMMENDATION: Bar Secret Votes as a Means of Evading the Bill

As drafted, the bill would allow the Commission to take a (non-public) vote to keep an investigation alive without the subject receiving additional communications. We can think of no reason to permit the Commission to hide the existence of a continuing investigation from its subject, however. In fact, although doing so requires a small price (an affirmative vote of the Commission), the price is so small that it is reasonable to expect that the exception would subsume the rule, and permit the Commission to evade the overall benefits of the proposed bill. Thus, we suggest amending section (2)(B) of the proposed bill, which authorizes an investigation to continue if “the Commission votes to extend the covered investigation before the expiration of such period,”²¹⁴ to also require the Commission to send a communication to the subject informing it of the vote. This would add no appreciable cost to the Commission's ability to extend an investigation, but, unlike a non-public vote, it ensures that the subject is made aware of the extension.

This amendment would have the benefit of allowing the subject's management to take *true* repose, knowing that an investigation had truly ended. Only then, for instance, would many managers feel comfortable revising a public securities disclosure about the company's lingering potential liability. In short, this would allow companies to clear their good names and get on with the business of serving consumers.

²¹³ Operating Manual at 9, § 3.2.1.1.

²¹⁴ STALL Act, *supra* note 208.

Commissioner Meetings

The Freeing Responsible & Effective Exchanges (FREE) Act

Rep. Pete Olson’s (R-TX) bill (HR 5116)²¹⁵ would allow a bipartisan quorum of FTC Commissioners to meet confidentially under certain circumstances: no vote or agency action may be taken, the meeting must be FTC staff only, with a lawyer from the Office of General Counsel present, and the meeting must be disclosed publicly online. This would greatly empower other Commissioners by allowing them to meet with each other and with Commission staff — potentially without the Chairman, or without the Chairman having organized the meeting.

The bill does essentially the same thing as the FCC Process Reform Act of 2015 (H.R. 2583), which was so uncontroversial that it passed the House on a voice vote in November 2015.²¹⁶ Both bills would, for the affected agency, undo an unintended consequence of the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976. That well-intentioned effort to bring transparency to agency decision-making in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal has had the perverse result of undermining the very purpose of multi-member commissions.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Restoring the Collegiality of the FTC

The Sunshine Act calls multi-member commissions “collegial bod[ies],”²¹⁷ but the effect of the law has been to greatly contribute to the rise of the Imperial Chairmanship, because the law not only requires that “disposing of” (*i.e.*, voting on) major items (*e.g.*, rulemakings or enforcement actions) be conducted in public meetings (organized by the Chairman), it also bars Commissioners from “jointly conduct[ing]... agency business” except under the Act’s tight rules. In effect, this makes it difficult for other Commissioners to coordinate without the Chairman.

The bill would continue to require that any “vote or any other agency action” be taken at meetings held under the Sunshine Act. This would ensure that the FTC generally continues to operate in full public view and according to valid process.

But the bill would allow Commissioners to meet privately, potentially without the Chairman present.

²¹⁵ The Freeing Responsible and Effective Exchanges Act, H.R. 5116, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter FREE Act], available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5116/text>.

²¹⁶ Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 2583, 114th Cong. (2016), available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2583/actions>

²¹⁷ 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) & (3).

The benefits of such meetings are self-evident. They would encourage collegiality and facilitate bipartisan discussions, leading to a more open and inclusive process. They would also provide opportunities for minority commissioners to be apprised earlier in the process when the Commission is considering various actions, from investigations to issuing consent decrees.

The fact that the Energy & Commerce Committee has already vetted these reforms for the FCC, and that the full House has already voted for them as part of a larger FCC reform package, should make passage of this bill straightforward.

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that Two of Three Commissioners Can Meet

As amended by the bill, 15 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(2)(A) would require that the group consist of at least three or more Commissioners. This would have the perverse result of rendering the bill useless at present, when the Commission has only three Commissioners — because all three would have to be present for a meeting. We recommend simply striking this subsection, so that, on a three-member commission, the Democrat and Republican commissioners can meet without the Chairman.

Part III Litigation

Numerous commentators have raised serious questions about the FTC’s use of adjudication under Part III of the FTC’s Rules. Commissioner Wright put it best in a 2015 speech:

Perhaps the most obvious evidence of abuse of process is the fact that over the past two decades, the Commission has almost exclusively ruled in favor of FTC staff. That is, when the ALJ agrees with FTC staff in their role as Complaint Counsel, the Commission affirms liability essentially without fail; when the administrative law judge dares to disagree with FTC staff, the Commission almost universally reverses and finds liability. Justice Potter Stewart’s observation that the only consistency in Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the 1960s was that “the Government always wins” applies with even greater force to modern FTC administrative adjudication.

Occasionally, there are attempts to defend the FTC’s perfect win rate in administrative adjudication by attributing the Commission’s superior expertise at choosing winning cases. And don’t get me wrong – I agree the agency is pretty good at picking cases. But **a 100% win rate is not pretty good; Michael Jordan was better than pretty good and made about 83.5% of his free throws during his career, and that was with nobody defending him. One hundred percent isn’t Michael Jordan good; it is Michael Jordan in the cartoon movie “Space Jam” dunking from half-court good.** Besides being a facially implausible defense – the data also show appeals courts reverse Commission decisions at four times the rate of feder-

al district court judges in antitrust cases suggests otherwise. This is difficult to square with the case-selection theory of the FTC's record in administrative adjudication.²¹⁸

Former FTC Chairman Terry Calvani provides an apt summary of empirical research on the FTC's perfect win rate.²¹⁹ He notes FTC practitioner David Balto's study of eighteen years of FTC litigation, in which "the FTC has never found for the respondent and has reversed all ALJ decisions finding for the respondent."²²⁰ Balto concluded "there appears to be a lack of impartiality by the Commission that really undermines the credibility of the process, and I think that makes it more difficult for the FTC to effectively litigate tough cases and get the court of appeals to support [its] decisions going forward."²²¹

We recommend that Congress consider one of two structural reforms.

RECOMMENDATION: Separate the FTC's Enforcement & Adjudicatory Functions

Former Chairman Calvani proposes that

the FTC be reorganized to separate the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. The former would be vested in a director of enforcement appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the president. Commissioners would hear the cases brought before the agency. This model is not alien to American administrative law and independent agencies. Labor complaints are evaluated and issued by National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") regional directors. Administrative hearings are held before ALJs, and appeals from the ALJs are vested in the NLRB. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC's") prosecutorial functions are vested in the Division of Enforcement while administrative hearings are held before ALJs and appeals are vested in the SEC.

This change in organization would eliminate the existence or perception of unfairness associated with the same commissioners participating in both the decision to initiate a case and in its ultimate resolution. It would also make the deci-

²¹⁸ Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Remarks at the Global Antitrust Institute Invitational Moot Court Competition*, 16-17 (Feb. 21, 2015) (emphasis added), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/626231/150221judgingantitrust-1.pdf.

²¹⁹ Terry Calvani & Angela M. Diveley, *The FTC At 100: A Modest Proposal for Change*, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1169, 1178-82 (2014).

²²⁰ *Id.* at 1179 (quoting David A. Balto, *The FTC at a Crossroads: Can It Be Both Prosecutor and Judge?*, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found.) (Apr. 23, 2013), 1).

²²¹ Wash. Lgl Found., *FTC's Administrative Litigation Process: Should the Commission Be Both Prosecutor and Judge?*, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2014), <http://youtu.be/a9zvyDr4a-Y>, at 9:24.

sion to prosecute more transparent. One person would be responsible for the agency's enforcement agenda.²²²

Calvani notes that this would not significantly alter the responsibility of the powers of Commissioners, since “the power of a commissioner is relatively slight. The only real power of a commissioner is a negative one: blocking an enforcement initiative.”²²³ But it would “rather dramatically, [the responsibilities] of the chair.”²²⁴ In our view, this is a bug, not a feature.

RECOMMENDATION: Abolish or Limit Part III to Settlements

More fundamentally, Congress should re-examine the continued need for Part III as an alternative to litigation in Federal court. There are important differences between adjudications that originate in Part III proceedings as opposed to those that originate in Article III proceedings. Foremost, the selection of venue is an important determinant of the FTC's likelihood of success as well as the level of deference it will enjoy. Defendants will likewise see major differences between litigation in the different fora: from the range of discovery options available to the range and sort of materials considered by the tribunal (e.g., through amicus briefs). And, perhaps most important, the different venues each will create different legal norms and rules binding upon parties to future proceedings.

There is also a question regarding to what extent Part III proceedings are more than a mere formality. On the one hand, the FTC's Administrative Law Judge takes his job seriously, and has reversed the Commission in, most notably, two recent consumer protection decisions.²²⁵ However, on the other hand, the Commission *always* reverses decisions of the ALJ that find against it.²²⁶ Which leads to an important question: if the Commission is simply going to reverse its ALJ anyway what is the point of having an ALJ?

Even the threat of Part III litigation has a significant effect in coercing defendants to settle with the FTC during the investigation stage — not merely because of the direct financial costs of two additional rounds of litigation (first before the ALJ and then before the full Commission) prior to facing an independent Article III tribunal, but also because the Part III process drags out the other, less tangible but potentially far greater costs to the company in reputation and lost management attention. The threat of suffering two rounds of bad

²²² Calvani & Diveley, *supra* note 219, at 1184.

²²³ *Id.* at 1185.

²²⁴ *Id.* at 1184.

²²⁵ In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., FTC File No. 102 3099 (May 16, 2016), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter>; POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

²²⁶ Joshua D. Wright, *Recalibrating Section 5: A Response to the CPI Symposium*, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, 4 (2012).

press before going to federal court (or at least one, if the ALJ rules for a defendant but the Commission reverses) may persuade some defendants who wouldn't otherwise to settle. Thus, the current operation of Part III rarely, if ever, serves to actually advance the interests of a fair hearing on disputed issues, and is more a tool to coerce settlements.

Congress could end this dynamic by requiring the FTC to litigate in federal court while potentially still preserving Part III for the supervision of the settlement process and discovery. This is not a novel idea, nor would it be disruptive to the FTC as the Commission has had independent litigating authority since the 1970s.²²⁷ The Smarter Act (H.R. 2745) effectively abolishes Part III with respect to merger cases, by requiring the FTC to bring Clayton Act Section 7 cases (for preliminary injunctions to stop mergers) in federal court under the same procedures as the Department of Justice.²²⁸ This bill passed by a vote of 230 to 170.²²⁹

Finally, those who might object that abolishing Part III would hamstring the agency should take comfort in the fact that the FTC uses Part III so rarely anyway. Abolishing Part III will not bury the FTC in an avalanche of litigation in federal court. At most it would marginally increase the willingness of companies to resist the siren song of settlement, thus resulting in slightly more litigation (and perhaps also slightly more cases simply abandoned by staff, if they do not think they could win). But this is a trivial price to pay in comparison with the benefit of getting more judicial review and consistent enforcement standards and judicial standards of review. The difference between essentially no litigation and *some* litigation is the key difference between the Discretionary and Evolutionary Models.

RECOMMENDATION: Allow Commissioners to Limit the Use Part III

The least draconian reform would be to empower one or two Commissioners to insist that the Commission bring a particular complaint in Federal court. This would allow them to steer cases out of Part III either because they are doctrinally significant or because the Commissioners fear that, unless the case goes to federal court, the defendant will simply settle, thus denying the entire legal system the benefits of litigation in building the FTC's doctrines. In particular, it would be a way for Commissioners to act on the dissenting recommendations of staff, particularly the Bureau of Economics, about cases that are problematic from either a legal or policy perspective.

²²⁷ Elliott Karr, *Essay: Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General*, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1090-91 (2009).

²²⁸ Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015, H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. (2015), available at <https://www.congress.gov/bills/114th-congress/house-bill/2745> [hereinafter SMARTER Act].

²²⁹ U.S. House of Rep., *Final Vote Results For Roll Call 137* (Mar. 23, 2016) available at <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll137.xml>

Standard for Settling Cases

No Bill Proposed

RECOMMENDATION: Set a Standard for Settling Cases Higher than for Bringing Complaints

Currently there is no standard for settling cases. The Commission simply applies the “reason to believe” standard set forth in Section 5(b) — and very often combines the vote as to whether to bring the complaint with the vote on whether to settle the matter, when the staff has already negotiated the settlement during the investigation process (because of the enormous leverage it has in this process, as we explain above). As Commissioner Wright has noted, “[w]hile the Act does not set forth a separate standard for accepting a consent decree, I believe that threshold should be at least as high as for bringing the initial complaint.”²³⁰ Reform in this area is especially critical if Congress chooses not to enact the “preponderance of the evidence” standard for issuing complaints.²³¹

While it would certainly be an improvement to adopt even a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for the approval of consent decrees (relative to the status quo), we believe that this should be the standard for the approval of *complaints*, and that approval of *consent decrees* should be even higher (although, as we emphasize above, the “preponderance of the evidence” is not a particularly high standard).²³² The standard and process required by the Tunney Act for antitrust settlements would be a good place to begin. That act requires the FTC to file antitrust consent decrees with a federal court, and requires the court make the following determination:

Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court shall consider:

(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and

²³⁰ Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc., FTC. File No. 132 3251 (Sept. 3, 2015), 2, *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/638371/150423nomiwrightstatement.pdf.

²³¹ See, *supra*, at 18.

²³² See *infra* at 18.

(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.²³³

If anything, a standard for settlements should require *more* analysis than this, as the Tunney Act has been relatively ineffective. In particular, any approach based on the Tunney act should allow third parties to intervene to challenge the FTC's assertions about the public interest.²³⁴ This reform could go a long way toward inspiring the agency to perform more rigorous analysis.

Competition Advocacy

The FTC occupies a unique position in its role as the federal government's competition scold. Despite the absence of direct legal authority over federal, state and local actors (which limits the efficacy of competition advocacy efforts), some have argued that "the commitment of significant Commission resources to advocacy is nonetheless warranted by the past contributions of competition authorities to the reevaluation of regulatory barriers to rivalry, and by the magnitude and durability of anticompetitive effects caused by public restraints on competition."²³⁵

The FTC performs two different, but related, kinds of "competition advocacy":


1. **Competition advocacy litigation:** The Bureau of Competition occasionally brings antitrust cases against nominally public bodies that the FTC believes are ineligible for state action immunity, either because they are effectively operating as marketplace participants (*e.g.*, state-run hospitals) or because state-created regulatory boards have been so completely coopted by private actors that they operate as private cartels, lacking sufficiently clear statement of legislative intent to maintain their state action immunity.
2. **Competition advocacy filings:** The Office of Policy Planning files comments with state, local, tribal and federal lawmakers and regulators as to the impact of proposed (or existing) legislation or regulation upon consumers and competition.

²³³ 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1).

²³⁴ The act currently provides that "Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene." 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2).

²³⁵ Ernest Gellhorn, & William E. Kovacic, *Analytical Approaches and Institutional Processes for Implementing Competition Policy Reforms by the Federal Trade Commission* (Dec. 12, 1995), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418071/951212compolicy.pdf.

In 2004, James Cooper, Paul Pautler and Todd Zywicki (all FTC veterans) provided an empirical basis for comparing the FTC's level of activity on competition advocacy filings.²³⁶ Their analysis included this chart:



Since 2009, the FTC has averaged just nineteen competition advocacy filings per year.²³⁸ On high-tech matters, the Commission has been particularly inactive, making just four filings on ride-sharing,²³⁹ four on direct sale of cars to consumers (*i.e.*, online),²⁴⁰ and none on

²³⁶ James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, *Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC* at 3, available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/FTC%2090th%20Anniversary%20Symposium/040910zywicki.pdf.

²³⁷ *Id.*

²³⁸ A search of the FTC's Advocacy Filings reveals that between January 2009 and January 2016, 115 separate documents have been filed. See Fed Trade Comm'n, *Advocacy Filings* available at <https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-filings>.

²³⁹ Fed Trade Comm'n, "Transportation" Advocacy Filings, available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-filings?combine=&field_matter_number_value=&field_advocacy_document_terms

(cont.)

house-sharing. It has also made few other broadly tech-related miscellaneous filings to other federal agencies on privacy and data security, vehicle-to-vehicle communications, mobile financial services, and the National Broadband Plan.

The FTC held a workshop on the sharing economy in June 2015,²⁴¹ but has since missed the opportunity to do significant competition advocacy work in the area, despite growing protectionist state and local regulation aimed at upstarts like Uber, Lyft, Airbnb and others. Recent legislation in Austin, Texas, is sadly illustrative. An Austin City Council ordinance,²⁴² essentially regulating ride-sharing services out of existence, was approved by (the few) voters who showed up to vote in a referendum.²⁴³ This type of overly broad law regulating innovative technology is exactly the sort of thing the FTC should be taking initiative to advocate against, and it is unfortunate that, in the face of it, the FTC's competition advocacy has receded.

By contrast, in the early 2000s, OPP's State Action Task Force and Internet Task Force made a concerted effort to challenge anticompetitive state and local regulations that hindered online commerce through litigation, testimony and comments. The FTC started several campaigns, including one challenging rules making it harder to participate in e-commerce. Unlike the current Commission's stunted approach, the early 2000s FTC started with a workshop,²⁴⁴ released reports explaining the problem the FTC's planned approach,²⁴⁵

[tid=5283&field_date_value%5Bmin%5D%5Bdate%5D=January%2C+2009&field_date_value%5Bmax%5D%5Bdate%5D=January%2C+2016&items_per_page=100.](#)

²⁴⁰ Fed Trade Comm'n, "Automobiles" Advocacy Filings, *available at* <https://goo.gl/lq9ACP>.

²⁴¹ Fed. Trade Comm'n, The "Sharing" Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators (Jun. 9, 2015), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators>

²⁴² Austin, Texas, Ordinance No. 20151217-075 (2015), *available at* <http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm%3Fid=245769>.

²⁴³ Jared Meyer, *The Reverse of Progress. Austin's new rules strangle Uber, Lyft – and the ridesharing economy*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 18, 2016), *available at* <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-18/austins-very-un-progressive-example-on-uber-and-lyft>.

²⁴⁴ Fed. Trade Comm'n Workshop, Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet, Oct. 8-10, 2002, *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2002/10/possible-anticompetitive-efforts-restrict-competition-internet>.

²⁴⁵ FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-action-task-force/stateactionreport.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE (2003), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: CONTACT LENSES: A REPORT FROM THE STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 29, 2004), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-contact-lenses-report-staff-ftc/040329clreportfinal.pdf.

and then went on to systematically challenge e-commerce-related regulations (among other things) inconsistent with consumer welfare. Filings included:

- Comment on Ohio legislation to allow direct shipment of wine to Ohio consumers;²⁴⁶ and on similar New York legislation;²⁴⁷
- Congressional Testimony regarding online wine sales;²⁴⁸
- Comment on Arkansas legislation regarding online contact sales;²⁴⁹ and
- Comment on Connecticut regulation of contact sales.²⁵⁰

The current FTC has many ripe targets for public interest advocacy around the nation as incumbents are, predictably, using regulation to try to stop Internet- and app-based competition, especially disruptive new “sharing economy” business models.

VALUE OF THE IDEA: Competition Advocacy Is the Most Cost-Effective Way to Serve Consumers

As Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki explain:

The economic theory of regulation (“ETR”) posits that because of relatively high organizational and transaction costs, consumers will be disadvantaged relative to businesses in securing favorable regulation. This situation tends to result in regulations — such as unauthorized practice of law rules or per se prohibitions on sales-below-cost — that protect certain industries from competition at the expense of consumers. Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective ac-

²⁴⁶ Comment on Proposed Direct Shipment Legislation of the Federal Trade Commission to the Ohio State Senate (2006), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-eric-d.fingerhut-concerning-ohio-s.b.179-allow-direct-shipment-wine-ohio-consumers/v060010commentreohiosb179directshipmentofwine.pdf

²⁴⁷ Letter of the Federal Trade Commission regarding Assembly bill 9560-A, Senate bills 6060-A and 1192 to the New York State legislature (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-william-magee-et-al.concerning-new-york.b.9560-s.b.606-and-s.b.1192-allow-out-state-vendors-ship-wine-directly-new-york-consumers/v040012.pdf

²⁴⁸ Prepared Statement of Todd Zywicki, Fed. Trade Comm’n, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Energy and Commerce United States House of Representatives (Oct. 13, 2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-statement-u.s.house-representatives-energy-and-commerce-concerning-e-commerce-wine-sales-and-direct-shipment/031030ecommercewine.pdf

²⁴⁹ Letter of the Federal Trade Commission regarding Arkansas HB 2286 to the Arkansas House of Representatives (2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-doug-matayo-concerning-arkansas-h.b.2286-and-fairness-contact-lens-consumers-act-and-contact-lens-rule/041008matayocomment.pdf

²⁵⁰ Comments of the Staff Of the Federal Trade Commission In Re: Declaratory Ruling Proceeding on the Interpretation and Applicability of Various Statutes and Regulations Concerning the Sale of Contact Lenses (2002), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-connecticut-board-examiners-opticians-intervenor-re-declaratory-ruling-proceeding/v020007.pdf

tion problem by acting within the political system to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens. Furthermore, advocacy can be the most efficient means to pursue the FTC's mission, and when antitrust immunities are likely to render the FTC impotent to wage ex post challenges to anticompetitive conduct, advocacy may be the only tool to carry out the FTC's mission.²⁵¹

Competition advocacy is probably the most cost-effective way the FTC can promote consumer welfare. Anticompetitive practices and agreements backed up by the power of the state are much less likely to be corrected by the power of competition than those that exist in the marketplace, and antitrust law cannot be used to remove such barriers to competition. The only way for the FTC to even get at such conduct is through its competition advocacy arm.

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify Section 6(f) & the FTC May File Unsolicited Comments

The FTC currently relies on Sections 6(a) (information gathering) and 6(f) (issuance of reports) as the basis for its competition advocacy filings.²⁵² But as discussed above,²⁵³ Section 6(f) could be read to allow the FTC to make recommendations for legislation only to Congress, not to states or local governments. This is the kind of small discontinuity between the statute's plain meaning and the agency's practice (on an issue that enjoys broad bipartisan support) that should be addressed by Congress in regular reauthorization.

In the same vein, we gather that, if only by standing convention, the FTC does not file comments with state and local lawmakers or regulators unless invited to do so by someone on the relevant body. This is undoubtedly well-intentioned, perhaps grounded in some kind of sense of federalism, but it may have the perverse result of denying consumers the benefit of the FTC's competition-advocacy work where it is most needed: when state regulators are so captured by incumbents, or otherwise blinded to the benefits of new technologies, that they will resent the FTC's comment as an intrusion upon their decision-making.

We urge Congress to kill two birds with one stone by amending Section 6(f) to add the following bolded text (and, for clarity's sake, roman numeral subsection numbers):

²⁵¹ Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, *Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC* *supra* note 236, at 2.

²⁵² See, e.g., *id.* at 1, n.3:

The legal authority for competition advocacy is found in Section 6 of the FTC Act, which allows the FTC to “gather and compile information” that concerns persons subject to the FTC Act, and “to make public such portions of the information obtained” that are “in the public interest.”

(Quoting 15 U.S.C. § 46(a), (f) (2005)).

²⁵³ See *supra* 61.

To (i) make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest; and to (ii) make annual and special reports to the Congress and to submit therewith recommendations for additional legislation; *and to (iii) file recommendations for legislation or regulatory action with state, local, tribal and federal bodies*; and to (iv) provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use

RECOMMENDATION: Create an Office of Bureau of Competition Advocacy with Dedicated Funding

The FTC's Competition advocacy *filing* function has languished, in part, because while competition advocacy *litigation* resides inside the Bureau of Competition, the filings are primarily the responsibility of the Office of Policy Planning (OPP), a relatively tiny organization attached to the Chairman's office, which has a staff of just over a dozen compared to 285 for the Bureau of Competition, 331 for the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and 114 for the Bureau of Economics.²⁵⁴

Congress should seriously consider creating an independent office of Competition Advocacy, which would manage competition-advocacy filings, and share joint responsibility for competition-advocacy litigation with the Bureau of Competition. In particular, this would mean giving this new Bureau a line item in the FTC's budget.

RECOMMENDATION: In the Alternative, Reconstitute the Task Force

As noted above, the Internet Task Force, which was spun off from the broader State Action Task Force, had considerable effect through its research, reports, and associated filings. A standing Task Force of this nature could provide dividends by picking up where the Sharing Economy Workshop left off and studying the effects of regulation on the sharing economy around the nation. A well-done report could then be followed by strategic litigation, amicus briefs, and other filings in order to promote sound public policy and combat the Internet-age protectionism that is slowing down innovation and competition and the attendant benefit to consumers.

Expanding FTC Jurisdiction

Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the Commission to prevent unfair and deceptive acts and practices by nearly all American businesses (and business people). The exceptions are

²⁵⁴ Cf. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission Office of Policy Planning Organizational Chart, <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/office-policy-planning/opp-org-chart-may2016.pdf>; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Shutdown of Federal Trade Commission Operations Upon Failure of the Congress to Enact Appropriations, <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/office-executive-director/130925ftcshutdownplan.pdf>.

few: “banks, savings and loan institutions..., federal credit unions..., common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and [certain meat packers and stockyards]....” One important limitation is that the FTC Act does not expressly give the Commission jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations. Nevertheless, courts have held that nonprofit status is not in itself sufficient to exempt an organization from FTC jurisdiction.²⁵⁵ In *Cal Dental Ass’n v. FTC*, the Supreme Court noted that the FTC has jurisdiction over both “‘an entity organized to carry on business for its own profit’ ... [as well as] one that carries on business for the profit ‘of its members.’”²⁵⁶ Thus, various types of nonprofits — notably trade associations — can be reached by the FTC *depending on their activities*, but “purely charitable” organizations remain outside of the FTC’s enforcement purview.²⁵⁷

Subcommittee Democrats have revived two sensible proposals from 2008 to expand the FTC’s jurisdiction. Both have long enjoyed bipartisan support, and have been endorsed by the Commission under both Republican and Democratic chairmen.

FTC Jurisdiction over Common Carriers

The Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act of 2016

Jerry McNerney’s (D-CA) bill (H.R. 5239)²⁵⁸ would allow the FTC to regulate common carriers currently regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. In particular, this would ensure that the FTC and FCC have dual jurisdiction over broadband — effectively restoring the jurisdiction the FTC lost when the FCC “reclassified” broadband in 2015.

The FCC recently issued a controversial NPRM proposing privacy and data security rules for broadband that are significantly different from the approach the FTC has taken. This bill would moot the need for new FCC privacy and data security rules as a “gap filler.” The bill would also allow the FTC to police net neutrality concerns, interconnection and other broadband practices (to the extent it finds unfair or deceptive practices) even if the FCC’s Open Internet Order fails in pending litigation.

²⁵⁵ See, e.g., *Community Blood Bank v. FTC*, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969).

²⁵⁶ *Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC*, 526 U.S. 756, 766 (1999).

²⁵⁷ See *Statement of William C. Macleod, Dir. of FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, Before The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy & Commerce; Subcommittee on Transportation & Hazardous Materials; Hearing On Deceptive Fundraising By Charities* (Jul. 28, 1989), available at <http://www.freespeechcoalition.org/macleod.htm>.

²⁵⁸ Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act of 2016, H.R. 5239, 114th Cong. (2016), available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5239/text>.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Reclassification of Broadband by the FCC Should Not Remove FTC Jurisdiction

There has long been unusual bipartisan agreement on ending the common carrier exemption. This was proposed by Sen. Byron Dorgan's proposed FTC Reauthorization Act of 2002,²⁵⁹ and supported by Republican Commissioner Thomas Leary and Democrat Commissioner Sheila Anthony.²⁶⁰ Sen. Dorgan last proposed the same reform in 2008.²⁶¹ More recently, in 2015, Democrat Chairman Edith Ramirez and Republican Commissioner Josh Wright supported this reform.²⁶²

Section 5 jurisdiction excludes "common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce."²⁶³ The bill simply edits the definition of "Acts to regulate commerce" in Section 4 to remove the Communications Act.²⁶⁴ Thus, the FTC *could* regulate common carriers regulated by the FCC but *not* transportation common carriers.

Former Commissioner Joshua Wright summarized the many advantages of keeping the FTC as a cop on the broadband beat:

The FTC has certain enforcement tools at its disposal that are not available to the FCC. Unlike the FCC, the FTC can bring enforcement cases in federal district court and can obtain equitable remedies such as consumer redress. The FCC has only administrative proceedings at its disposal, and rather than obtain court-ordered consumer redress, the FCC can require only a "forfeiture" payment. In addition, the FTC is not bound by a one-year statute of limitations as is the FCC. The FTC's ability to proceed in federal district court to obtain equitable remedies that fully redress consumers for the entirety of their injuries provides comprehen-

²⁵⁹ Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2002, S. 2946, 104th Cong. (2002), *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-bill/2946/text>.

²⁶⁰ *Additional Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce*, 108th Cong. (2003), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-reauthorization/030611learyhr.pdf; Federal Trade Commission Testifies Before Senate in Support of Reauthorization Request for Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005, *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/es/node/63553>.

²⁶¹ Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2008, S. 2831 §14, 110th Cong. (2008), *available at* <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s2831/text>

²⁶² *Prepared Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, Federal Trade Commission: Wrecking the Internet to Save It? The FCC's Net Neutrality Rule Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (2015), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/632771/150325wreckinginternet.pdf; Ramirez urges repeal of common carrier exemption, FTC WATCH, *available at* <http://www.ftcwatch.com/ramirez-urges-repeal-of-common-carrier-exemption/>.

²⁶³ 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).

²⁶⁴ *Cf.* 15 U.S.C. § 44.

sive consumer protection and can play an important role in deterring consumer protection violations.²⁶⁵

RECOMMENDATION: Pass the Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act to End the Exemption for Telecom Common Carriers

Ending the common carrier exemption for telecom companies is long overdue. “As the telecommunications and Internet industries continue to converge, the common carrier exemption is likely to frustrate the FTC’s efforts to combat unfair or deceptive acts and practices and unfair methods of competition in these interconnected markets.”²⁶⁶ Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the application of the exemption to new technologies, as well as the long-standing uncertainty around application of the exemption to non-common-carrier activities carried out by common carriers introduce needless administrative costs.

RECOMMENDATION: Require the FCC to Terminate Its Privacy Rulemaking

With respect to the common carrier exception, the fortunes of the FTC are tied to those of the FCC; adopting optimal policy for one requires adopting complimentary policy for the other. The conclusions above are complicated by the FCC’s ongoing efforts to exercise the *exclusive* authority it claimed when it reclassified Internet service providers as common carriers, particularly with respect to privacy and similar matters.²⁶⁷ Because the FCC’s rationale for its proposed privacy rules is to fill the gap it created by “reclassifying” broadband and thus removing it from the FTC’s jurisdiction, enactment of this legislation would moot the need for new FCC rules. Accordingly, this bill should include a provision directing the FCC to terminate that rulemaking — so that the FTC may resume its former role in policing broadband privacy and data security without unnecessary and costly duplicative regulations.

This situation is very much unlike that in the 1980 FTC Improvements Act, by which Congress both tightened the FTC’s Section 5 rulemaking processes (as instituted in 1975) and also ended the FTC’s children’s advertising rulemaking.²⁶⁸ In signing the bill, President Carter lauded the former but objected to the latter:

²⁶⁵ *Prepared Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, supra*, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/632771/150325wreckinginternet.pdf (internal citations omitted).

²⁶⁶ FED TRADE COMM’N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION REPORT, 41 (2007), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-policy/v070000report.pdf>.

²⁶⁷ Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, WC Docket No. 16-106 (rel. Apr. 1, 2016), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-39A1_Rcd.pdf.

²⁶⁸ FTC Improvements Act Section 11 added the following language to 17 U.S.C. § 57a: “The Commission shall not have any authority to promulgate any rule in the children’s advertising proceeding pending on the date of the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, p. 374. Act of 1980 or in any

(cont.)

We need vigorous congressional oversight of regulatory agencies. But the reauthorization bills passed by the Senate and the House went beyond such oversight and actually required termination of specific, major, ongoing proceedings before the Commission. I am pleased that the conferees have modified these provisions. If powerful interests can turn to the political arena as an alternative to the legal process, our system of justice will not function in a fair and orderly fashion.²⁶⁹

President Carter had a point, in general. But in this case, Congress would not be telling an agency to stop a pending rulemaking because of a policy difference; it would be telling the FCC to stop a rulemaking that it claims is necessary only because of a regulatory vacuum of its own creation.

If the FCC insists on issuing its own rules, the bill will result in overlapping jurisdiction, which could create problems of its own: forum-shopping, inconsistent results, and politicization of the enforcement process. The Memorandum of Understanding reached between the two agencies on how to handle enforcement where their authority *does* overlap will do little to minimize potential conflicts.²⁷⁰ It would be particularly incongruous to enact legislation authorizing overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction while Congress is also considering the SMARTER Act, aimed at mitigating exactly such problematic overlap in the antitrust enforcement authority of the FTC and DOJ.²⁷¹ None of these concerns are inherent reasons not to restore the FTC's jurisdiction; after all, the FTC is the better regulator, in large part because applying standards of general applicability makes the FTC a more difficult agency to capture than a sector-specific regulator like the FCC. But these concerns do make it important that passage of this bill be tied to ending the FCC's foray into privacy and data-security regulation.

FTC Jurisdiction over Tax-Exempt Organizations & Nonprofits

The Tax Exempt Organizations Act

Representative Rush's (D-IL) bill (H.R. 5255)²⁷² would add tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) nonprofits to the definition of "corporation" subject to the FTC Act in Section 4 (15 U.S.C. § 44). It

substantially similar proceeding on the basis of a determination by the Commission that such advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice in or affecting commerce."

²⁶⁹ Carter, *supra* note 19.

²⁷⁰ Memorandum of Understanding on Consumer Protection Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission (Nov. 2015), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-mou.pdf.

²⁷¹ SMARTER Act, *supra* note 228.

²⁷² A Bill to Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to Permit the Federal Trade Commission to Enforce Such Act Against Certain Tax-exempt Organizations, H.R. 5255, 114th Cong. (2016) *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5255/text>.

would not, however, amend Section 4 to remove the language that limits the FTC’s jurisdiction to corporations that “carry on business for [their] own profit or that of [their] members.” Thus, the FTC would still be limited to policing for-profit activities but would have an easier time establishing that a nonprofit was essentially conducting for-profit activities.

VALUE OF THE BILL: Would Reduce Litigation Expenses for the FTC

This bill does precisely the same thing proposed by Sen. Byron Dorgan’s FTC Reauthorization Act of 2008.²⁷³ The Republican-led FTC supported this provision at the time.²⁷⁴

In 2008, in supporting Sen. Dorgan’s version of this bill, the FTC explained the advantage of this reform, even though it would not technically change the substance of the FTC’s jurisdiction:

The proposed legislation would also help increase certainty and reduce litigation costs in this area. Although the FTC has been successful in asserting jurisdiction against “sham” nonprofits and against non-profit trade associations, the proposed legislation would help avoid protracted factual inquiries and litigation battles to establish jurisdiction over such entities.²⁷⁵

We agree with the FTC’s 2008 assessment.

RECOMMENDATION: Extend Jurisdiction to Tax-Exempt Entities, Including Trade Associations

In 2008, in supporting Sen. Dorgan’s version of this bill, the FTC also said:

The Commission would be pleased to work with Congressional staff on crafting appropriate language. The Commission notes that, as drafted, Section 6 would reach only those non-profit entities that have tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commission would benefit from broadening this provision to cover certain other nonprofits, such as Section 501(c)(6) trade associations. The Commission has previously engaged in protracted litigation battles to determine whether such entities are currently covered under the FTC Act. *See, e.g., California Dental Ass’n v. FTC*, 526 U.S. 756, 765-69 (1999) (holding that FTC Act applies to anticompetitive conduct by non-profit dental association whose activities provide substantial economic benefits to for-profit members); *American Medical Ass’n v. FTC*, 638 F.2d 443, 447-448 (1980) (finding FTC jurisdiction over non-profit medical societies whose activities

²⁷³ Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 2008, *supra* note 261, § 6, available at <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s2831/text>.

²⁷⁴ *Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation*. 110th Cong. (2008), 19, available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-testimony-reauthorization/p034101reauth.pdf.

²⁷⁵ *Id.* at 16.

“serve both the business and non-business interests of their member physicians”).²⁷⁶

RECOMMENDATION: Extend Jurisdiction to All Non-Profits

We likewise recommend expanding the bill to encompass all nonprofit corporations, regardless of their tax-exempt status.²⁷⁷ The logic of the FTC’s jurisdiction doesn’t turn on the tax-exempt status of organizations, which, for these purposes, is essentially a meaningless dividing line between entities. It makes little sense to include tax-exempt nonprofits within the FTC’s ambit while excluding nonprofits without federal tax-exempt status.

Rulemaking

The FTC makes rules in two ways: (1) under Section 5, through the process created by Congress in 1980 to require additional economic rigor and evidence; and (2) under narrow grants of standard APA rulemaking authority specific to a particular issue.

Economic Analysis in All FTC Rulemakings

No Bill Proposed

RECOMMENDATION: Require BE to Comment on Rulemakings

The RECS Act, discussed below, would require the FTC to include BE analysis of any recommendations it makes for rulemakings. However, this would not apply to the FTC’s own rulemakings because that bill is focused on the FTC’s statutory authority to make recommendations to Congress, other agencies, and state and local governments.

Requiring regulatory agencies to do cost-benefit analysis has been uncontroversial for decades, dating back at least to the Carter Administration. Indeed, in 2011, shortly after President Obama issued Executive Order 13563,²⁷⁸ his version of President Clinton’s 1993 Executive Order 12866²⁷⁹ applying to Executive Branch agencies, he issued a second order, Regu-

²⁷⁶ *Id.* at 18 n.49.

²⁷⁷ The nonprofit designation is a creature of state incorporation law, and obligates corporations to adopt certain governance rules and structures. Federal tax-exempt status is a creature of federal tax law, and, while it obligates companies to limit their corporate purpose (*e.g.*, to education, religious activities, etc.), it doesn’t appreciably affect their governance structure. Companies can be nonprofit but not tax-exempt, although all tax-exempt companies are nonprofit.

²⁷⁸ Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 13563 (2012) available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/executive-order-13563-improving-regulation-and-regulatory-review>.

²⁷⁹ Exec. Order No. 12,866 3 C.F.R. 12866 (1993) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/eo12866/eo12866_10041993.pdf.

lation and Independent Regulatory Agencies, Executive Order 13579.²⁸⁰ The key difference between the two is that the President said Executive agencies “must” do cost-benefit analysis for each new regulation, but that independent agencies “should” undertake retrospective analysis of its rules and periodically update them.

FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz fully endorsed the idea in the White House’s blog about the Order:

President Obama deserves enormous credit for ensuring regulatory review throughout the federal government, including at independent agencies. Although regulations are critically important for protecting consumers, they need to be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that they are up-to-date, effective, and not overly burdensome. For all agencies – independent or not – periodic reviews of your rules is just good government. The announcement raises the profile of this issue, and I think that’s a constructive step.²⁸¹

The chief (indeed, perhaps the only) reason for the difference is that the President has no authority over independent agencies, which are creatures and servants of Congress. The bipartisan Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2015 (S. 1607) would solve this problem, giving the President the authority to set cost-benefit standards for independent agencies as well.²⁸² We fully support that bill and believe this requirement should apply to *all* independent agencies. But there is no reason to wait for passage of the more comprehensive bill. The FTC in particular would benefit from a commitment to cost-benefit analysis in its rulemakings immediately.

Of course, it is true that the Commission has abandoned using its Section 5 rulemaking power (precisely because it reflects the Carter-era commitment to cost-benefit analysis). But the Commission *does* continue to make rules under a variety of issue-specific statutes such as several of those now pending before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade in May 2016.²⁸³ As the chief example of the need for greater economic rigor in FTC rulemakings, we note the FTC’s 2012 COP-PA rulemaking: the agency expanded the definition of “personal information,” thus greatly

²⁸⁰ Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 13579 (2012) available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/11/executive-order-13579-regulation-and-independent-regulatory-agencies>.

²⁸¹ Cass Sunstein, *The President’s Executive Order on Improving and Streamlining Regulation by Independent Regulatory Agencies*, WHITEHOUSE.GOV BLOG (Jul. 11, 2011), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/11/president-s-executive-order-improving-and-streamlining-regulation-independent-regula->

²⁸² Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2015, S. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015), available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1607/text>.

²⁸³ See Press Release, HEARING: #SubCMT to Review 17 Bills Modernizing the FTC for the 21st Century NEXT WEEK, THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE (May 17, 2016), <https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/press-releases/hearing-subcmt-review-17-bills-modernizing-ftc-21st-century-next-week>.

expanding the number of children's-oriented media subject to the rule, with no meaningful analysis of what this would do to children's media.

Despite loud protests from small operators that the rule might cause them to cease offering child-oriented products, the FTC produced a meaningless estimate that the rule would cost \$21.5 million in the aggregate.²⁸⁴ Of course, the *real* cost of the new rule is not the direct compliance cost but the second-order effects of the number of providers who exit the children's market, reduce functionality, slow innovation or raise prices — none of which did the FTC even attempt to estimate. This was a clear failure of economic analysis.

We also note Commissioner Ohlhausen's 2015 dissent from the Commission's vote to update the Telemarketing Sales Rule to ban telemarketers from using four "novel" payment methods. Ohlhausen cited no less an authority than the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (FRBA), which is not merely one of twelve Federal Reserve Branches, but the one responsible for "operat[ing] the Federal Reserve System's Retail Payments Product Office, which manages and oversees the check and Automated Clearing House (ACH) services that the Federal Reserve banks provide to U.S. financial institutions."²⁸⁵ Ohlhausen explained:

The amendments do not satisfy the third prong of the unfairness analysis in Section 5(n) of the FTC Act, which requires us to balance consumer injury against countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. Although the record shows there is consumer injury from the use of novel payment methods in telemarketing fraud, it is not clear that this injury likely outweighs the countervailing benefits to consumers and competition of permitting novel payments methods....

In sum, the FRBA's analysis of the prohibition of novel payments in telemarketing indicates that any reduction in consumer harm from telemarketing fraud is outweighed by the likely benefits to consumers and competition of avoiding a fragmented law of payments, not limiting the use of novel payments prematurely, and allowing financial regulators working with industry to develop better consumer protections.²⁸⁶

Again, it appears that the Commission majority failed to undertake an economically rigorous analysis of the sort BE would likely perform, in this case failing to properly weigh injury and countervailing benefits as Section 5(n) requires.

²⁸⁴ 78 Fed. Reg. 4002 *available at*

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/federal_register_notices/2013/01/2012-31341.pdf

²⁸⁵ Separate Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dissenting in Part, In the Matter of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, Project No. R411001, at n. 3 (Nov. 18, 2015), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/881203/151118tsrmkospeech.pdf.

²⁸⁶ *Id.* at 1-2.

At a minimum, the Commission would have done well to solicit further public comment on its rule, heeding the experience of past chairmen, as summarized by Former Chairman Tim Muris:

By their nature, however, rules also must apply to legitimate actors, who actually deliver the goods and services they promise. Remedies and approaches that are entirely appropriate for bad actors can be extremely burdensome when applied to legitimate businesses, and there is usually no easy or straightforward way to limit a rule to fraud. Rather than enhancing consumer welfare, overly burdensome rules can harm the very market processes that serve consumers' interests. For example, the Commission's initial proposal for the Telemarketing Sales Rule was extremely broad and burdensome, and one of the first acts of the Pitofsky Commission was to narrow the rule. More recently, the Commission found it necessary to re-propose its Business Opportunity Rule, because the initial proposal would have adversely affected millions of self-employed workers.²⁸⁷

Issue-Specific Rulemakings

Several Bills Proposed

Congress has long enacted legislation tasking the FTC with enacting regulations in a specific area through standard rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. This, in effect, has allowed the FTC to avoid having to conduct rulemakings under the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975 (as amended in 1980). The result has been that there may not be anyone left at the FTC who has ever conducted a Section 5 rulemaking. This contributes to the common misconception that the FTC lacks rulemaking authority — something the Chairman and other Commissioners have said casually. Of course, they mean that the FTC lacks *APA* rulemaking authority, and that they believe Section 5 rulemaking is too difficult.

But this belief is unfounded. There is good reason to think that the FTC could have conducted a Section 5 rulemaking to address telemarketing complaints, for example, in about the same amount of time it took Congress to pass the Do Not Call Act and for the FTC to conduct an *APA* rulemaking, and perhaps even less. As Former Chairman Tim Muris explained, in 2010:

The Commission's most prominent rulemaking endeavor, the creation of the National Do Not Call Registry, could have proceeded in a timely fashion under Magnuson-Moss procedures. It took two years from the time the rule was first publicly discussed until it was implemented. Although it would have been neces-

²⁸⁷ *Statement of Timothy J. Muris, supra* note 14, at 24.

sary to structure the proceedings differently, there would have been little, if any, additional delay from using Magnuson-Moss procedures.²⁸⁸

This is not idle speculation. Muris actually ran the FTC during its creation of the Do Not Call registry. Attempting a Section 5 rulemaking would have been a valuable experience for the FTC, and it might have avoided some of the unintended consequences of ex ante legislation.

We make two broad recommendations applicable to all six rulemaking bills.

RECOMMENDATION: Require the FTC to Conduct Section 5 Rulemakings & Report on the Process

The FTC would greatly benefit from conducting a Section 5 rulemaking. Congress should direct the FTC to conduct such a rulemaking on at least one, and preferably two or three, of the issues to be addressed by these proposed issue-specific bills. Having multiple rulemakings would produce a more representative experience with the FTC's Section 5 rulemaking powers. However many Section 5 rulemakings the FTC does, Congress should direct the FTC to report back in, say, three years as to the state of these rulemakings and the FTC's general experience with its Section 5 rulemaking procedures. This is the only way Congress will ever be able to make informed decisions about how existing Section 5 rulemaking processes might be expedited or streamlined without removing the safeguards that Congress rightly imposed to prevent the FTC from abusing its rulemaking powers.

Any reconsideration of the FTC's Section 5 rulemaking processes should be undertaken with the utmost caution. Unfairness is a uniquely elastic concept, which requires unique procedural safeguards if it is to serve as the basis for rulemaking. If anything, FTC's approach to enforcing Section 5 in high tech matters over the last 15–20 years reconfirms the need for safeguards: in its “common law of consent decrees,” the FTC has paid little more than lip service to the balancing test inherent in unfairness, and has increasingly nullified the materiality requirement at the heart of the deception policy statement.

RECOMMENDATION: Include Periodic Re-Assessment Requirements in Any New Grants of APA Rulemaking Authority

It is impossible to predict the unintended consequences of any of the proposed issue-specific bills granting the FTC new rulemaking authority.²⁸⁹ However narrowly targeted they may

²⁸⁸ *Id.* at 27.

²⁸⁹ See Press Release, #SubCMT Releases Reform Package to Modernize the FTC and Promote Innovation, THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE (May 5, 2016), <https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/press-releases/subcmt-releases-reform-package-modernize-ftc-and-promote-innovation>.

seem, they may wind up constraining new technologies or business models that would otherwise serve consumers.

Consider the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“VPPA”), which barred “wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records.”²⁹⁰ After the experience of Judge Robert Bork, whose video rental records were made an issue at his (failed) Supreme Court confirmation hearings, this quick-fix bill must have seemed utterly uncontroversial. Yet it proved overly rigid in the digital age. In 2009, an anonymous plaintiff sued Netflix over its release of data sets for the Netflix Prize, alleging that the company’s release of the information constituted a violation of the VPPA.²⁹¹ In 2011 Netflix launched a feature integrating its service with Facebook — everywhere *except* in the U.S., citing the 2009 lawsuit and concerns over the VPPA. After two years, President Obama signed legislation (H.R. 6671) amending the VPPA to allow Netflix and other video companies to *give consumers the option* of sharing information about their viewing history on social networking sites like Facebook.²⁹² Despite this amendment, the VPPA continues to threaten to overly restrict novel online transactions that were never contemplated or intended by the drafters of the statute.²⁹³

The VPPA is just one of many laws that have proven unable to keep up with technological change (the 1996 Telecommunications Act, (largely) a classic example of the Rulemaking Model, comes readily to mind). To protect against this inevitability, Congress should include regular review of legislation as a “safety hatch.” The 1998 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) included this review provision:

Not later than 5 years after the effective date of the regulations initially issued under ... this title, the Commission shall —

(1) review the implementation of this chapter, including the effect of the implementation of this chapter on practices relating to the collection and disclosure of information relating to children, children’s ability to obtain access to information of their choice online, and on the availability of websites directed to children; and
(2) prepare and submit to Congress a report on the results of the review under paragraph (1).²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (Nov. 5, 1988), *available at* <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE-102-Pg3195.pdf>.

²⁹¹ See Kristian Stout, *Pushing Ad Networks Out of Business: Yershov v. Gannett and the War Against Online Platforms*, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 10, 2016), <https://truthonthemarket.com/2016/05/10/pushing-ad-networks-out-of-business-yershov-v-gannett-and-the-war-against-online-platforms/>.

²⁹² Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, H.R. 6671, 112th Cong (2012), *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/6671?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hr6671%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1>.

²⁹³ See Stout, *supra* note 291.

²⁹⁴ 15 U.S.C. § 6506.

In principle, this is the right idea. However, in practice, this requirement has proven ineffective. The FTC’s review of COPPA included little meaningful analysis of the cost of COPPA.²⁹⁵ Indeed, the FTC used the discretion afforded it by Congress in the statute to expand the definition of the term “personal information” in ways that appear to have reduced the availability, affordability and diversity of children’s media — yet without any economic analysis by the Commission.

At a minimum, Congress should include something like the following in any issue-specific grant of new APA rulemaking authority it enacts:

Not later than 5 years after the effective date of the regulations initially issued under... this title, *and every 5 years thereafter*, the Commission shall —

(1) *direct the Bureau of Economics, with the assistance of the Office of Technology Research and Investigation*, to review the implementation of this chapter, including the effect of the implementation of this chapter on practices relating to *[affected industries]*; and

(2) prepare and submit to Congress a report on the results of the review under paragraph (1).

Conclusion

The letter by which the FTC submitted the Unfairness Policy Statement to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Commerce Committee in December 1980 concludes as follows:

We hope this letter has given you the information that you require. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of any further assistance. With best regards,

/s/Michael Pertschuk, Chairman²⁹⁶

We believe it’s high time Congress picked up the phone.

To be effective, any effort to reform the FTC would require a constructive dialogue with the Commission — not just those currently sitting on the Commission, but past Commissioners and the agency’s staff, including veterans of the agency. Along with the community of practitioners who navigate the agency on behalf of companies and civil society alike, all of these will have something to add. We do not presume to fully understand the inner workings of the Commission as only veterans of the agency can. Nor do we presume that the ideas presented here are necessarily the best or only ones to accomplish the task at hand. But reform

²⁹⁵ See *supra* note 284.

²⁹⁶ Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness>

cannot be effective if it begins from the presumption that today's is the "best of all possible FTCs," or that any significant reform to the agency would cripple it.

Unfortunately, many of those who would tend to know the most about the inner workings of the agency are also the most blinded by status quo bias, the tendency not just to take for granted that the FTC works, and has always worked, well, but to dismiss proposals for change as an attacks upon the agency. It would be ironic, indeed, if an agency that wields its own discretion so freely in the name of flexibility and adaptation were itself unwilling to adapt.

We believe that reforms to push the FTC back towards the Evolutionary Model can be part of a bipartisan overhaul and reauthorization of the agency, just as they were in 1980 and 1994. At stake is much more than how the FTC operates; it is nothing less than the authority of Congress as the body of our democratically elected representatives to steer the FTC. Congress should not, as Justice Scalia warned in 2014 in *UARG v. EPA*, willingly "stand on the dock and wave goodbye as [the FTC] embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery."²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014).



Testimony of

TechFreedom

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**FTC Stakeholder Perspectives: Reform Proposals to
Improve Fairness, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare**

*Hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance,
& Data Security of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation*

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

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**Russell Senate Office Building
Room 253**

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I. Introduction

Over the last two decades, use of, and access to, the Internet has grown exponentially, connecting people and businesses and improving the human condition in ways never before imagined. In 2011, 71.7% of households reported accessing the Internet, a sharp increase from 18 percent in 1997 and 54.7% in 2003.³ This digital growth — from a network of computers that only a few consumers could reach, to a seemingly infinite marketplace of ideas accessible by almost all Americans — has benefited society beyond measure, affording consumers the ability to access information, purchase goods and services, and interact with each other almost instantaneously without having to leave the home.⁴

However, as use and benefits of the Internet has grown, so too has the collection of personal data and, consequently, cyber-attacks endeavoring to steal that data. Since 2013, the number of companies facing data breaches has steadily increased.⁵ In 2016, 52% of companies reported experiencing a breach — an increase from 49% in 2015 — with 66% of those who experienced a breach reporting multiple breaches.⁶ Perhaps not surprisingly, not much has changed since 2000, where one report revealed that system penetration by outsiders grew by 30% from 1998 to 1999.⁷ Interestingly, despite immense improvements in companies' ability to anticipate and prevent cyber-attacks, some of the largest and most sophisticated companies in the world, including Sony, Target, eBay, and JPMorgan, continue to experience data breaches today,⁸ just as they did in 2000.⁹ In spite of these statistics, the United States currently has no comprehensive legal framework in which to inform companies of the best

³ THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (May 2013), <https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf>; see also Steve Case, The Complete History of the Internet's Boom, Bust, Boom Cycle, Business Insider (Jan. 14, 2011), available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-factors-led-to-the-bursting-of-the-internet-bubble-of-the-late-90s-2011-1>.

⁴ See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2000), <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf>.

⁵ PONEMON INST. LLC, FOURTH ANNUAL STUDY: IS YOUR COMPANY READY FOR A BIG DATA BREACH? 1 (2016), <http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2016-experian-data-breach-preparedness-study.pdf> [hereinafter PONEMON, DATA BREACH].

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ Hope Hamashige, *Cybercrime can kill venture*, CNN (March 10, 2000), http://cnfn.cnn.com/2000/03/10/electronic/q_crime/index.htm (reporting the findings of the Computer Security Institute at Carnegie Mellon University).

⁸ PONEMON INST. LLC, 2014: A YEAR OF MEGA BREACHES 1 (2015), <http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2014%20The%20Year%20of%20the%20Mega%20Breach%20FINAL3.pdf>.

⁹ Hamashige, *Cybercrime* (noting that, just as today, in 2000, “[e]ven the biggest Internet companies with the most sophisticated technology are vulnerable to hackers, a trend highlighted last month when hackers stopped traffic on several popular Internet sites including Yahoo!, Amazon.com and eBay.”).

practices to both prevent or respond to cyber-attacks, as well as to ensure that they're acting responsibly in the eyes of the Government.¹⁰

Absent a comprehensive statutory framework, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") happily stepped in to police the vast number of data security and privacy practices not covered by the few Internet privacy and cyber security statutes enacted at the time. For two decades, the FTC has grappled with the consumer protection issues raised by the Digital Revolution. Armed with vast jurisdiction and broad discretion to decide what is unfair and deceptive, the agency has dealt with everything from privacy to data security, from online purchases to child protection, and much more. The FTC has become the Federal *Technology* Commission — a term we coined,¹¹ but which the FTC and others have embraced.¹²

This was inevitable, given the nature of the FTC's authority. Enforcing the promises made by tech companies to consumers forms a natural baseline for digital consumer protection. On top of that deception power, the FTC has broad power to police other practices, without waiting for Congress to catch up. As the FTC said in its 1980 Unfairness Policy statement:

The present understanding of the unfairness standard is the result of an evolutionary process. The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion.¹³

¹⁰ See, e.g., ALAN CHARLES RAUL, TASHA D MANORANJAN & VIVEK MOHAN, THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 268 (Alan Charles Raul, 1st ed. 2014) ("With certain notable exceptions, the US system does not apply a 'precautionary principle' to protect privacy, but rather, allows injured parties (and government agencies) to bring legal action to recover damages for, or enjoin, 'unfair or deceptive' business practices.").

¹¹ Berin Szóka & Geoffrey Manne, The Second Century of the Federal Trade Commission, TECHDIRT (Sept. 26, 2013), available at <https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130926/16542624670/secondcentury-federal-trade-commission.shtml>; see also Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission, Report 1.0 of the FTC: Technology & Reform Project, 3 (Dec. 2013), available at http://docs.techfreedom.org/FTC_Tech_Reform_Report.pdf.

¹² Kai Ryssdal, The FTC is Dealing with More High Tech Issues, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting then-Chairman Edith Ramirez), available at <http://www.marketplace.org/2016/03/07/tech/ftc-dealing-more-high-tech-issues>.

See, e.g., Omer Tene, *With Ramirez, FTC became the Federal Technology Commission*, IAPP (Jan. 18, 2017), <https://iapp.org/news/a/with-ramirez-ftc-became-the-federal-technology-commission/>.

¹³ Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness> (hereinafter 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement).

The question is not whether the FTC *should* be the Federal Technology Commission, but *how* it wields its powers. For all that academics like to talk about creating a Federal Search Commission¹⁴ or a Federal Robotics Commission,¹⁵ and for all the talk in Washington of passing “comprehensive baseline privacy legislation” or data security legislation, the most important questions turn on the FTC’s processes, standards, and institutional structure. How the FTC and Congress handle these seemingly banal matters could be even more important in determining how consumer protection works in 2117 than will any major legislative lurches over the next century. Indeed, with the costs of cybercrimes expected to reach \$2 trillion by 2019,¹⁶ the business community can ill afford to have to anticipate the approaches of both hackers and federal regulators simultaneously, and it would seem more practical for the agency to help guide businesses by providing best practices to better protect their consumers. Yet, rather than promulgate rules or provide any clear guidance, the FTC has instead chosen to approach the issue through case-by-case enforcement actions, almost always ending in consent decrees, which do not admit liability and only focus on prospective requirements of the specific defendant in that case.¹⁷

This approach, and the resulting ambiguity, has left companies facing uncertainty in terms of whether their data security and privacy practices are not only sufficient to safeguard against an FTC enforcement action, but more importantly, whether they’re utilizing the best practices available to protect their consumers’ data and privacy.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, *Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search*, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008), available at <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Bracha-Pasquale-Final.pdf>.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Ryan Calo, *The case for a federal robotics commission*, Brookings Institute (Sept. 15, 2014), available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-a-federal-robotics-commission/>; Nancy Scola, *Why the U.S. might just need a Federal Commission on Robotics*, Washington Post (Sept. 15, 2014), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/15/why-the-u-s-might-just-need-a-federal-commission-on-robots/?utm_term=.38dfc4bec72e.

¹⁶ Steve Morgan, *Cyber Crime Costs Projected to Reach \$2 Trillion by 2019*, Forbes (Jan. 17, 2016), available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-projected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#6e10063a3a91>.

¹⁷ See *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 257, n.22. (3d Cir. 2015). Notably, this practice is not entirely limited to data security and privacy enforcement — though for reasons later discussed, the effects on companies are arguably more severe in this context — by the Commission, with one study finding that 1,524 of the 2,092 enforcement action brought by the FTC in either federal or administrative courts have ended in consent decrees without any adjudication. This means that almost 73% of the FTC’s enforcement actions have ended in legally enforceable orders, despite no impartial judicial guidance as to the factual and legal legitimacy of the FTC’s claims. See Daniel A. Crane, *Debunking Humphrey’s Executor*, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1867 (2015). But in tech-related cases its almost 100%, meaning the courts have played essentially no role at all in disciplining the FTC’s use of unfairness in “informational injury” cases. See *infra* note 122 (providing list of a few cases that did not result in settlement).

Understandably, this ambiguity has frustrated judges and legal commentators alike, even resulting in one company's demise. Such frustration was made abundantly clear by the Third Circuit when, despite affirming the FTC's authority to regulate cyber security practices under the "unfair practices" prong of Section 5, the court nonetheless questioned the Commission's assertion that its consent decrees and "guidance" somehow create standards against which companies' cyber practices can be tested for "unfairness."¹⁸ In fact, the Third Circuit emphatically agreed with the defendant's claim that "consent orders, which admit no liability and which focus on prospective requirements on the defendant, were of little use to it in trying to understand the specific requirements imposed by § 45(a)."¹⁹ The court continued:

We recognize it may be unfair to expect private parties back in 2008 to have examined FTC complaints or consent decrees. Indeed, these may not be the kinds of legal documents they typically consulted. At oral argument we asked how private parties in 2008 would have known to consult them. The FTC's only answer was that "if you're a careful general counsel you do pay attention to what the FTC is doing, and you do look at these things." Oral Arg. Tr. at 51. We also asked whether the FTC has "informed the public that it needs to look at complaints and consent decrees for guidance," and the Commission could offer no examples. *Id.* at 52.²⁰

The court's frustration did not end with the Commission's use of consent decrees either, making sure to also address issues with the FTC's 2007 guidebook, *Protecting Personal Information, A Guide for Businesses*, which, according to the FCC, "describes a 'checklist[]' of practices that form a 'sound data security plan.'"²¹ Ultimately, the court recognized that "[t]he guidebook does not state that any particular practice is required by [Section 5]," and "[f]or this reason, we agree ... that the guidebook could not, on its own, provide 'ascertainable certainty' of the FTC's interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices fail [Section 5]."²²

Despite being rebuked by practitioners and courts alike, the FTC has brushed aside this frustration and continued to rely on consent decrees, conclusory guidebooks/reports, and "blog posts" to inform businesses as to what constitutes reasonable data security and privacy practices. By contrast, the FTC has pursued a radically different course, providing significantly more thorough guidance in an area not considered to be the FTC's primary jurisdiction — environmental regulations through "Green Guides." As explained below, these Green Guides

¹⁸ *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 252-253, 255 (3d Cir. 2015).

¹⁹ *Id.* at 257 n.22.

²⁰ *Id.* at 257 n.23.

²¹ *Id.* at 257.

²² *Id.* at 257 n.21.

reflect a sincere and thoughtful effort by the FTC to gather relevant data as the basis for analyzing not only “what” is required, but more significantly “why” is it essential and “how much” of a certain practice is necessary.

On privacy and data security, the Commission has refused to do such empirical work or to issue clear guidance, relying instead on consent decrees and conclusory reports and guidebooks that lack any evident empirical foundation. This has deprived businesses of the regulatory certainty and clarity they need to comply with the law — and deprived consumers of better, more consistent data security and privacy practices. The Commission has flaunted the warning given it by the D.C. Circuit over forty years ago, that “courts have stressed the advantages of efficiency and expedition which inhere in reliance on rule-making instead of adjudication alone,” including in providing businesses with greater certainty as to what business practices are not permissible.²³ Ironically, the D.C. Circuit made that statement in a case where the FTC fought vehemently — and the court agreed — for the authority to provide the very guidance they refuse to provide to the digital economy today. Congress *did* provide that rulemaking authority a year later, with the Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975,²⁴ but also found it necessary to institute new procedural safeguards in 1980, after the FTC’s gross abuse of its rulemaking powers in the intervening five years,²⁵ which culminated in the agency being denounced as the “National Nanny.”²⁶

With this backdrop in mind, I come before this Committee today with two goals. First, to inform this body — through a historical lens — of the FTC’s ongoing procedural issues, particularly as they pertain to data security and privacy practices. Second, to use that historical analysis as a framework with which to propose practical process reforms that will ensure American businesses and the FTC work together as partners, not enemies, to make certain that consumers’—including Americans as well as foreign consumers who patronize U.S. businesses—data and privacy are afforded the greatest respect and protection possible.

²³ *Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. F.T.C.*, 482 F.2d 672, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).

²⁴ The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement (Magnuson-Moss) Act, Pub.L.No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).

²⁵ The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980 (Improvements Act), Pub.L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).

²⁶ Editorial, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, *REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION*, 69–70 (1982); see also J. Howard Beales III, *Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that Advises the Present*, 8 n.37 (2004), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kidsand-ftc-regulatory-retrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf. (“Former FTC Chairman Pertschuk characterizes the Post editorial as a turning point in the Federal Trade Commission’s fortunes.”).

To that end, we herein provide a more in-depth historical analysis of the FTC’s enforcement authority, including an examination of the problems that have arisen due to the FTC’s current procedural issues. We detail how the FTC has utilized data-driven guidance in other contexts — namely the aforementioned Green Guides — to guide businesses through empirical analysis of available data. Finally, we use that historical context to frame ways that Congress can help urge the FTC to provide the same types of empirical guidance to the tech industry. Finally, I will discuss the underlying issues with the FTC’s *very* low pleading standard and examine ways that Congress can address this problem.

Background of FTC Enforcement in the Digital Economy

While the FTC began studying online privacy issues as early as 1995,²⁷ the FTC truly started dealing with consumer protection issues related to the Internet in 1997 — settling a series of assorted cases before, in 2001, it brought its first data security enforcement action premised on deception, settled against Eli Lilly in 2002.²⁸ In 2005, the FTC brought its first data security action premised on unfairness against BJ’s Wholesale Club.²⁹ According to the FTC’s most recent Privacy & Data Security Update, the Commission has brought over 60 data security cases since 2002, over 40 general privacy cases, and over 130 spam and spyware cases.³⁰ Yet, as discussed, rather than promulgate rules or provide any clear guidance, the FTC has instead chosen to approach the issue through case-by-case enforcement actions, almost always ending in consent decrees, which only focus on prospective requirements of the specific defendant in that case.³¹ the FTC truly started dealing with consumer protection issues related to the Internet in 1997 — settling a series of assorted cases before, in 2001, it brought

²⁷ See FED. TRADE COMM’N, *PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2* (June 1998), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf> [hereinafter 1998 FTC Privacy Report] (“In April 1995, staff held its first public workshop on Privacy on the Internet, and in November of that year, the Commission held hearings on online privacy as part of its extensive hearings on the implications of globalization and technological innovation for competition and consumer protection issues.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, *A REPORT FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF: THE FTC’S FIRST FIVE YEARS PROTECTING CONSUMERS ONLINE* (Dec. 1999), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/protecting-consumers-online/fiveyearreport.pdf>.

²⁸ See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach* (Jan. 18, 2002), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/01/eli-lilly-settles-ftc-charges-concerning-security-breach>.

²⁹ See Complaint, *In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.* (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. C-4-4148), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/092305comp0423160.pdf>; see also Michael D. Scott, *The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?*, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 127, 146 (2008) (discussing BJ’s Wholesale Club enforcement action and use of unfairness prong).

³⁰ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, *2016 Privacy & Data Security Update* (Jan. 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016> (providing overview of various enforcement actions).

³¹ *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 257 n.22 (3d Cir. 2015).

its first data security enforcement action premised on deception, settled against Eli Lilly in 2002.³² In 2005, the FTC brought its first data security action premised on unfairness against BJ's Wholesale Club.³³ According to the FTC's most recent Privacy & Data Security Update, the Commission has brought over 60 data security cases since 2002, over 40 general privacy cases, and over 130 spam and spyware cases.³⁴ Yet, as discussed, rather than promulgate rules or provide any clear guidance, the FTC has instead chosen to approach the issue through case-by-case enforcement actions, almost always ending in consent decrees, which only focus on prospective requirements of the specific defendant in that case.³⁵

In a speech last week, Acting Chairman Ohlhausen broadly summarized the “various types of consumer injury addressed in our privacy and data security cases” as “informational injury.”³⁶ It's a useful shorthand: one term to describe a cluster of consumer protection problems behind a wide range of cases. But for the same reason, it's also a dangerous term — one that could, like “net neutrality,” take on a life its own, and serve to obscure and frustrate analysis rather than inform it.³⁷ Of course, Chairman Ohlhausen chose her words carefully:

[L]et me also emphasize that this is not a discussion of the legal question of what constitutes a ‘substantial injury’ under our unfairness standard. My topic today

³² See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach* (Jan. 18, 2002), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/01/eli-lilly-settles-ftc-charges-concerning-security-breach>.

³³ See Complaint, *In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc.* (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. C-4-4148), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/092305comp0423160.pdf>; see also Michael D. Scott, *The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?*, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 127, 146 (2008) (discussing BJ's Wholesale Club enforcement action and use of unfairness prong).

³⁴ See Fed. Trade Comm'n, 2016 Privacy & Data Security Update (Jan. 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016> (providing overview of various enforcement actions).

³⁵ *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 257 n.22 (3d Cir. 2015).

³⁶ Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Painting the Privacy Landscape: Information Injury in FTC Privacy and Data Security Cases*, Address Before the Federal Communications Bar Association (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1255113/privacy_speech_mkohlhausen.pdf [hereinafter Ohlhausen, *Informational Injury Speech*].

³⁷ Larry Downes, *The Tangled Web of Net Neutrality and Regulation*, Harvard Business Review (March 31, 2017), available at <https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-tangled-web-of-net-neutrality-and-regulation> (“Despite being a simple idea, net neutrality has proven difficult to translate into U.S. policy. It sits uncomfortably at the intersection of highly technical internet architecture and equally complex principles of administrative law. Even the term “net neutrality” was coined not by an engineer but by a legal academic, in 2003.”). Gerard Stegmaier, a veteran attorney in the field of data security and privacy, explained it as such: “Words matter. Net Neutrality. Deep Packet Inspection. #Privacy. Businesses beware. There's a new label in town from the gov't and repeating it could have significant unintended consequences. From a speech yesterday the @FTC acting chair declared “informational injuries” exist. Let that sink in.” Posting of Gerard Stegmaier on LinkedIn.com (Sept. 20, 2017), available at <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6316291846356115456> (also on file with author).

may inform the substantial injury question, but I am speaking more broadly. Indeed, many of the cases I will mention are deception cases, or allege both deception and unfairness.

...

In my review of our privacy and data security cases, I have identified at least five different types of consumer informational injury. Certain of these types are more common. Many of our cases involve multiple types of injury. Courts and FTC cases often emphasize *measurable* injuries from privacy and data security incidents, although other injuries may be present. And to be clear, not all of these types of injury, standing alone, would be sufficient to trigger liability under the FTC Act.³⁸

It is fitting that she should emphasize the word “measurable” — and also caveat it with the word “often” — because both speak to the central question facing the Federal Technology Commission as it grapples with an endless, and accelerating, parade of novel consumer protection issues: *how* does the agency determine what the right answer is in any particular case and what should be done about it? Ohlhausen defended the FTC’s approach to privacy and data security enforcement:

Case-by-case enforcement focuses on real-world facts and specifically alleged behaviors and injuries. As such, each case integrates feedback on earlier cases from advocates, the marketplace and, importantly, the courts. This ongoing process preserves companies’ freedom to innovate with data use. And it can adapt to new technologies and new causes of injury.³⁹

Yes, the courts’ “feedback” is “important.” Indeed, in a reply brief the FTC expressly agreed with TechFreedom on this importance of courts’ guidance when it said it “agrees that the field would be aided by a body of law that includes ‘Article III court decisions.’”⁴⁰ Yet, such assertions of the importance of courts’ “feedback” by the FTC seem empty given there has been precious little of it. Since 1997, not counting a handful of cases where the FTC sought

³⁸ Ohlhausen, *Informational Injury Speech*, *supra* note 36, at 2-3.

³⁹ Ohlhausen, *Informational Injury Speech*, *supra* note 36, at 2.

⁴⁰ Plaintiff’s Response In Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), *aff’d*, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-SCM) at 22, n. 8.

injunctive relief against absent defendants (generally foreign scammers), the FTC has litigated, even partially, only a handful of cases: *LabMD*,⁴¹ *Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*,⁴² *Amazon.com, Inc.*,⁴³ and *D-Link Systems, Inc.*⁴⁴ Thus, the way the FTC works today is a far cry from what the FTC said about how it would operate back in 1980:

The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to the Commission, subject to judicial review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would evolve and develop over time. As the Supreme Court observed as early as 1931, the ban on unfairness “belongs to that class of phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called ‘the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.’”⁴⁵

What former FTC Chairman Tim Muris said of the Commission in 1981 remains true today: “Within very broad limits, the agency determines what shall be legal. Indeed, the agency has been ‘lawless’ in the sense that it has traditionally been beyond judicial control.”⁴⁶ As he noted in his 2010 testimony before a Senate Subcommittee, “the Commission’s authority remains extremely broad.”⁴⁷ What Commissioner Wright said of the FTC’s competition enforcement — where the Commission differs from the DOJ in enforcing (in theory, anyway) the same substantive laws — is even more true of consumer protection:

The combination of institutional and procedural advantages with the vague nature of the Commission’s Section 5 authority gives the agency the ability, in some cases, to elicit a settlement even though the conduct in question very likely may

⁴¹ *LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, No. 1:14-CV-00810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2014), *aff’d*, 776 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015).

⁴² *F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 257 n.22 (3d Cir. 2015).

⁴³ *F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2014).

⁴⁴ *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017 WL 4150873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).

⁴⁵ 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement, *supra* note 12 (quoting *FTC v. Raladam Co.*, 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).

⁴⁶ Timothy J. Muris, Judicial Constraints, in *THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR*, 35, 49 (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, eds., 1981).

⁴⁷ *Hearing on Financial Services and Products: The Role of the Fed. Trade Commission in Protecting Customers, before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation*, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Former Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n) available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/muris_senate_testimony_ftc_role_protecting_consumers_3-17-101.pdf.

not [violate any law or regulation]. This is because firms typically prefer to settle a Section 5 claim rather than going through lengthy and costly administrative litigation in which they are both shooting at a moving target and have the chips stacked against them. Significantly, such settlements also perpetuate the uncertainty that exists as a result of the ambiguity associated with the Commission's [Section 5] authority by encouraging a process by which the contours of Section 5 are drawn without any meaningful adversarial proceeding or substantive analysis of the Commission's authority.⁴⁸

Without the courts to demand rigor from the FTC in defining “measurable” harm, what should the Commission do? And what should Congress do?

Chairman Ohlhausen's speech represents a major step in the right direction — precisely because it promises to give more analytical rigor to the term “informational injury” than such generalizations generally have. She concludes:

This analysis raises several important questions. Is this list of injuries representative? When do these or other informational injuries require government intervention? Perhaps most importantly, how does this list map to our statutory deception and unfairness authorities?

These are critical and challenging questions. That's why I am announcing today that the FTC will host a workshop on informational injury on December 12 of this year. This workshop will bring stakeholders together to discuss these issues in depth. I have three goals for this workshop: First, better identify the qualitatively different types of injury to consumers and businesses from privacy and data security incidents. Second, explore frameworks for how we might approach quantitatively measuring such injuries and estimate the risk of their occurrence. And third, better understand how consumers and businesses weigh these injuries and risks when evaluating the tradeoffs to sharing, collecting, storing, and using information. Ultimately, the goal is to inform our case selection and enforcement choices going forward.⁴⁹

Amen. This is the kind of workshop the FTC should have held two decades ago — and several more times since. The FTC has, in fact, conducted such workshops, collected empirical data,

⁴⁸ Joshua D. Wright, *Revisiting Antitrust Institutions: The Case for Guidelines to Recalibrate the Federal Trade Commission's Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Authority*, 4 CONCURRENTS: COMPETITION L.J. 1 at 3 (2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/siting-antitrust-institutions-case-guidelines-recalibrate-federal-trade-commissions-section-5-unfair/concurrences-4-2013.pdf.

⁴⁹ Ohlhausen, *Informational Injury Speech*, *supra* note 36, at 9.

and issued corresponding guidance based upon rigorous empirical analysis in another context: the Green Guides first issued for environmental marketing in 1992, and updated three times since then.⁵⁰ As discussed below, these offer an excellent model for how the Commission could begin to take a more substantive approach to defining informational injury, while also providing clearer guidance to industry.

Congress should support and encourage this effort — by holding the FTC to the high standards set by its work on the Green Guides. If this effort represents a significant departure with the analytically flimsy, “know-it-when-we-see-it” approach the FTC has generally taken to “informational injury” cases thus far, both consumers and companies would benefit from clearer, better substantiated guidance. But this will not be an easy change to make; it will require a new degree of rigor in how the Bureau of Consumer Protection operates, and a new closeness in BCP’s engagement with the Bureau of Economics.

At best, this could be the beginnings of a “law and economics” revolution in consumer protection law — of the sort that transformed competition law in decades past, has guided the Bureau of Competition since, and has informed the courts in their development of antitrust case law.

But at worst, this process could result in blessing the FTC’s current approach with a veneer of analytical rigor that merely validates the status quo. The report that comes out of this process *could* resemble the reports the FTC has produced since the 2012 Privacy Report, which make broad recommendations as to what industry best practices should be, without any real analysis behind those recommendations or how they relate to the Commission’s powers under Section 5.⁵¹

Chairman Ohlhausen’s initial thoughtful framing suggests reason for optimism, but everything will depend on how she and whoever becomes permanent Chairman (if it is not her) execute on the plan. In any event, the Commission’s own more recent experience with the

⁵⁰ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Environmental Friendly Products: FTC’s Green Guides* (last visited Sept. 24, 2017), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/green-guides> (“The Green Guides were first issued in 1992 and were revised in 1996, 1998, and 2012. The guidance they provide includes: 1) general principles that apply to all environmental marketing claims; 2) how consumers are likely to interpret particular claims and how marketers can substantiate these claims; and 3) how marketers can qualify their claims to avoid deceiving consumers.”).

⁵¹ See BERIN SZÓKA & GEOFFREY A. MANNE, *THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE SECOND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE 57-60* (2016), available at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20160524/104976/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-ManneG-20160524-SD004.pdf> [hereinafter White Paper].

Green Guides — to say nothing of the last 15 years of experience with data security and privacy — suggests that self-restraint is unlikely to prove sustainable, on its own, in disciplining the agency. Ultimately, the kind of analytical quality that has defined antitrust law, and has sustained the law and economics approach there, requires *external* constraints — namely, regular engagement with the courts and oversight by Congress.

To that end, a careful reassessment of the Commission’s processes is long overdue. The last time Congress seriously reconsidered, and revised, the FTC’s processes was in 1994.⁵² The agency has not been reauthorized since 1996.⁵³ Congress should return to its habit — the default assumption prior to Ken Starr, Monica Lewinsky, and impeachment — of reauthorizing the FTC every two years and, each time, re-examining how well the agency is working. Modifications to the statute should not be made lightly, but they should also happen more often than once in a generation.

Last year, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce considered no fewer than seventeen bills regarding the FTC. The attached white paper, co-authored with Geoffrey Manne, Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, surveys those bills and provides recommendations to Congress on how to approach them.⁵⁴ Together, they form a starting point for the Senate Commerce Committee to begin its work, but they do not cover many of the most important aspects of how the agency works. Given this Committee’s extensive knowledge and expertise, we hope that this Committee, along with the broader Senate, should start its own work on FTC reform legislation afresh.

II. Summary of Proposed Legislative Reforms

Rather than repeat the full analysis provided in the aforementioned white paper we presented to the House Energy & Commerce Committee last year, we have instead provided a short overview of how to consider thinking about the main issues we believe need to be addressed through legislation.

⁵² Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691 (Aug. 26, 1994) *available at* <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/103/312.pdf>.

⁵³ Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-216, 110 Stat. 3019 (Oct. 1, 1996), *available at* <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/104/216.pdf>.

⁵⁴ *See generally* White Paper, *supra* note 51.

A. The Common Carrier Exception

The FTC Act excludes “common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce.”⁵⁵ What this provision means will be crucial — especially for technology cases in the coming years — and merits clarification from Congress.

The Federal Communications Commission has proposed to undo its 2015 reclassification of broadband providers as common carriers.⁵⁶ Doing so will return the controversial issue of “net neutrality” to the Federal Trade Commission by restoring the FTC’s jurisdiction over broadband providers — or rather, there *should* be a seamless transition to ensure that consumers remain protected. But a Ninth Circuit panel decision last year calls into question whether the FTC’s jurisdiction will be fully restored,⁵⁷ creating the possibility that a company providing broadband service, once that service is no longer considered a common carrier service by the FCC, might still remain outside the jurisdiction of the FTC either because (1) that particular corporate entity also provides a common carrier service such as voice (which will remain subject to Title II of the Communications Act even after the FCC’s proposes re-reclassification of broadband) or (2) another corporate entity under common ownership provides such a common carrier service. In short, the panel decision rejected the FTC’s longstanding “activity-based” interpretation of the statute in favor of an “entity-based” interpretation. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing of that decision earlier this year, effectively vacating the panel decision.⁵⁸

At oral arguments last week, AT&T stuck by its general arguments for an entity-bases interpretation, but clarified two things.⁵⁹ First, it read the statute to turn on the common carrier or non-common carrier status of each specific corporate entity, so that the FTC’s jurisdiction over Oath, for example, the company formed by the Verizon parent company after it acquired AOL and Yahoo! and merged them together, would not be affected by the fact that Verizon Wireless provides a common carrier voice service. Second, AT&T argued that the FCC has plenary jurisdiction to, as it did in the *Computer Inquiries*, mandate such structural separation to ensure that there is no gap in consumer protection between the FTC and FCC.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).

⁵⁶ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, 32 FCC Rcd 4434 (2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-17-60A1_Rcd.pdf.

⁵⁷ *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT & T Mobility LLC*, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), *reh’g en banc granted sub nom.*, *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC*, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).

⁵⁸ *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC*, 864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).

⁵⁹ United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC*, 864 F.3d 995 (2017), Oral Arguments, *available at* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs8EQU-KIEW>.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 13:50.

It is impossible to predict how the Ninth Circuit might resolve this case, but it is safe to say that if the FCC issues its Third Open Internet Order this year, or even early next year, that decision might well come out before the Ninth Circuit's decision.

Congress should not assume that the Ninth Circuit will fully restore the FTC's activity-based interpretation of its jurisdiction, even though appears to be the most likely result of the case. Congress should, instead, consider quickly moving legislation that would codify that interpretation. Even if the Ninth Circuit en banc panel accepts AT&T's argument and simply narrows the panel decision, that would only solve part of the problem raised by the panel decision. Requiring structural separation between "edge" companies like Oath and broadband companies like Verizon *might* make business sense anyway, but it might not — especially given the ongoing push to restrict the sharing of consumer data *even among corporate affiliates under common ownership*. Furthermore, AT&T's argument would still raise serious questions about which agency will deal with net neutrality and other consumer protection concerns about broadband services once they are returned to Title I: it is difficult to see how the common carrier services provided by these companies, if only telephony, could be functionally separated from the broadband service. Would consumers have to deal with, and subscribe to, two separate services, each offered by a separate corporate entity?

The Ninth Circuit may, of course, reject AT&T's arguments completely, fully reverse the panel decision, and restore the FTC's activity-based interpretation completely. But it would be far better for Congress to resolve this question before the FCC revises the regulatory classification of broadband. It could do so in a one-sentence bill.

Of course, many have argued that the common carrier exception should be abolished, and the Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act of 2016 (H.R. 5239) would have done just that.⁶¹ Simply restoring the activity-based exemption need not be permanent; it could be stop-gap measure that allows Congress time to consider whether to maintain the exemption.

B. More Economic Analysis

As many commentators have noted, the FTC has frequently failed to employ sufficient economic analysis in both its enforcement work and policymaking. Former Commissioner Josh Wright summarized the problem pointedly in a speech entitled "The FTC and Privacy Regulation: The Missing Role of Economics," explaining:

An economic approach to privacy regulation is guided by the tradeoff between the consumer welfare benefits of these new and enhanced products and services

⁶¹ Protecting Consumers in Commerce Act of 2016, H.R. 5239, 114th Cong. (2016), *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5239/text>.

against the potential harm to consumers, both of which arise from the same free flow and exchange of data. Unfortunately, government regulators have instead been slow, and at times outright reluctant, to embrace the flow of data. What I saw during my time at the FTC is what appears to be a generalized apprehension about the collection and use of data – whether or not the data is actually personally identifiable or sensitive – along with a corresponding, and arguably crippling, fear about the possible misuse of such data.⁶²

As Wright further noted, such an approach would take into account the risk of abuses that will cause consumer harm, weighed with as much precision as possible. Failing to do so can lead to significant problems, including creating disincentives for companies to innovate and create benefits for consumers.

Specifically, Congress or the FTC should require the Bureau of Economics to have a role in commenting on consent decrees⁶³ and proposed rulemaking,⁶⁴ and a greater role in the CID process. But the most effective ways to engage economists in the FTC's decisionmaking would be to raise the FTC's pleading standards and make reforms to the CID process designed to make litigation more likely: in both cases, the FTC will have to engage its economists more closely, either in order to ensure that its complaints are well-pleaded or to prevail on the merits in federal court.

C. Clarification of the FTC's Substantive Standards

The FTC has departed in significant ways from both the letter and spirit of the 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement and the 1983 Deception Policy Statement. This is mainly due to the FTC essentially having complete, unchecked, discretion to interpret these policy statements as it sees fit — including the discretion to change course regularly without notice. The courts simply have not had the opportunity to effectively implement Section 5(n), nor has the FTC ever really chosen to constrain its own discretion in meaningful ways (as it has done with the Green Guides). Making substantive clarifications to Section 5 will not be adequate without *process* reforms to ensure that these clarifications are given effect over time. But that does not mean they would be without value.

⁶² Remarks of Joshua D. Wright, *The FTC and Privacy Regulation: The Missing Role of Economics*, George Mason University Law and Economics Center (Nov. 12, 2015), available at http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Wright_PRIVACYSPEECH_FINALv2_PRINT.pdf.

⁶³ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 42-43.

⁶⁴ See *id.* at 98-100.

In order to clarify the FTC’s substantive standards under Section 5, we would suggest the following key changes:

1. Codifying other key aspects of the 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement into Section 5 that were not already added by the addition of Section 5(n) in 1994;
2. Codifying the Deception Policy Statement, just as Congress codified the Unfairness Policy Statement in a new Section 5(n).⁶⁵ This issue is explored in greater depth in my 2015 joint comments with Geoffrey Manne on the FTC’s settlement of its enforcement action with Nomi Technologies, Inc.⁶⁶ Specifically, in codifying the Deception Policy Statement, Congress should:
 - a. Clarify — or require the FTC to propose clarifications of — when and how the FTC must establish the materiality of statements about products: it made sense to presume that all express statements were material in the context of traditional advertising: because each such statement was calculated to persuade users to buy a product. But the same cannot *necessarily* be said of the myriad other ways that companies communicate with users today, such as through online help pages or privacy policies (which companies are required to post online, if only by California law).
 - b. Require the FTC to meet the requirements of Section 5(n) when bringing enforcement actions based on the “reasonableness” of a company’s practices, such as data security.⁶⁷
3. Codify the FTC’s 2015 Unfair Methods of Competition Policy Statement, with one small modification: the FTC should be barred from going beyond antitrust doctrine.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 21-28.

⁶⁶ *In the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc.*, Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics & TechFreedom, File No. 1323251 (May 26, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/05/00011-96185.pdf.

⁶⁷ See *infra* 69.

⁶⁸ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 28-30; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Aug. 13, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf.

D. Clarifying the FTC's Pleading Standards

Several courts have already concluded that the FTC's deception enforcement actions must satisfy the heightened pleading standards of Section 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies to claims filed in federal court that "sound in fraud."⁶⁹ As explained below, this requirement would not be difficult for the FTC to meet, since the agency has broad Civil Investigative powers that are not available to normal plaintiffs before filing a complaint.⁷⁰ There is no reason the FTC should not have to plead its deception claims with specificity.

The same can be said for unfairness claims, even though they do not "sound in fraud." In both cases, getting the FTC to file more particularized complaints is critical, given that the FTC's complaint is, in essentially all cases, the FTC's last word on the matter, supplemented by little more than a press release, and an aid for public comment.

Indeed, the bar should likely be *higher*, not lower for unfairness cases. The attached white paper recommends a preponderance of objective standard for unfairness cases.⁷¹ The critical thing to note is that there is no statutory standard for settling FTC enforcement actions — so the standard by which the FTC really operates is the very low bar set by Section 5(b): "reason to believe that [a violation may have occurred]" and that "it shall appear to the Commission that [an enforcement action] would be to the interest of the public."⁷² In addition to the substantive clarifications to the FTC's substantive standards, Congress must clarify either the settlement standard or the pleading standard, if not both.

E. Encouraging More Litigation to Engage the Courts in the Development of Section 5 Doctrine and Provide More Authoritative Guidance

Litigation is important for two reasons. First, having to prove its case before a neutral tribunal forces analytical rigor upon the FTC and thus forces it to make better, more informed decisions. Second, court decisions will provide guidance to regulated companies on how to comply with the law that is necessarily more authoritative (since the FTC cannot simply overrule a court decision the way it can change its mind about its own enforcement actions

⁶⁹ *Rombach v. Chang*, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) ("In deciding this issue, several circuits have distinguished between allegations of fraud and allegations of negligence, applying Rule 9(b) only to claims pleaded under Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) that sound in fraud.").

⁷⁰ See *infra* at 19.

⁷¹ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 18-21.

⁷² 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).

or guidance) and also likely (but not necessarily) more detailed and better grounded in the FTC's doctrines.

One major reason companies settle so often across the board is that the FTC staff has the discretion to force companies to endure the process of litigating through the FTC's own administrative process, first before an administrative law judge and then before the Commission itself, before ever having the opportunity to go before an independent, neutral tribunal. The attached white paper explore three options:⁷³

1. "[E]mpower one or two Commissioners to insist that the Commission bring a particular complaint in Federal court. This would allow them to steer cases out of Part III either because they are doctrinally significant or because the Commissioners fear that, unless the case goes to federal court, the defendant will simply settle, thus denying the entire legal system the benefits of litigation in building the FTC's doctrines. In particular, it would be a way for Commissioners to act on the dissenting recommendations of staff, particularly the Bureau of Economics, about cases that are problematic from either a legal or policy perspective."⁷⁴
2. Abolish Part III completely, as former Commissioner Calvani has proposed.⁷⁵
3. Require the FTC to litigate in federal court while potentially still preserving Part III for the supervision of the settlement process and discovery.⁷⁶ Requiring the FTC to litigate all cases in federal court (as the SMARTER Act would do for competition cases⁷⁷) might, in principle, prove problematic for the Bureau of Consumer Protection, which handles many smaller cases. Retaining Part III but allowing Commissioners to object to its use might strike the best balance.

F. The Civil Investigative Demand Process

There are many reasons why companies do not litigate privacy and data security cases. Some of them are beyond the control of FTC or Congress — for example, the extreme sensitivity of these issues for companies. Studies by the Ponemon Institute found that "[d]ata breaches are more concerning than product recalls and lawsuits,"⁷⁸ with a company's stock price falling

⁷³ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 82-85.

⁷⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁵ See *id.* at 84-85.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015, H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. (2015).

⁷⁸ PONEMON, DATA BREACH, *supra* note 5, at 6.

an average of 5% after a data breach is disclosed.⁷⁹ Witness the 30% hit Equifax took to its stock price upon revelation of its data breach.⁸⁰ Perhaps most illustrative of the sensitivity of these issues was the case of LabMD — a medical testing company and one of the handful of companies who dared litigate against the FTC — which ultimately went out of business due to litigation costs and reputational damage, even though the judge ultimately found that no consumer was injured.⁸¹ But a very significant, if not the biggest, reason why companies reflexively, almost invariably settle their cases is that the process of the FTC’s investigation can be punishment enough to make settlement seem more attractive. After enduring a burdensome investigative process, companies (especially start-ups) frequently lack additional resources to defend themselves and face an informational asymmetry given the intrusiveness inherent in the FTC’s current process. Even Chris Hoofnagle, who has long advocated that the FTC be far more aggressive on privacy and data security, warns, in his new treatise on privacy regulation at the agency, that

[T]he FTC’s investigatory power is very broad and is akin to an inquisitorial body. On its own initiative, it can investigate a broad range of businesses without any indication of a predicate offense having occurred.⁸²

This onerous the process inevitably leads to more false-positives as FTC staff becomes invested in fishing expeditions and force such consent decrees regardless of the actual harms on consumers.⁸³ Other systemic costs of this process include increased discovery burdens on (even blameless) potential defendants, inefficiently large compliance expenditures throughout the economy, under experimentation and innovation by firms, doctrinally questionable consent orders, and a relative scarcity of judicial review of Commission enforcement decisions. Ultimately, this phenomena distorts the FTC’s consumer protection mission because the agency can self-select cases that are likely to settle and further its policy goals,

⁷⁹ See Help Net Security, *After a data breach is disclosed, stock prices fall an average of 5%* (May 16, 2017), <https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/05/16/data-breach-stock-price/> (detailing a study by Ponemon).

⁸⁰ Paul R. La Monica, *After Equifax apologizes, stock falls another 15%* (Sept. 13, 2017), available at <http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/13/investing/equifax-stock-mark-warner-ftc-probe/index.html>.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Cheryl Conner, *When The Government Closes Your Business*, Forbes (Feb. 1, 2014), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/02/01/when-the-government-closes-your-business/#6e7c78971435>; Dune Lawrence, *A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off*, Bloomberg (April 25, 2016), <https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmd-ftc-tiversa/> (“The one company that didn’t settle with the FTC is LabMD. Daugherty hoped, at first, that if he were as cooperative as possible, the FTC would go away. He now calls that phase ‘the stupid zone.’”).

⁸² Darren Bush, *The Incentive and Ability of the Federal Trade Commission to Investigate Real Estate Markets: An Exercise in Political Economy*, 20-21, available at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/517c.pdf>.

⁸³ See Geoffrey A. Manne, R. Ben Sperry & Berin Szoka, *In the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc.: The Dark Side of the FTC’s Latest Feel-Good Case*, ICLE Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program White Paper 2015-1 (2015).

rather than choosing cases on the basis of stopping the most nefarious actors and truly protecting consumers. As even former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright noted, such self-serving personal and agency goals may push agencies to pursue cases “with the best prospect for settlement, cases that will consume few investigative resources, settle quickly, and are more likely to result in a consent decree that provides a continuing role for the agency.”⁸⁴ Thus, more than any other aspect of the FTC Act or the FTC’s operations, it is here that reinvigorated congressional oversight is needed.

The attached white paper explores this topic in great depth. Specifically, we recommend:

1. Reporting on how the agency uses CIDs⁸⁵
2. Making CIDs confidential by default and allowing companies to move to quash them confidentially.⁸⁶ Today, fighting an FTC subpoena means the FTC can make the fight public, which may have serious consequences for a company’s brand and stock price.
3. Requiring a greater role for Commissioners and economists in supervising the discovery process.⁸⁷

Ultimately, any examination of the FTC’s processes should start with arguably the most sacred principle in the American judicial system: innocent until proven guilty. As the Supreme Court made clear in 1895, “[t]he principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”⁸⁸ While it is inarguably true that these cases are very clearly not criminal, it is also true that these companies and their employees face the threat of losing their “life, liberty, and property” as a result of these actions, as evidenced by LabMD. Despite the Administrative Law Judge finding that “the evidence fails to show any computer hack for purpose of committing identity fraud,” the employees of LabMD were nonetheless left without employment simply due to “speculation” by the FTC — a word that appeared seventeen times in the ALJ’s decision.⁸⁹

Given the sensitive nature of both the type of information involved in these cases, including financial and health information, as well as consumers’ sensitivity to reports that their data

⁸⁴ D.H. Ginsburg & J.D. Wright, *Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of Consent*, in I. William E. Kovacic: An Anti-trust Tribute – Liber Amicorum (Charbit et al. eds., February 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/antitrust-settlements-culture-consent/130228antitruststlmt.pdf.

⁸⁵ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 37-40.

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 46-48.

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 48-53.

⁸⁸ *Coffin v. United States*, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

⁸⁹ LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *48 (MSNET Nov. 13, 2015), <https://causeofaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Docket-9357-LabMD-Initial-Decison-electronic-version-pursuant-to-FTC-Rule-3-51c21.pdf>.

may be in jeopardy, it is of the utmost importance that Congress ensure that innocent businesses' reputations aren't irreparably damaged simply due to "speculation." To be clear: this is not to say that parties who are guilty of implementing nefarious practices should be protected from the court of public opinion. Indeed, as former Commissioner Wright alluded to, implementing processes that would, at the very least, require the FTC to plead its claims with specificity — and, ideally, subsequently prove it on the basis of data-driven standards — prior to dragging a companies' name through the mud would actually ensure the FTC was using its limited resources to *only* go after the worst actors, rather than merely those most likely to settle.

Requiring the FTC to first make a showing beyond "speculation" of harm it alleges before invoking its immensely broad investigatory power, would at least provide businesses and its employees with some level of protection before being labeled as having insecure data practices and being forced to face the repercussions that inevitably come with such a label. In doing so, Congress would ensure one of the oldest maxims of law in democratic civilizations continues. As Roman Emperor Julian eloquently quipped in response to his fiercest adversary's statement that "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?": "If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?"⁹⁰

G. Fencing-In Relief

The FTC has broad powers under Section 13(b) to include in consent decrees extraordinarily broad behavioral requirements that "fence in" the company in the future.⁹¹ The courts have been exceedingly deferential to the FTC in applying these requirements, though at least one circuit court has rebuked the FTC's broad approach, as explained in the attached white paper.⁹² Rather than attempting to limit how the FTC uses its 13(b) powers, Congress should focus on when Section 13(b) applies. As Howard Beales, former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, has argued, regarding deception:

the Commission's use of Section 13(b) remedies should be reevaluated in light of the law's original purpose: [O]ne class of cases clearly improper for awarding redress under Section 13(b): traditional substantiation cases, which typically involve established businesses selling products with substantial value beyond the

⁹⁰ *Coffin v. United States*, 156 U.S. 432, 455 (1895).

⁹¹ See, e.g., *Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 970 F.2d 311, 326 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The F.T.C. has discretion to issue multi-product orders, so called 'fencing-in' orders, that extend beyond violations of the Act to prevent violators from engaging in similar deceptive practices in the future.") (citing *F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965)).

⁹² See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 73-75.

claims at issue and disputes over scientific details with well-regarded experts on both sides of the issue. In such cases, the defendant would not have known *ex ante* that its conduct was “dishonest or fraudulent.” Limiting the availability of consumer redress under Section 13(b) to cases consistent with the Section 19 standard strikes the balance Congress thought necessary and ensures that the FTC’s actions benefit those that it is their mission to protect: the general public.⁹³

The same logic goes for the kind of unfairness cases the FTC is bringing against high-tech companies, as Josh Wright noted in his dissent in the *Apple* product design case:

The economic consequences of the allegedly unfair act or practice in this case — a product design decision that benefits some consumers and harms others — also differ significantly from those in the Commission’s previous unfairness cases. The Commission commonly brings unfairness cases alleging failure to obtain express informed consent. These cases invariably involve conduct where the defendant has intentionally obscured the fact that consumers would be billed. Many of these cases involve unauthorized billing or cramming – the outright fraudulent use of payment information. Other cases involve conduct just shy of complete fraud — the consumer may have agreed to one transaction but the defendant charges the consumer for additional, improperly disclosed items. Under this scenario, the allegedly unfair act or practice injures consumers and does not provide economic value to consumers or competition. In such cases, the requirement to provide adequate disclosure itself does not cause significant harmful effects and can be satisfied at low cost. However, the particular facts of this case differ in several respects from the above scenario.⁹⁴

The key point, as Wright argued, is that the Commission is increasingly using unfairness not to punish obviously bad actors or to proscribe conduct that merits *per se* illegality because it is inherently bad, but rather, conduct that presents difficult tradeoffs: How long should consumers remained logged in to an apps store to balance the convenience of the vast majority of users with the possibility that some users with children may find that their children make unauthorized purchases on the device immediately after the parent has logged in? How much, and what kind of, data security is “reasonable?” And so on. These reflect business decisions that are inevitable in the modern economy. The Commission might well be justified in declaring that a company has struck the wrong balance, but it should not treat them exactly as it would obvious fraudsters, who set out to defraud consumers.

⁹³ J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, *Striking the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act*, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6-7 (2013).

⁹⁴ Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Apple, Inc., FTC File No. 1123108, at 3 (Jan. 15, 2014), available at <https://goo.gl/0RCC9E>.

In order to deter the Commission from taking advantage of this frequent judicial deference by imposing such disconnected “fencing-in” remedies in non-fraud cases — which, of course, is compounded by the fact that most cases are never reviewed by courts at all — Congress should consider imposing some sort of minimal requirement that provisions in proposed orders and consent decrees be (i) reasonably related to challenged behavior, and (ii) no more onerous than necessary to correct or prevent the challenged violation.

H. Closing Letters

While consent decrees might help companies understand what the FTC will deem illegal on a case-by-case basis, in unique fact patterns, closing letters could do the inverse, telling companies what the FTC will deem *not* to be illegal, which is potentially far more useful in helping companies plan their conduct. In the past, the FTC issued at least a few closing letters with a meaningful degree of analysis of the practices at issue under the doctrinal framework of Section 5(n).⁹⁵ But in recent years, the FTC has markedly changes its approach, issuing fewer letters and writing those it did issue at a level of abstraction that offers little real guidance and even less analysis.⁹⁶

Rep. Brett Guthrie’s (R-KY) proposed CLEAR Act (H.R. 5109) would require the FTC to report annually to Congress on the status of its investigations, including the legal analysis supporting the FTC’s decision to close some investigations without action. This requirement would not require the Commission to identify its targets, thus preserving the anonymity of the firms in question.⁹⁷ Most importantly, the bill requires:

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to Congress on investigations with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of subsection (a)(1)), detailing—

(A) the number of such investigations the Commission has commenced;

(B) the number of such investigations the Commission has closed with no official agency action;

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 40-43. *See, e.g.*, Letter from Joel Winston, Associate Director of Fed. Trade Comm’n to Michael E. Burke, Esq., Counsel to Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (June 5, 2001) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/dollar-tree-stores-inc./070605doltree.pdf.

⁹⁶ *See, e.g.*, Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director of Fed. Trade Comm’n to Lisa J. Sotto, Counsel to Michael’s Stores, Inc. (June 5, 2001) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/michaels-storesinc./120706michaelsstorescltr.pdf.

⁹⁷ The Clarifying Legality and Enforcement Action Reasoning Act, H.R. 5109, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter CLEAR Act] available at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5109/text>.

(C) the disposition of such investigations, if such investigations have concluded and resulted in official agency action; and

(D) for each such investigation that was closed with no official agency action, a description sufficient to indicate the legal *and economic* analysis supporting the Commission’s decision not to continue such investigation, and the industry sectors of the entities subject to each such investigation.

This bill, with our proposed addition noted, would go a long way to improving the value of the FTC’s guidance. Indeed, such annual reporting could form annual addenda to guidance that the FTC issues in the guidance it provides on informational injury modeled on the Green Guides. Although the Green Guides themselves do not involve such reporting, it would make sense in this context, where the FTC is regularly confronted with far more novel fact patterns each year.

I. Re-opening Past Settlements

The FTC may, under its current rules, re-open past settlements at any time — subject only to the Commission’s assertion about what the “public interest” requires and after giving companies an opportunity to “show cause” why their settlements should *not* be modified.⁹⁸ By contrast, courts require far more for re-opening their orders. The FTC has, in fact, proposed to re-open four settlements entered into in 2013 under the Green Guides. Congress should write a meaningful standard by which the FTC should have to justify re-opening past settlements. If the Commission continues on its current course, it will be able to use its settlements to bypass the procedural safeguards of notice-and-comment rulemaking.

III. Reasonable Siblings: Background on Section 5 and Negligence

The FTC’s enforcement authority is derived from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”⁹⁹ Under the broad terms of Section 5, the FTC challenges “unfair methods of competition” through their

⁹⁸ 16 C.F.R. 3.72(b).

⁹⁹ 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2017).

antitrust division and “unfair or deceptive practices” through their consumer protection division.¹⁰⁰ In pursuing its consumer protection mission there are different standards for “unfair” and “deceptive” practices, with its unfairness authority being “the broadest portion of the Commission’s statutory authority.”¹⁰¹ Indeed, this “unfairness” authority was initially unrestrained by any statutory definition,¹⁰² and remained so until Congress added Section 5(n) in 1994. In addition to Section 5 authority, however, the FTC has also asserted violations of other statutes in its data security enforcement, most notably the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),¹⁰³ Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”),¹⁰⁴ as well as regulations promulgated under those statutes.¹⁰⁵

Congress intentionally framed the FTC’s authority under Section 5 in the general terms “unfair” and “deceptive” to ensure that the agency could protect consumers and competition throughout all trade and under changing circumstances.¹⁰⁶ To be sure, this broad authority has not been lost on the FTC, who readily acknowledges that “Congress intentionally framed the statute in general terms,” which the agency interprets to mean “[t]he task of identifying unfair methods of competition” as being “assigned to the Commission.”¹⁰⁷ Despite the addi-

¹⁰⁰ See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, *Data Security and the FTC's Uncommon Law*, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 955, 964 (2016) (discussing in great lengths the FTC’s “common law” approach) [hereinafter Hurwitz, *Uncommon Law*].

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

¹⁰² See *Id.*; see also Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (setting the three-factor contours of the “unfairness” prong for the first time through application of Section 5 to cigarette advertisements).

¹⁰³ See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 *et seq.* (2012) (“It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to ... protect the security and confidentiality of ... customers' nonpublic personal information.”).

¹⁰⁴ The Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501, *et seq.* (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (making it unlawful under § 6502(a)(1) “for an operator of a website or online service directed to children ... to collect personal information from a child in a manner that violates the regulations prescribed under subsection (b) of this section.”); see also Melanie L. Hersh, *Is Coppa A Cop Out? The Child Online Privacy Protection Act As Proof That Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children's Interests on the Internet*, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1831, 1878 (2001) (detailing how the FTC uses COPPA to regulate data security for children).

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., FTC Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 313.10–313.12 (2000); *Individual Reference Servs. Grp., Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 20 (D.D.C. 2001), *aff'd sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C.*, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the FTC’s final rule, promulgated under the GLBA “did not contravene plain meaning of Act and were permissible construction of that legislation” and “agencies' action in promulgating final rules was not arbitrary and capricious”).

¹⁰⁶ See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (observing if Congress “were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task”).

¹⁰⁷ Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Federal Trade Comm’n, Section 5 Recast: Defining the Federal Trade Commission’s Unfair Methods of Competition Authority at the Executive Committee Meeting of the New York

tion of Section 5(n) to the Act in 1994 to *require* cost-benefit analysis, this lack of clear statutory guidance as to what constitutes “unfair” proved to be problematic, with at least one Commissioner recently recognizing that “nearly one hundred years after the agency’s creation, the Commission has still not articulated what constitutes ... unfair... leaving many wondering whether the Commission’s Section 5 authority actually has any meaningful limits.”¹⁰⁸ Commissioner Wright was referring to a lack of clarity around the meaning of unfairness in competition cases, but his point holds more generally.

Given the broad nature of Section 5, few industries are beyond the FTC’s reach and the FTC has met the broad statutory language with an equally broad exercise of its authority to enforce Section 5.¹⁰⁹ The FTC has brought data security and privacy actions against advertising companies, financial institutions, health care companies, and, perhaps most significantly, companies engaged in providing data security products and services.¹¹⁰ Further, not only are companies responsible for safeguarding their own data, but the FTC has also alleged that companies are responsible for any data security failings of their third-party clients and vendors, too.¹¹¹

Companies who are the victims of such cyber-attacks are victims themselves. They suffer immense financial losses, stemming largely from reputational damage as customers are fearful of remaining loyal to companies who can’t protect their personal and financial information.¹¹² According to one study, 76% of customers surveyed said they “would move away from companies with a high record of data breaches,” with 90% responding that “there are

State Bar Association’s Antitrust Section, 2 (June 19, 2013), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/section-5-recast-defining-federal-trade-commissions-unfair-methods-competition-authority/130619section5recast.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ See Cho & Caplan, *Cybersecurity Lessons*; Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy by Design: New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity 12 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 227, 232 (2017) (discussing the FTC’s enforcement of “everything from funeral homes, vending machine companies, telemarketing and mail marketing schemes, credit reporting, and the healthcare industry.”) [hereinafter Pardau & Edwards, *New Legal Frontiers*].

¹¹⁰ See Fed. Trade Comm’n, 2016 Privacy & Data Security Update (Jan. 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016> (providing overview of various enforcement actions).

¹¹¹ See *id.* (For example, the consent decree agreed to in the FTC’s enforcement action against Ashley Madison required the defendants to implement a comprehensive data-security program, including third-party assessments).

¹¹² See generally PONEMON, DATA BREACH; see also *Data breaches cost US businesses an average of \$7 million – here’s the breakdown*, Business Insider (April 27, 2017), <http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million-2017-4> (providing that the average cost of a data security breach is \$7 million, with 76% of customers saying they would move away from companies with a high record of data breaches).

apps and websites that pose risks to the protection and security of their personal information.”¹¹³ Unquestionably, data security is the cornerstone of the digital economy and digitization of the physical economy. As Naveen Menon, President of Cisco Systems for South-east Asia, put it “[s]ecurity is what protects businesses, allowing them to innovate, build new products and services.”¹¹⁴

The recent Equifax breach illustrates just how strongly reputational forces encourage companies to invest in data security. As of the time this testimony was being written, Equifax’s post-hack stock had plummeted 30%.¹¹⁵ Given the enormous stakes for companies’ brands, it is not difficult to understand why—with no clear guidance from Congress or the FTC—companies have opted to settle and enter into consent decrees rather than risk further reputational damage and customer loss through embarrassing and costly litigation.¹¹⁶ Out of approximately 60 data security enforcement actions, only two defendants dared face an FTC armed with near absolute discretion as to the interpretation of “reasonable” data security practices. This hesitation to challenge the FTC in order to gain clarity from the courts about what actually constitutes unreasonable practices — in addition to the more obvious reason of escaping liability — was only reinforced by the *LabMD* case, where the company’s decision to litigate against the FTC rather than enter into a consent decree led to its demise.¹¹⁷

Data security poses a unique challenge: unlike other unfairness cases, the company at issue is both the victim (of data breaches) and the culprit (for allegedly having inadequate data security). In such circumstances, the FTC should apply unfairness as more of a negligence standard than strict liability. Consider both a company that has been hacked and a business owner whose business has burned down. In both situations, it is very likely that employees and customers lost items they consider to be precious — perhaps even irreplaceable. Additionally, it is equally likely that neither *wanted* this unfortunate event to occur. Finally, in both situations, prosecutors would investigate the accident to determine the cause and as-

¹¹³ See VANSONBOURNE, DATA BREACHES AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY REPORT (2015), <http://www.vanson-bourne.com/client-research/18091501JD>.

¹¹⁴ Naveen Menon, *There can be no digital economy without security*, World Economic Forum (May 8, 2017), <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/there-can-be-no-digital-economy-without-security/>.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., *Equifax Plummets After Huge Data Breach, Kroger Sinks on Profit drop, American Outdoor Brand Falls*, Yahoo Finance, Sept. 8, 2017, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/equifax-plummets-huge-data-breach-kroger-sinks-profit-drop-american-outdoor-brands-falls-144654294.html>.

¹¹⁶ *Id.*

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

sess the damage and costs. However, under the FTC's current approach to Section 5 enforcement, how each business owner would be judged for liability purposes would vary greatly despite these similarities.

Under the common law of torts, absent some criminal intent (*e.g.*, insurance fraud) the businessman whose office burned down would only be held liable if he acted negligent in some way. At common law, negligence involves either an act that a *reasonable* person would know creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.¹¹⁸ Should a prosecutor or third party bring a lawsuit against the business owner, they would be required to put forth expert testimony and a detailed analysis showing exactly *how* and *why* the owner's negligence caused the fire.

Conversely, despite all of the FTC's rhetoric about "reasonableness" — which, as one might "reasonably" expect, should theoretically resemble a negligence-like framework — the FTC's approach to assessing whether a data security practice is unfair under Section 5 actually more closely resembles a rule of strict liability.¹¹⁹ Indeed, rather than conduct any analysis showing that (1) the company owed a duty to consumers and (2) *how* that the company's breach of that duty was the cause of the breach — either directly or proximately— which injured the consumer, instead, as one judge noted, the FTC "kind of take them as they come and decide whether somebody's practices were or were not within what's permissible from your eyes...."¹²⁰

There is no level of prudence that can avert *every* foreseeable harm. A crucial underpinning of calculating liability in civil suits is that some accidents are unforeseeable, some damages fall out of the chain of causation, and mitigation does not always equal complete prevention. Thus our civil jurisprudence acknowledges that no amount of care can prevent *all* accidents (fires, car crashes, *etc.*), or at least the standard of care required to achieve an accident rate near zero would be wildly disproportionate, paternalistic, and unrealistic to real-world applications (*e.g.*, setting the speed limit at 5 mph).

The chaos theory also applies to the unpredictability of data breaches. Thus, if the FTC wants to regulate data security using a "common law" approach, then it must be willing to accept that certain breaches are inevitable and liability should only arise where the company was truly negligent. This is not simply a policy argument; it is the weighing of costs and benefits that Section 5(n) requires — at least in theory. Companies do not want to be hacked any

¹¹⁸ See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965).

¹¹⁹ See Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, *When "Reasonable" Isn't: The FTC's Standard-Less Data Security Standard*, Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming (Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041533.

¹²⁰ Transcript of Proceedings at 91, 94–95, *LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n*, No. 1:14-CV-810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2014)).

more than homeowners want their houses to burn down. The FTC should begin its analysis of data security cases with that incentive in mind, and ask whether the company has acted as a "reasonably prudent person" would.

This, then, presents the key question: what constitutes "reasonably prudent" data security and privacy practices for purposes of avoiding liability under Section 5? To help inform Congress — and, in turn, the FTC — on how to go about answering this question, the remainder of this testimony will focus on determining three key elements of this question: (1) the types of injuries that should merit the FTC's attention, (2) the analytical framework, built upon empirical research and investigations, which should determine what constitutes "reasonable," and (3) the pleading requirements to determine the specificity with which the FTC must state its claim in the first instance.

IV. Informational Injuries In Practice: Data Security & Privacy Enforcement to Date

In 2005, the FTC brought its first data security case premised solely on unfairness — against a company (BJ's Warehouse) not for violating the promises it had made to consumers, but for the underlying adequacy of its data security practices.¹²¹ Whether this was a proper use of Section 5 is not the important question — although it is essential to note that *BJ's Warehouse* was the consent decree that launched the FTC's use of unfairness for data security. a thousand" more (or closer to "hundreds" in the context of privacy and data security). Even if one stipulates that the FTC could have, and likely *would* have, prevailed on the merits, had the case gone to trial, the important question is this: how might the Commission have changed its approach to data security? That question becomes even more salient if one tries to project back, asking what the Commission should have done then if it had known what we know today: that twelve years later, we would still not have a single tech-related unfairness case resolved on the merits (and only four that had made it to federal court).¹²²

The Commission had, of course, asked Congress for comprehensive privacy legislation in 2000.¹²³ Besides asking again, what else could the Commission have done? It could have be-

¹²¹ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *BJ's Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges* (June 16, 2005), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/06/bjs-wholesale-club-settles-ftc-charges>.

¹²² See *Fed. Trade Comm'n v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017 WL 4150873, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017); *Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 799 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2015); *LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, No. 1:14-CV-00810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2014), *aff'd*, 776 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015); *F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2014).

¹²³ Fed. Trade Comm'n, *Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Market Place- A Report to Congress* (2000) [hereinafter Privacy Report].

gun a rulemaking under the Magnusson-Moss Act of 1975, subject to the procedural safeguards imposed by Congress in 1980 (after the FTC’s abuse of its rulemaking powers in the intervening five years). But, as many have noted, it would be difficult to craft prescriptive rules for data security or privacy in any rulemaking, and the process would have taken several years.

There *was* a third way: the FTC could have sought public comment on the issues of data security and privacy, issued a guidance document, then repeated the process every few years to update the agency’s guidance to reflect current risks, technologies, and trade-offs. In short, the Commission could have followed the model established by its Green Guides.

V. The Green Guides as Model for Empirically Driven Guidance

As the FTC proceeds with Chairman Ohlhausen’s plans for a workshop on “informational injuries,” it should consider its own experience with the Green Guides as a model. The parallel is not exact: the Guides focus entirely on deception, and primarily on consumer expectations, while the FTC’s proposed “informational injuries” would involve both deception and unfairness. However, the Guides do still delve into substantiation of environmental marking claims, and, thus, the underlying merits of what companies were promising their customers. FTC guidance on the meaning of “informational injuries” in the context of data security and privacy would necessarily cover wider ground, ultimately attempting to understand harms as well as “reasonable” industry practices under both deception and unfairness prongs. Still, the Guides emphasis on empirical substantiation would serve the FTC well in attempting to provide a clearer analytical basis for *why* a practice or action is deemed to have caused “informational injury” in certain cases, rather than merely stating *what* practices the FTC has determined likely to cause such harm.

Though court guidance in this context may seem rarer than the birth of a giant panda, the Third Circuit nonetheless provided some insight into the value of previous FTC guidance — namely the FTC’s 2007 guidebook titled “Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business,” — in understanding harms and “reasonable” practices that constitute violations of Section 5.¹²⁴ Discussing this guidebook, which “describes a ‘checklist[]’ of practices that form a ‘sound data security plan,’” the court notably found that, because “[t]he guidebook does not state that any particular practice is required by [Section 5],” it, therefore, “could not, on its own, provide ‘ascertainable’ certainty” of the FTC’s interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices fail [Section 5].”¹²⁵ Despite this recognition, the court still noted that the

¹²⁴ *Wyndham*, 799 F.3d at 256.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 256 n.21.

guidebook did “counsel against many of the specific practices” alleged in that specific case, and thus, provided sufficient guidance in that very narrow holding to inform the defendant of “what” conduct was not considered reasonable.¹²⁶ Specifically, the court noted that the guidebook recommended:

[T]hat companies “consider encrypting sensitive information that is stored on [a] computer network ... [, c]heck ... software vendors’ websites regularly for alerts about new vulnerabilities, and implement policies for installing vendor-approved patches.” It recommends using “a firewall to protect [a] computer from hacker attacks while it is connected to the Internet,” deciding “whether [to] install a ‘border’ firewall where [a] network connects to the Internet,” and setting access controls that “determine who gets through the firewall and what they will be allowed to see ... to allow only trusted employees with a legitimate business need to access the network.” It recommends “requiring that employees use ‘strong’ passwords” and cautions that “[h]ackers will first try words like ... the software’s default password[] and other easy-to-guess choices.” And it recommends implementing a “breach response plan,” *id.* at 16, which includes “[i]nvestigat[ing] security incidents immediately and tak[ing] steps to close off existing vulnerabilities or threats to personal information.”¹²⁷

Most notably, nowhere in the court’s discussion did it identify a single instance of the FTC explaining *why* a certain practice is necessary or reasonable; instead the FTC had merely asserted that companies should just accept the FTC’s suggestions, without any consideration or analysis as to whether the immense costs that might be associated with implementing many of these practices are in the consumers’ best interest. This is far from the weighing of costs and benefits that Section 5(n) requires. By comparison, the Green Guides, while focused on deception, reflect a deep empiricism about substantiation of environmental marketing claims, informed by a notice and comment process and distilled into clear guidance accompanied by detailed analysis.

While multi-national corporations such as Wyndham *might* (arguably) possess the resources to blindly implement any and all suggestions the FTC makes, and to follow the FTC’s pronouncements in each consent decree, the economic principle of scarcity will inevitably require smaller businesses with vastly fewer resources to make difficult decisions as to which practices they should utilize to provide the greatest security possible with its limited resources. For example, using the list above, would a company with limited resources be acting “reasonable” if it implemented a “breach response plan,” but failed to check *every* software vendors’ website regularly for alerts? Further, would a company be engaging in “deceptive”

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 256-57.

¹²⁷ *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

practices if it failed to notify customers that, due to limited resources, it could only implement half of the FTC's recommended practices? The answer to these questions matter and will undoubtedly have significant consequences on how competitive small businesses remain in this country. As mentioned earlier, one study suggests that 76% of customers "would move away from companies with a high record of data breaches," with 90% responding that "there are apps and websites that pose risks to the protection and security of their personal information."¹²⁸ This shows that consumers are understandably concerned about how well a company protects their data. If a company is essentially required to choose between admitting that it lacks the resources to implement advanced security practices on par with large, established businesses, or risk an FTC action for "deception," how can any startup or small business expect to compete and grow in these polarizing circumstances?

Under the FTC's current enforcement standards, this all shows how easily small businesses may find themselves in a catch-22. On the one hand, if the business wishes to pretend it has the resources to implement the same data security standards as multi-national corporations in order to attract and maintain customers weary of their data being hacked, the business will be acting "deceptively" in the eyes of the FTC, and will be open to the costly litigation, reputational damage, and massive fines that come with it. On the other hand, if the small business wishes to be open and readily admit that, due to resource constraints, its data security practices are anemic when compared to multi-national corporations, it will be open to the loss of customers and businesses invariably linked to such claims. As this illustrates, how can any startup or small business expect to compete without the FTC providing guidance as to best practices based on empirical research — including economies of scale?

Thus, to ensure the ability of businesses to compete and make sound decisions as to the allocation of their finite resources, it is imperative that the FTC not only endeavor to provide guidance as to *what* practices are sound, but also explain *why* such practices are necessary, as well as "how much" is necessary, especially in relation to a business's size and available resources.

A. The Green Guides (1992-2012)

First published in 1992, the Guides represented the Commission's attempt to better understand a novel issue before jumping in to case-by-case enforcement. By 1991, it was becoming increasingly common for companies to tout the environmental benefits of their products. In some ways, these claims were no different from traditional marketing claims: the FTC's job was to make sure consumers "got the benefit of the bargain." But in other ways, it was less

¹²⁸ See VANSONBOURNE, DATA BREACHES AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY REPORT (2015), <http://www.vanson-bourne.com/client-research/18091501JD>.

clear exactly what that “benefit” was — such as regarding recycling content, recyclability, compostability, biodegradability, refillability, sourcing of products, etc. Rather than asserting how much of each of these consumers *should* get, the Commission sought to ground its understanding of these concepts in empirical data about what consumers actually expected. As the Commission summarized its approach in the Statement of Basis and Purpose for the 2012 update:

The Commission issued the Guides to help marketers avoid making deceptive claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Under Section 5, a claim is deceptive if it likely misleads reasonable consumers. Because the Guides are based on how consumers reasonably interpret claims, consumer perception data provides the best evidence upon which to formulate guidance. As EPA observed, however, perceptions can change over time. The Guides, as administrative interpretations of Section 5, are inherently flexible and can accommodate evolving consumer perceptions. Thus, if a marketer can substantiate that consumers purchasing its product interpret a claim differently than what the Guides provide, its claims comply with the law.¹²⁹

Of course, as the Deception Policy Statement notes, “If the representation or practice affects or is directed primarily to a particular group, the Commission examines reasonableness from the perspective of that group.”¹³⁰ Thus, the Commission immediately added the following:

the Green Guides are based on marketing to a general audience. However, when a marketer targets a particular segment of consumers, such as those who are particularly knowledgeable about the environment, the Commission will examine how reasonable members of that group interpret the advertisement. The Commission adds language in Section 260.1(d) of the Guides to emphasize this point. Marketers, nevertheless, should be aware that more sophisticated consumers may not view claims differently than less sophisticated consumers. In fact, the Commission’s study yielded comparable results for both groups.¹³¹

This bears emphasis because many speak of privacy-sensitive consumers as a separate market segment, and argue that we should apply deception in privacy cases based upon their expectations. But here, unlike in privacy, the Commission actually undertook empirical research — which turned not to support an idea that probably seemed intuitively obvious: that

¹²⁹ Fed Trade Comm’n, Statement of Basis and Purpose (2012 Update), at 24-25, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides/green-guidesstatement.pdf> [hereinafter “Statement of Basis and Purpose”].

¹³⁰ Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), at 1, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.

¹³¹ See Statement of Basis and Purpose, at 25.

more environmentally knowledgeable or “conscious” consumers had different interpretation of environmental marketing claims.

The Commission issued the first Green Guides in August 1992, thirteen months after two days of public hearings, including a 90-day public comment period in between. The Commission followed this process in issuing revised Green Guides in 1996, 1998, and 2012. So detailed was the Commission’s analysis, across so many different fact patterns, that, while the 2012 Guides ran a mere 12 pages in the Federal Register,¹³² the Statement of Basis and Purpose for them ran a staggering 314 pages.¹³³ In each update, the FTC explored how the previous version of the Guides addresses each, the FTC’s proposal, comments received on the proposal and justification for the final rule. In short, the FTC was doing something a lot like rulemaking. Except, of course, the Guides are not themselves legally binding.

The FTC has never done anything even resembling this type of comprehensive guide for data security or privacy. Indeed, just this year, the FTC touted “a series of blog posts” as a grand accomplishment in the FTC’s “ongoing efforts to help businesses ensure they are taking reasonable steps to protect and secure consumer data.”¹³⁴ The FTC has regularly trumpeted its 2012 Privacy Report, but that document does something very different. Most notably, the Report calls on industry actors to self-police in the most general of terms, making statements like “to the extent that strong privacy codes are developed, the Commission will view adherence to such codes favorably in connection with its law enforcement work.”¹³⁵ Unlike the focus on substance and comprehensiveness of the Green Guides, the 2012 Privacy Report speaks in generalities, dictating “areas where the FTC will be active,” such as in monitoring Do Not Track implementation or promoting enforceable self-regulatory codes.¹³⁶ The lack of a Statement of Basis and Purpose akin to that issued in updating the Green Guides (the 2012 Statement totaled a whopping 314 pages) introduces unpredictability into the enforcement process, and chills industry action on data security and privacy.

¹³² 16 C.F.R. 260 (2012).

¹³³ See generally note 129.

¹³⁴ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Stick with Security: FTC to Provide Additional Insights on Reasonable Data Security Practices (July 21, 2017), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/07/stick-security-ftc-provide-additional-insights-reasonable-data>.

¹³⁵ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers* (March 2012), at 73, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf>. [hereinafter “2012 Privacy Report”].

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 72.

In all, the Green Guides offer a clear, workable model for how the FTC could provide empirically grounded guidance on data security and privacy — even without any action by Congress. The key steps in issuing such guidance would be:

1. Study current industry practices across a wide range of businesses;
2. Gather data on consumer *expectations*, rather than making assumptions about consumer preferences;
3. Engage the Bureau of Economics and the FTC’s growing team of in-house technologists in analysis of the costs and benefits of practice; and
4. Issue (at least) biennial or triennial guidance to reflect the changing nature, degree, and applicability of data security and privacy regulations.

Short of rulemaking, this rulemaking-like approach offers the most clarity, comprehensibility, and predictability for both FTC enforcement staff and industry actors.

B. What the Commission Said in 2012 about Modifying the Guides

There is an obvious tension between conducting thorough empirical assessments to inform updating Commission guidance and how often that guidance can be updated: the more regular the update, the more difficult it will be to for the Commission to maintain methodological rigor in justifying that update. The 2012 Statement of Basis and Purpose noted requests that the Commission review and update the Guides every two or three years, but concluded:

Given the comprehensive scope of the review process, the Commission cannot commit to conducting a full-scale review of the Guides more frequently than every ten years. The Commission, however, need not wait ten years to review particular sections of the Guides if it has reason to believe changes are appropriate. For example, the Commission can accelerate the scheduled review to address significant changes in the marketplace, such as a substantial change in consumer perception or emerging environmental claims. When that happens, interested parties may contact the Commission or file petitions to modify the Guides pursuant to the Commission’s general procedures.¹³⁷

This strikes a sensible balance. Unfortunately, this is not at all how the Commission has handled modification of the 2012 Green Guides. Within a year, the FTC would modify the Green guides substantially with no such process for empirical substantiation to justify the new change. And this year, not five years after the issuance of the Guides, it modified the Guides yet again.

¹³⁷ See Statement of Basis and Purpose, at 26-27.

VI. Eroding the Green Guides and their Empirical Approach

While the Green Guides offer a model for empirically grounded consumer protection, the Commission has gradually moved away from that approach since issuing its last update to the Green Guides in 2012 — following an approach that more closely resembles its approach to data security and privacy.

A. Modification of the Green Guides by Policy Statement (2013)

In 2013, FTC issued an enforcement policy statement clarifying how it would apply the Green Guides,¹³⁸ updated just the year after taking notice-and-comment, to architectural coatings such as paint. The Commission appended this Policy Statement onto its settlement with PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (“PPG”) and The Sherwin-Williams Company (“Sherwin-Williams”) to settle alleged violations of Section 5 for marketing paints as being “Free” of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs).¹³⁹ Specifically, the Policy Statement focused on application of the 2012 Green Guides’ trace-amount test, which provided:

Depending on the context, a free-of or does-not-contain claim is appropriate even for a product, package, or service that contains or uses a trace amount of a substance if: (1) the level of the specified substance is no more than that which would be found as an acknowledged trace contaminant or background level; (2) the substance’s presence does not cause material harm that consumers typically associate with that substance; and (3) the substance has not been added intentionally to the product.¹⁴⁰

The Policy Statement made two clarifications specific to architectural coatings:

First, the “material harm” prong specifically includes harm to the environment and human health. This refinement acknowledges that consumers find both the environmental and health effects of VOCs material in evaluating VOC-free claims for architectural coatings.

¹³⁸ Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding VOC-Free Claims for Architectural Coatings (Mar. 6, 2013), <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/03/130306ppgpolicystatement.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Orders Settling Charges Against The Sherwin-Williams Co. and PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.; Issues Enforcement Policy Statement on “Zero VOC” Paint Claims (Mar. 6, 2013), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/03/ftc-approves-final-orders-settling-charges-against-sherwin>.

¹⁴⁰ 16 C.F.R. § 260.9(c) (2012).

Second, the orders define “trace level” as the background level of VOCs in the ambient air, as opposed to the level at which the VOCs in the paint would be considered “an acknowledged trace contaminant.” The harm consumers associate with VOCs in coatings is caused by emissions following application. Thus measuring the impact on background levels of VOCs in the ambient air aligns with consumer expectations about VOC-free claims for coatings.¹⁴¹

In both respects, the Policy Statement amended the Green Guides — while purporting merely to mirror the Guides. Most notably, the Guides had always been grounded in claims about environmental harms. For example, the Statement of Basis and Purpose for the 2012 Update had said:

In this context [the “free of” section of the Guides], the Commission reminds marketers that although **the Guides provide information on making truthful environmental claims**, marketers should be cognizant that consumers may seek out free-of claims for non-environmental reasons. For example, as multiple commenters stated, chemically sensitive consumers may be particularly likely to seek out products with free-of claims, and risk the most grievous injury from deceptive claims.¹⁴²

But now the FTC’s enforcement framework would, for the first time, focus on “human health” as well. In principle, this is perfectly appropriate: after all, “Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act,” as the Unfairness Policy Statement reminds us.¹⁴³ But note that the Commission was *not* bringing an unfairness claim — which would have required satisfying the cost-benefit analysis of Section 5(n). Instead, the Commission was bringing a pure deception claim, as with any Green Guides claim. But unlike deception cases brought under the Green Guides, the Commission provided none of the kind of empirical evidence about how consumers understood green marketing claims that had informed the Green Guides. The Commission did not seek public comment on this proposed enforcement policy statement, nor did it supply any such evidence of its own.

In short, the 2013 Policy Statement represented not merely a *de facto* amendment of the Green Guides, undermining the precedential value of the Guides and of all other FTC guidance documents, but a break with the empirical approach by which the FTC had developed

¹⁴¹ Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding VOC-Free Claims for Architectural Coatings, at 2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/voc-free-claims-architectural-coatings/130306ppgpolicystatement.pdf.

¹⁴² See Statement of Basis and Purpose, at 138 n. 469.

¹⁴³ 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement.

the Guides since 1992. This alone should call into question the FTC’s willingness, in recent years, to ground consumer protection work in empirical analysis. But worse was yet to come.

B. Modification of the Green Guides by Re-Opening Consent Decree (2017)

This July, Ohlhausen, now Acting Chairwoman, effectively proposed amending the FTC’s Green Guides — first issued in 1992 and updated in 1996, 1998 and 2012 — via proposed consent orders issued to four paint companies accused of deceptively promoting emission-free or zero volatile organic compounds in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.¹⁴⁴ In the corresponding press release, the Commission said it plans to “propose harmonizing changes to two earlier consent orders issued in the similar PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (Docket No. C-4385) and the Sherwin Williams Company (Docket No. C-4386) matters,” and plans to “issue orders to show cause why those matters should not be modified pursuant to Section 3.72(b) of the Commission Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. 3.72(b),” if the consent orders are finalized.¹⁴⁵

This repeated, and compounded, the two sins committed by the FTC in 2013: (1) undermining the value of Commission guidance (here, both the 2012 Guides and the 2013 Enforcement Policy Statement) by reminding all affected parties that guidance provided one day can be changed or revoked the next and (2) failing to provide empirical substantiation for its new approach. To these sins, the Commission added two more: (3) revoking guidance that had been treated as authoritative, and relied upon, by regulated parties for the previous four years through a consent decree and (4) re-opening the two consent decrees to which the 2013 Enforcement policy was attached to “harmonize” them with the FTC’s new approach. Revoking guidance treated as authoritative raises fundamental constitutional concerns about “fair notice.” Re-opening consent decrees raises even more serious concerns about the FTC’s process.

These concerns are reflected in recently proposed FTC settlements. In the 2013 PPG and Sherwin-Williams consent orders, the Commission specified the scope of its jurisdiction in Article II of the orders, stating:

¹⁴⁴ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Paint Companies Settle FTC Charges That They Misled Consumers; Claimed Products Are Emission- and VOC-free and Safe for Babies and other Sensitive Populations, (July 11, 2017), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/07/paint-companies-settle-ftc-charges-they-misled-consumers-claimed>.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.* at ¶ 13.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, trade name, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any covered product in or affecting commerce, shall not make any representation, in any manner, expressly or by implication, regarding:

A. The VOC level of such product; or

B. Any other *environmental* benefit or attribute of such product,

unless the representation is true, not misleading, and, at the time it is made, respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation.¹⁴⁶

In the same orders, the Commission defined “trace” levels of VOCs as including a “human health” component, stating:

7. “Trace” level of VOCs shall mean:

A. VOCs have not been intentionally added to the product;

B. The presence of VOCs at that level does not cause material harm that consumers typically associate with VOCs, including but not limited to, harm to the environment or *human health*; and

C. The presence of VOCs at that level does not result in concentrations higher than would be found at background levels in the ambient air.¹⁴⁷

While the inclusion of language that specified health as a VOC-related hazard created no immediate substantive changes, it laid the groundwork for a broadening of what constitutes a legitimate claim under the definition of VOC. Specifically, this would mean that the FTC would only have to take one additional step to claim a VOC-related violation if a company did not meet some broad, amorphous standard of “human health” conceived by the FTC. In fact, the 2017 Benjamin & Moore Co., Inc., ICP Construction Inc., YOLO Colorhouse LLC, and Imperial Paints, LLC consent orders took this additional step in an updated Article II, stating:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent must not make any representation, expressly or by implication ... regarding:

¹⁴⁶ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *In the Matter of PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.*, Agreement Containing Consent Order (Oct. 25, 2012), at 4, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121025ppgagree.pdf>; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, *In the Matter of Sherwin-Williams Company*, Agreement Containing Consent Order (Oct. 25, 2012), at 4, <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121025sherwinwilliamsagree.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.* at 3.

- A. The emission of the covered product;
- B. The VOC level of the covered product;
- C. The odor of the covered product;
- D. *Any other health benefit or attribute* of, or risk associated with exposure to, the covered product, including those related to VOC, emission, or chemical composition; or
- E. Any other environmental benefit or attribute of the covered product, including those related to VOC, emission, or chemical composition, unless the representation is non-misleading, including that, at the time such representation is made, Respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that is sufficient in quality and quantity based on standards generally accepted in the relevant scientific fields, when considered in light of the entire body of relevant and reliable scientific evidence, to substantiate that the representation is true.

Given the nature and type of these products, it is possible that health-related hazards should have been included in these particular consent orders. This would imply that it is the specific context of these cases that serves as a justification for the inclusion of the health-related language. However, the harmonization of these new orders with the 2013 PPG and Sherwin-Williams orders would create new, broader obligations on those two companies. More generally, this would imply that the basis of the FTC's authority emanates not from the context in which the claim is brought, but instead from the very nature of VOCs, i.e. as newly-deemed health hazards.

As a general principle, this means that, under its deception authority, the FTC could create *ex post facto* justifications for expanding its enforcement powers arbitrarily and with no forward guidance. For example, although the voluminous 2012 Green Guides Statement of Basis and Purpose made no mention of health risks,¹⁴⁸ the Commission found a way to add it on to previous consent agreements in a unilateral, non-deliberative way. This places industry actors at the mercy of the FTC, which can alter previous consent orders based on present or future interpretations of "deception."

C. Remember Concerns over Revocation of the Disgorgement Policy?

It is ironic that it should be this particular FTC that would modify a Policy Statement, which was treated as authoritative by regulated parties for four years and which was itself a surreptitious modification of a Guide issued through public notice and comment (and resulting

¹⁴⁸ See *generally* Statement of Basis and Purpose.

in a 314-page Statement of Basis and Purpose), through such summary means — given that Acting Chairman Ohlhausen had previously urged greater deliberation and public input in withdrawing a policy statement.

In July 2012, the FTC summarily revoked its 2003 Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (commonly called the “Disgorgement Policy Statement”)¹⁴⁹ on a 2-1 vote.¹⁵⁰ Commissioner Ohlhausen, the sole Republican on the Commission at the time, objected: “we are moving from clear guidance on disgorgement to virtually no guidance on this important policy issue.”¹⁵¹ She also objected to the cursory, non-deliberative nature of the underlying process:

I am troubled by the seeming lack of deliberation that has accompanied the withdrawal of the Policy Statement. Notably, the Commission sought public comment on a draft of the Policy Statement before it was adopted. That public comment process was not pursued in connection with the withdrawal of the statement. I believe there should have been more internal deliberation and likely public input before the Commission withdrew a policy statement that appears to have served this agency well over the past nine years.¹⁵²

What then-Commissioner Ohlhausen said then about revocation of a policy statement remains true now about substantial modification of a policy statement (which is effectively a partial withdrawal of previous guidance): both internal debate and public input are essential. Burying the request for public comment in a press release about new settlements hardly counts as an adequate basis for reconsidering the 2013 Policy Statement — let alone modifying the 2012 Green Guides.

D. What Re-Opening FTC Settlements Could Mean for Tech Companies

The Commission could have, at any time over the last twenty years, undertaken the kind of empirical analysis that led to the Green Guides, and published guidance about interpretation of Section 5, but never did so. Instead, the Commission issued only a series of reports making broad, general recommendations. In fact, in one of the only two data security cases not to

¹⁴⁹ Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820 (Aug. 4, 2003).

¹⁵⁰ Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Policy Statement on Use of Monetary Remedies in Competition Cases (July 31, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/disgorgement.shtm>.

¹⁵¹ See Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen Dissenting from the Commission’s Decision to Withdraw its Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, *at* 2 (July 31, 2012), <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2012/07/statement-commissioner-maureen-k-ohlhausen-dissenting-commissions-decision>.

¹⁵² *Id.* at 2.

end in a consent decree, a federal district judge blasted the FTC's decision not provide *any* data security standards:

No wonder you can't get this resolved, because if [a 20-year consent order is] the opening salvo, even I would be outraged, or at least I wouldn't be very receptive to it if that's the opening bid.... You have been completely unreasonable about this. And even today you are not willing to accept any responsibility.... *I think that you will admit that there are no security standards from the FTC.* You kind of take them as they come and decide whether somebody's practices were or were not within what's permissible from your eyes.... [H]ow does any company in the United States operate when . . . [it] says, well, tell me exactly what we are supposed to do, and you say, well, all we can say is you are not supposed to do what you did.... *[Y]ou ought to give them some guidance as to what you do and do not expect, what is or is not required.* You are a regulatory agency. I suspect you can do that.¹⁵³

In recent years, the Commission has proudly trumpeted its “common law of consent decrees” as providing guidance to regulated entities.¹⁵⁴ Now, everyone must understand that those consent decrees may be modified at any time, particularly those consent decrees that are ordered by the Commission (as opposed to a federal court). As the Supreme Court made clear, “[t]he Commission has statutory power to reopen and modify its orders at all times.”¹⁵⁵ In order to reopen and modify an order, the Commission faces an incredibly low bar, having to merely show that it has “reasonable grounds to believe that public interest at the present time would be served by reopening.”¹⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the FTC's consent decrees often stipulate that the defendant “waives... all rights to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of the order entered pursuant to this agreement.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Transcript of Proceedings at 91, 94-95, *LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n*, No. 1:14-CV-810-WSD, 2014 WL 1908716 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2014)) (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁴ Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, “Privacy, Consumer Protection, and Competition,” Address at the 12th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-consumer-protection-and-competition/120427loyolasymposium.pdf (stating the FTC consent decrees have “created a ‘common law of consent decrees,’ producing a set of data protection rules for businesses to follow”).

¹⁵⁵ *Atl. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C.*, 381 U.S. 357, 377 (1965).

¹⁵⁶ *Elmo Co. v. F.T.C.*, 389 F.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1967), *cert. denied*, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).

¹⁵⁷ *See, e.g.*, Agreement Containing Consent Order at 3(C), *In re Oracle*, No. 132 3115 (F.T.C. Dec. 21, 2015), <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151221oracleorder.pdf>.

But in cases where the FTC needs a court to issue a consent decree (e.g., to obtain an injunction or restitution), if the FTC wishes to modify the decree, it must at least meet the requirements imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60:¹⁵⁸ the FTC must meet a heightened pleading standard through a showing of, for example, “fraud,” “mistake,” or “newly discovered evidence” necessitating such a modification.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the FTC does not have the freedom to modify court ordered consent decrees “at any time,” as with settlements, but must file a motion “within a reasonable time” — the same standard that applies to all litigants in federal court.¹⁶⁰

Why should there be such radically different standards? It is true that violating court-ordered consent decrees can result in criminal liability penalties, while violating Commission-ordered consent decrees means only civil penalties — but those penalties may be significant. For example, in 2015, the FTC imposed a \$100 million fine against Lifelock for violating a 2010 consent decree by failing to provide “reasonable” data security¹⁶¹ — over eight times the amount of the company’s 2010 settlement and two thirds of the company’s entire revenue that quarter (\$156.2 million).¹⁶² In general, arbitrarily-imposed, post-hoc civil liability carries the risk of causing significant economic loss, reputational harm, and even business closure. For example, the Commission could re-open *all* its past data security and privacy cases to modify the meaning of the term “covered information.” To the extent that companies are found to be in non-compliance with the new standard, they would be liable for prosecution to the full extent of the FTC’s powers. Besides compromising the ability of existing industry actors to comply, invest, and grow, this would have the effect of deterring new actors from entering a data-based industry for fear of uncertainty and retroactive prosecution.

Congress should reassess the standard by which the FTC may reopen and modify its own orders. In doing so, it should begin with the question articulated long ago by the Supreme Court: “whether any thing has happened that will justify ... changing a decree.”¹⁶³ In answering this question, the Court made clear that “[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous

¹⁵⁸ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (stating that “the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for certain reasons, including “mistake,” “newly discovered evidence,” “fraud,” and “any other reason that justifies relief.”).

¹⁵⁹ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

¹⁶⁰ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

¹⁶¹ Fed. Trade Comm’n, *LifeLock to Pay \$100 Million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges it Violated 2010 Order* (Dec. 17, 2015), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/lifelock-pay-100-million-consumers-settle-ftc-charges-it-violated>.

¹⁶² LifeLock, Inc., *LifeLock Announces 2015 Fourth Quarter Results* (Feb. 10, 2016), available at <https://www.lifelock.com/pr/2016/02/10/lifelock-announces-2015-fourth-quarter-results-2/>

¹⁶³ *United States v. Swift & Co.*, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).

wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed ... with the consent of all concerned.”¹⁶⁴ The reason for the Court’s hesitation to modify consent decrees should be obvious: despite retaining the force of a court order, consent decrees are, at their core, stipulated terms *mutually* agreed to by the parties to the litigation, similar to traditional settlements of civil litigation. Thus, by choosing to settle and enter into consent decrees, “[t]he parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.”¹⁶⁵

In federal court, Rule 60 forces parties to show that circumstances have indeed changed enough to justify modification of a court order. However, having to only show that it believes the “public interest” would be served, the FTC essentially is not required to make *any* showing of necessity that would counterbalance the value of preserving the terms of the settlement. Given the enormous weight the FTC itself has placed upon its “common law of consent decrees,” as a substitute both for judicial decisions and clearer guidance from the agency, Congress should find it alarming that the FTC is now undermining the value of that pseudo-common law.

Ultimately, allowing the FTC to modify such agreements without showing any real cause not only negates the value of such agreements to each company (in efficiently resolving the enforcement action and allowing the company to move on), but more systemically and perhaps more importantly, it diminishes the public’s trust in the government to be true to its word. Procedure matters. When agencies fail to utilize fair procedures in developing laws, the public’s faith in both the laws and underlying institutions is diminished. This, in turn, undermines their effectiveness and further erodes the public’s trust in the legal institutions upon which our democracy rests.¹⁶⁶ Thus, even in instances where the policy behind the rule may be sound, a failure by the implementing agency to follow basic due process will undermine the public’s faith and deprive businesses of the certainty they need to thrive.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ *Id.*

¹⁶⁵ *Local No. 93, Int’l Asso. of Firefighters, etc. v. Cleveland*, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986) (quoting *United States v. Armour & Co.*, 402 U.S. 673, 681-682 (1971)).

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., Pew Research Center, *Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government* (2015) (“Only 19% of Americans today say they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right “just about always” (3%) or “most of the time” (16%).”).

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., *Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. F.T.C.*, 482 F.2d 672, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (recognizing that “courts have stressed the advantages of efficiency and expedition which inhere in reliance on rule-making instead of adjudication alone,” including in providing businesses with greater certainty as to what business practices are not permissible).

VII. Better Empirical Research & Investigations

Why *doesn't* the FTC do more empirical research — the kind that went into the Green Guides? What should the process around, and following, its forthcoming workshop on “informational injuries” look like?

A. What the FTC Does Now

Since 2013, the FTC has published each January an annual report titled the “Privacy & Data Security Update.”¹⁶⁸ The 2016 Report¹⁶⁹ boasts the FTC’s “unparalleled experience in consumer privacy enforcement¹⁷⁰” and the wide spectrum of offline, online, and mobile privacy practices that the Commission has addressed with enforcement actions:

[The FTC] has brought enforcement actions against well-known companies, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft, as well as lesser-known companies. The FTC’s consumer privacy enforcement orders do not just protect American consumers; rather, they protect consumers worldwide from unfair or deceptive practices by businesses within the FTC’s jurisdiction.¹⁷¹

Given the far-reaching scope of the FTC’s jurisdiction on Section 5 enforcement and the wide range of companies that have settled “informational injury” cases, one might expect the these annual “Updates” to do more than merely summarize the previous year’s activities, and instead provide empirical research into the privacy and data threats facing consumers. By failing to do so, the Commission not only leaves businesses in the dark as to what constitutes “reasonable” practices in the Government’s eyes, but fails to inform them of the best practices available to ensure that Americans’ data and privacy is adequately protected.

For example, if the Commission is to proudly report that consumer protection was achieved from settling charges with a mobile ad network on the grounds that “[the company] deceived consumers by falsely leading them to believe they could reduce the extent to which the company tracked them online and on their mobile phones,”¹⁷² that Commission’s work should not have ended there as a single bullet-point of the Commission’s many highlights. As an

¹⁶⁸ FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2013 (June 2012), *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-and-staff-reports?title=data+security&items_per_page=20.

¹⁶⁹ FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2016 (Jan 2017), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016>.

¹⁷⁰ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁷¹ *Id.*

¹⁷² *Id.*

enforcement agency with vast interpretive powers on deceptive practices, and an investigative body with considerable analytical resources, the Commission has a further duty to clearly explain the empirical rationale that substantiates the settlement: Just how do consumers understand privacy in the use of advertising cookies? How might companies use Do Not Track signals, given those consumer expectations, to provide an effective opt-out mechanism? How should the standard differ based on the sizes of companies and the services they provide? What “informational injuries” occur when consumers unknowingly receiving tailored advertisements through the use of unique device identifiers? It is one thing to say that the Commission should not have to answer all these questions in its pleadings, or even in order to prevail in a deception case. It is quite another to say that the Commission should not be expected to perform any research even after the fact, especially on matters that recur across a larger arc of enforcement actions.

Unforeseen vulnerabilities are the inevitable side-effect of rapid technological advancements; in the area of data privacy and security, new consumer risks will arise continually, raising questions that *should* merit careful quantitative and qualitative analyses. However, in its “Privacy & Data Security Update,” the FTC essentially asserts an answer without “showing its work.”

This is in stark comparison to the FTC’s approach on the Green Guides, where “the Commission sought comment on a number of general issues, including the continuing need for, and economic impact of, the Guides, as well as the Guides’ effect on environmental claims”:¹⁷³

[B]ecause the Guides are based on consumer understanding of environmental claims, consumer perception research provides the best evidence upon which to formulate guidance. The Commission therefore conducted its own study in July and August of 2009. The study presented 3,777 participants with questions calculated to determine how they understood certain environmental claims. The first portion of the study examined general environmental benefit claims (“green” and “eco-friendly”), as well as “sustainable,” “made with renewable materials,” “made with renewable energy,” and “made with recycled materials” claims. To examine whether consumers’ understanding of these claims differed depending on the product being advertised, the study tested the claims as they appeared on three different products: wrapping paper, a laundry basket, and kitchen flooring. The second portion of the study tested carbon offset and carbon neutral claims.¹⁷⁴

Here is an excellent example of the FTC’s use of consumer perception data to study the effect of environmental labels, with variables on consumer behavioral segments and changes on

¹⁷³ Statement of Basis and Purpose, *at* 8.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* *at* 9-10.

perception over time, to substantiate deception claims. Even with the empirical research grounded in a large sample size, the Commission continued to reanalyze “claims appearing in marketing on a case-by-case basis because [the Commission] lacked information about how consumers interpret these claims.”¹⁷⁵ The “Green Guides: Statement of Basis and Purpose”¹⁷⁶ is a 314 page document that comprehensively reviews the Commission’s economic and consumer perception studies and weighs different empirical methodologies on the appropriate model of risk assessment. It meaningfully fleshes out the Green Guides’ core guidance on the “(1) general principles that apply to all environmental marketing claims; (2) how consumers are likely to interpret particular claims and how marketers can substantiate these claims; and (3) how marketers can qualify their claims to avoid deceiving consumers,” with self-awareness of the economic impact of regulations and a robust metric on consumer expectations to materialize the Commission’s enforcement policies.

It is deeply troubling that this level of thoroughness evades the Commission’s privacy enforcement, where the toolbox of economics remains unopened in managing the information flows of commercial data in boundless technology sectors pervading everyday life. The FTC’s history of consent decrees provides nothing more than anecdotal evidence that *some* guiding principle is present, within the vague conceptual frameworks of “privacy by design,” “data minimization”, or “notice and choice.”¹⁷⁷ Data privacy and security regulations do not exist in a silo, abstracted and harbored from real-life economic consequences for the consumers, firms, and stakeholders—whose interests intersect at the axis of the costs and benefits of implementing privacy systems, the need for working data in nascent industries, and the market’s right to make informed decisions. Consumer protection through privacy regulation is undoubtedly a matter of economic significance parallel to antitrust policies or the label marketing in the Green Guides. Personally identifiable information (“PII”) is a valuable corporate asset like any other,¹⁷⁸ with competitive market forces affecting how it is processed, shared, and retained. Modern consumers are cognizant of the tradeoffs they make at the convenience of integrated technology services, and the downstream uses of their data. Accordingly, not every technical deviation from a company’s privacy policy is an affront to consumer welfare that causes “unavoidable harms not outweighed by the benefits to consumers or competition.”¹⁷⁹ The FTC has too long failed to articulate the privacy risks it intends to rectify, nor to

¹⁷⁵ See Statement of Basis and Purpose, at 27.

¹⁷⁶ See generally Statement of Basis and Purpose.

¹⁷⁷ See generally 2012 Privacy Report.

¹⁷⁸ Clearwater Compliance LLC, *The Clearwater Definition of an Information Asset*, <https://clearwatercompliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Clearwater-Definition-of-Information-Assets-with-Examples V8.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ 12 U.S.C. § 5331(c)(1).

quantify the “material” consumer harm through behavioral economics or any empirical metric substantiated beyond its usual *ipso facto* assertion of deception.

B. The Paperwork Reduction Act

A noteworthy legislation that defined the FTC’s administrative authority after Congress imposed additional safeguards upon the FTC’s Magnuson-Moss rulemaking powers in 1980 is the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (“PRA”).¹⁸⁰ These two 1980 enactments must be understood together as embodying Carter-era attempts to reduce the burdens of government. Specifically, Congress intended the PRA to serve as an administrative check on the Federal agency’s information collection policy, with the goal of reducing paperwork burdens for individuals, businesses, and nonprofits by requiring the FTC to seek clearance from the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) on compulsory process orders surveying ten or more members of the public.

The “collection of information” that falls under the constraints of the PRA is defined as:

the obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an agency, regardless of form or format, calling for either— answers to identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed on, ten or more persons, other than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States.¹⁸¹

Some have claimed that the PRA has hampered the FTC’s ability to collect data from companies and thus to perform better analysis of industry practices, informational injuries, and the like. The FTC’s power to gather information *without* “a specific law enforcement purpose” derives from Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, which the FTC has summarized in relevant part as follows:

Section 6(b) empowers the Commission to require the filing of “annual or special reports or answers in writing to specific questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom the inquiry is addressed.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2012)).

¹⁸¹ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3).

¹⁸² Fed. Trade Comm’n, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (July 2008), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority>.

Such reports would certainly be helpful for providing better substantiated guidance regarding data privacy and security practices. It is worth carefully considering what the PRA requires and how it might affect the FTC's collection of data. There is indeed some circumstantial evidence to suggest that the FTC may be structuring its 6(b) inquiries to avoid the PRA, by limiting the number of firms from which the FTC requests data to fewer than ten¹⁸³ — the threshold for triggering the PRA's requirements.

A case study on the FTC's survey of Patent Assertion Entities ("PAEs")¹⁸⁴ illustrates two potential ways the PRA might affect the FTC's collection of empirical data and thus the quality of its analysis and guidance in data security and privacy cases. First, by its own terms, the PRA applies even to *voluntary* data-collection of the sort that could allow the FTC compile "line of business" studies that consider wider practices beyond a single case:

[T]he obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to an agency, third parties or the public of information by or for an agency ... *whether such collection of information is mandatory, voluntary, or required to obtain or retain a benefit.*¹⁸⁵

The burden-minimization goal of the PRA is evaluated by the OMB based on broad, unpredictable criteria, such as whether the "the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility."¹⁸⁶ The PRA has been enforced by the OMB with tunnel vision on reducing the burden of paperwork and compliance, measured quite simply on the metric of man hours spent processing the paperwork.¹⁸⁷ However, the more important question lies on balancing the potential burden of information collection with the value of added research and empirical data on FTC policymaking. The balance was correctly struck on the Green

¹⁸³ See e.g., FTC To Study Credit Card Industry Data Security Auditing Commission Issues Orders to Nine Companies That Conduct Payment Card Industry Screening (March 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-study-credit-card-industry-data-security-auditing>; FTC To Study Mobile Device Industry's Security Update Practices (May 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/05/ftc-study-mobile-device-industrys-security-update-practices>.

¹⁸⁴ Layne-Farrar, Anne, What Can the FTC's §6(B) PAE Study Teach Us? A Practical Review of the Study's Methodology (March 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2722057>. or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2722057>.

¹⁸⁵ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c).

¹⁸⁶ United States Office of Personnel Management, Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Guide Version 2.0 (April 2011), available at <https://www.opm.gov/about-us/open-government/digital-government-strategy/fitara/paperwork-reduction-act-guide.pdf>.

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* See also Sam Batkins, Evaluating the Paperwork Reduction Act: Are Burdens Being Reduced? AAF, <https://www.americanactionforum.org/testimony/evaluating-paperwork-reduction-act-burdens-reduced/>.

Guides, where the PRA analysis was satisfied upon a consideration of the benefits of consumer surveys which outweighed the minimal burdens to the respondents:

Overall burden for the pretest and questionnaire would thus be 2,511 hours. The cost per respondent should be negligible. Participation is voluntary and will not require start-up, capital, or labor expenditures by respondents.¹⁸⁸

Moreover, the FTC integrated various suggestions on the study methodology and data collection methods submitted in a public comment by the General Electric Company (“GE”), to ensure that the Commission surveyed “a proper universe of consumers” upon which to “obtain accurate projections of national sentiment.”¹⁸⁹

With respect to GE’s concern about identifying the “proper universe of consumers,” FTC staff has included in the questionnaire a brief section of questions that address participants’ level of interest in environmental issues. For example, one question asks: “In the past six months, have you chosen to purchase one product rather than another because the product is better for the environment?” Through analyses of answers to such questions, staff can compare the study responses of participants who have a high degree of interest in environmental issues and who take these issues into account when making purchasing decisions with responses of participants who are not as concerned with environmental issues.

GE also asserts that the FTC should ensure a “proper sample size.” The FTC staff determined the sample size of 3,700 consumers based on several considerations, including the funds available for the study, the cost of different sample size configurations, the number of environmental claims to be examined, and a power analysis. In this study, 150 participants will see each of the various environmental marketing claims to be compared. Staff believes that this will be adequate to allow comparisons across treatment cells.¹⁹⁰

By contrast, the FTC study on PAEs, which also received PRA clearance, compiled “nonpublic data on licensing agreements, patent acquisition practices, and related costs and revenues”¹⁹¹ to illuminate how PAEs operate in patent enforcement activity outside the confines

¹⁸⁸ Fed. Trade Comm’n, Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request (May 2009), Federal Register / VOL. 74, NO. 90, *available at* https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/green-marketing-consumer-perception-study-agency-information-collection-activities-submission-omb/090512greenmarketing.pdf.

¹⁸⁹ *Id* at 22398.

¹⁹⁰ *Id*.

¹⁹¹ See What Can the FTC’s §6(B) PAE Study Teach Us? A Practical Review of the Study’s Methodology (March 1, 2016); “Supporting Statement for a Paperwork Reduction Act: Part B” *available at* <http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=47563401>.

of litigation records. But even when the OMB cleared the PAE study, the FTC chose a limited sample size of “25 PAEs, 9 wireless chipset manufacturers that hold patents, and 6 non-practicing wireless chipset patent holders.”¹⁹² This restrictive sample size significantly limited the applicability of the Commission’s conclusions. More broadly, it suggests a shift towards a general reluctance to design and implement systemic research even when the required administrative blessing is obtained under the PRA.

The PRA Guide of 2011 outlines information collection policies and procedures, albeit with only a superficial explanation of statistical methodologies, and zero mention of survey design and quantitative research methods.¹⁹³ It is a cause for concern that the OMB’s task of cutting down on the amount of paperwork is framed so parochially, for the short term goal of reducing participation hours, without perhaps considering cases where the quality and usability of the research itself depends on obtaining a larger sample. The mandate to limit the sample size of survey respondents ironically defeats the “practical utility” of the research, which is one of the main cornerstones of the PRA.

On the other hand, the PRA does not apply to *all* voluntary collection — only when the FTC sends “identical” questions to ten or more companies (whether their answer is voluntary or compulsory). The PRA would *not* apply to the FTC requesting public comment, such as it has done through the Green Guides process. This point is critical: while targeting specific companies with the same questions might well prove useful in informing the FTC’s understanding of informational injuries, the FTC’s failure to collect more such data thus far, to analyze it, and to publish it in useful guidance can in no way be blamed on the requirements of the PRA. Nor can it excuse the FTC staff for relying on an expert witness in the LabMD case whose recommendations about “reasonable” data security referred exclusively to the practices of Fortune 500 companies, without referencing *any* small businesses comparable in size and technical sophistication to LabMD.¹⁹⁴

Indeed, the PRA Guide exempts from the definition of “information,” and thus eliminates the need for clearance on, the collection of “facts or opinions submitted in response to general solicitations of comments from the general public”¹⁹⁵ and “examinations designed to test the

¹⁹² *Id.*

¹⁹³ See generally Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Guide Version 2.0.

¹⁹⁴ Gus Hurwitz, *The FTC’s Data Security Error: Treating Small Businesses Like the Fortune 1000* (Feb. 20, 2017), available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/02/20/the-ftcs-data-security-error-treating-small-businesses-like-the-fortune-1000/#58d2b735a825>.

¹⁹⁵ United States Office of Personnel Management, Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), Version 2.0, OPM at 6 (April 2011), available at <https://www.opm.gov/about-us/open-government/digital-government-strategy/fitara/paperwork-reduction-act-guide.pdf>.

aptitude, abilities, or knowledge of the person tested for a collection.”¹⁹⁶ The PRA poses no impediment to the FTC taking a proactive approach on conducting empirical research on data privacy by calling for consumer survey participants, holding public workshops, or from analyzing public data such as companies’ privacy policies as a means to test privacy risk perception and consumer expectations. The Green Guides illustrate just how much data collection the FTC can do to substantiate its policymaking with empirical and economic research, based on real consumer studies.

VIII. Pleading, Settlement and Merits Standards under Section 5

In general, the FTC Act currently sets a very low bar for bringing complaints: “reason to believe that [a violation may have occurred]” and that “it shall appear to the Commission that [an enforcement action] would be to the interest of the public.”¹⁹⁷ In practice, this has become the standard for *settlements*, since the Act does not provide such a standard, and the FTC commonly issues both together. This raises three questions:

1. What should the standard be for issuing complaints?
2. Closely related, what should the standard be for courts weighing a defendant’s motions to dismiss?
3. What should the standard be for settling cases?

Raising all three bars would do much to improve the quality of the agency’s “common law” in several respects:

1. It would provide greater rigor for FTC staff throughout the course of the investigation;
2. Companies would be less likely to settle, and more likely to litigate, if they had a better chance of prevailing at the motion to dismiss stage; and
3. Complaints that settle before trial (after the FTC has survived a motion to dismiss) would, or complaints that the FTC has withdrawn (after the FTC has lost a motion to dismiss) would provide more guidance standing on their own as the final, principle record of each case.

We take the questions raised above in reverse order, beginning with the standard by which a court will assess a motion to dismiss and concluding with the standard by which Commissioners will decide whether to issue a complaint (and thus, in nearly every case, also a settlement):

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ 15 U.S.C. 45(b).

A. Pleading & Complaint Standards

Fortunately, the courts are already moving towards requiring the FTC to do a better job of writing its pleadings (complaints) or face dismissal of its complaints — at least with respect to deception. Congress should take note of the current case law on this issue and consider codifying a heightened pleading requirement for any use of Section 5.

Heightened pleading standards can be fatal to normal plaintiffs, who need to survive a motion to dismiss in order to obtain the discovery they need to actually prevail on the merits. But the FTC has uniquely broad investigative powers. It is difficult to see why they would *ever* need court-ordered discovery — in other words, why would it be a problem for the Commission to have to do more to ground their complaints in the requirements of Section 5, as made clear in the FTC’s Deception and Unfairness policy statements, and Section 5(n). Today, the FTC wants the best of both worlds: vast pre-trial discovery power *and* the low bar for pleadings claimed by normal plaintiffs who lack that power.

At a minimum, the FTC should be required to plead its Section 5 claims with specificity. Ideally, this standard would closely mirror a “preponderance of the evidence,” as explained in the attached white paper.¹⁹⁸

1. Deception Cases

TechFreedom has long argued that the FTC’s deception complaints should have to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(b).¹⁹⁹ Under that rule, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”²⁰⁰ In other words, such claims must be accompanied by the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the conduct charged.²⁰¹ Rule 9(b) gives defendants “notice of the claims against them, provide[] an increased measure of protection for their reputations, and reduce[] the number of frivolous suits brought solely to extract settlements.”²⁰²

Several district courts have concluded that 9(b) applies to FTC deception allegations.²⁰³ Most recently, the Northern District of California dismissed two of the FTC’s five deception counts

¹⁹⁸ See White Paper, *supra* note 51, at 18-21 (unfairness) and 28 (deception).

¹⁹⁹ See Brief of Amicus Curiae TechFreedom, International Center for Law and Economics, & Consumer Protection Scholars in Support of Defendants, *FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.*, 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 13-1887), 2013 WL 3739729, available at <https://goo.gl/JGUE9e>.

²⁰⁰ Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

²⁰¹ *Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA*, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).

²⁰² *In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.*, 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997).

²⁰³ See, e.g., *FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc.*, 760 F. Supp. 2d 848 (C.D. Cal. 2010); *FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc.*, 2011 WL 2118626 (D. Nev. May 25, 2011); *FTC v. ELH Consulting, LLC*, No. CV 12-02246-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 4759267,

in its data security complaint against D-Link²⁰⁴ for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).²⁰⁵ The district court noted that the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question, but nonetheless found controlling the appeals court’s decision holding that California’s Unfair Competition Law — the state’s “Baby FTC Act,” which, “like Section 5 outlaws deceptive practices without requiring fraud as an essential element” — is subject to Rule 9(b).²⁰⁶

The *D-Link* court’s analysis of each of the FTC’s five deception counts illustrates that, while a heightened pleading standard *would* require more work from Commission staff to establish their cases, this burden would be relatively small and would in no way hamstring the Commission from bringing legitimate cases. The court upheld the principal deception count (Count II: “that DLS has misrepresented the data security and protections its devices provide”) and two others, dismissing only two peripheral claims. If anything, merely applying Section 9(b) to the Commission’s complaints would likely not be enough, on its own, to provide adequate discipline to the Commission’s use of its investigation and enforcement powers — but it would certainly be a start.

The district court’s discussion of Count II illustrates what specificity in pleading deception claims would look like. The FTC’s allegations identified “specific statements DLS made at specific times between December 2013 and September 2015,” and that the allegations “also specify why the statements are deceptive.”²⁰⁷ The court goes on to say that “Count II identifies the time period during which DLS made the statements and provides specific reasons why the statements were false—for example, that the routers and IP cameras could be hacked through hard-coded user credentials or command injection flaws,” and that “this is all Rule 9(b) demands.”²⁰⁸

at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2013) (same); *see also* FTC v. Swish Marketing, No. C-09- 03814-RS, 2010 WL 653486, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2010) (finding “a real prospect” that Rule 9(b) applies but not deciding the issue).

²⁰⁴ *See* Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d-link_complaint_for_permanent_injunction_and_other_equitable_relief_unredacted_version_seal_lifted_-_3-20-17.pdf.

²⁰⁵ *See* Order Re Motion to Dismiss, *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys.*, No. 3:17-CV-00039-JD, 2017 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017), at 2-3, <https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/dlinkdismissal.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ *Id.* at 2-3 (discussing *Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA*, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)).

²⁰⁷ *Id.* at 4.

²⁰⁸ *Id.* at 4-5.

2. Unfairness Cases

The *D-Link* court noted that “[w]hether the FTC must also plead its unfairness claim under Rule 9(b) is more debatable,” finding “little flavor of fraud in the[] elements [of unfairness under Section 5(n)].” But, the court continued:

the FTC has expressly stated that the unfairness claim against DLS is not tied to an alleged misrepresentation. See Section III, below. At the same time, however, the FTC has said that for all of its claims “the core facts overlap, absolutely,” and there is no doubt that the overall theme of the complaint is that DLS misled consumers about the data security its products provide. The FTC also acknowledges that DLS’s misrepresentations are relevant to the unfairness claim because consumers could not have reasonably avoided injury in light of them.

Consequently, there is a distinct possibility that Rule 9(b) might apply to the unfairness claim. But the question presently is not ripe for resolution. As discussed below, the unfairness claim is dismissed under Rule 8. Whether it will need to satisfy Rule 9(b) will depend on how the unfairness claim is stated, if the FTC chooses to amend.²⁰⁹

Whatever the courts actually conclude about the applicability of Rule 9(b) to unfairness claims, we see no reason why the Commission should not be subject to the same heightened pleading requirements under unfairness.

B. Preponderance of the Evidence Standard

Applying Section 9(b) to all Section 5 pleadings would help greatly. But the more fundamental problem in unfairness cases is the low bar set by Section 5(b) for bringing a complaint — and the lack of *any* standard for settling it. We believe the answer is to require the Commission staff to demonstrate that it would prevail by a preponderance of the evidence. It may, at first, seem strange to apply this standard — the general standard for resolving civil litigation — at the early stages of litigation, but it must be remembered that this is not normal litigation. As noted above, the FTC has unique pre-trial discovery powers, and so is very likely to have accumulated all the evidence it will need at trial before the complaint is ever issued. Second, in nearly every “informational injury” case, the Commission’s decision over whether to issue a complaint *is* the final decision over the case — because the cause will simply settle at that point. Congress should consider applying this standard either to the issuance of unfairness complaints, or to the issuance of settlements. If the standard is applied only to the issuance of settlements, Congress should consider some other heightened standard for

²⁰⁹ *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys.*, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).

bringing unfairness complaints, above that required by Section 9(b). In any event, the purpose of any standard imposed at this stage would not be to change how litigation would work — which would still be resolved under separate standards for motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment and final resolution of litigation on the merits — but rather to spur Commissioners to demand more analytical work of the staff. Some such change is likely the only way to create sustainable analytical discipline inside the Commission.

IX. Conclusion

There is little reason to expect that the FTC will not continue to more and more closely resemble the Federal Technology Commission with each passing year: the Commission will continue to grapple with new issues. This is just as Congress intended. But if the agency is to be trusted with such broad power, Congress should expect — and indeed take steps to ensure — that the FTC does more to justify how it wields that power. As Sens. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) & Harrison Schmitt (D-AZ) said in 1980:

Considering that rules of the Commission may apply to any act or practice “affecting commerce”, and that the only statutory restraint is that it be unfair, the apparent power of the Commission with respect to commercial law is virtually as broad as the Congress itself. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission may be the second most powerful legislature in the country.... All 50 State legislatures and State Supreme Courts can agree that a particular act is fair and lawful, but the five-man appointed FTC can overrule them all. The Congress has little control over the far-flung activities of this agency short of passing entirely new legislation.²¹⁰

This testimony, and the attached documents, lay out some of the ideas that Congress should consider in assessing how to reform the FTC’s processes and standards. But these questions are sufficiently complex, and have been simmering for long enough, that the Committee would benefit from finding ways to maximize the input of outside experts.

One model for that would be the House Energy & Commerce Committee’s ongoing #CommActUpdate effort.²¹¹ The Committee has issued six white papers, each time taking public comment and refining its proposals. Given the complex interrelationships among the pieces of FTC reform, this would be a more constructive approach than having a flurry of separate bills, as Energy & Commerce did with FTC reform.

²¹⁰ S. Rep. No. 96-184, at 18 (1980), available at <http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/aw-web/awarchive?type=file&item=417102>.

²¹¹ The Energy and Commerce Committee, #COMMSUPDATE (last visited Sept. 25, 11:00 AM), <https://energycommerce.house.gov/commactupdate/>.

The Committee could also consider establishing a blue-ribbon Commission modeled on the Antitrust Modernization Commission — as TechFreedom and the International Center for Law & Economics proposed in 2014:

A Privacy Law Modernization Commission could do what Commerce on its own cannot, and what the FTC could probably do but has refused to do: carefully study where new legislation is needed and how best to write it. It can also do what no Executive or independent agency can: establish a consensus among a diverse array of experts that can be presented to Congress as, not merely yet another in a series of failed proposals, but one that has a unique degree of analytical rigor behind it and bipartisan endorsement. If any significant reform is ever going to be enacted by Congress, it is most likely to come as the result of such a commission's recommendations.²¹²

We stand ready to assist the Committee in whatever approach it takes.

²¹² Comments of TechFreedom & International Center for Law and Economics, In the Matter of Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, Docket No. 140514424-4424-01, at 4 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/tf-icle_ntia_big_data_comments.pdf