Charlie Kennedy, Senior Adjunct Fellow

Charlie Kennedy

Charlie Kennedy has been involved in communications law since the 1980s, when he worked on the AT&T divestiture litigation. He is currently a partner at Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP, where he advises clients on a broad range of communications law, privacy law, and related issues, including compliance with FCC and Federal Trade Commission regulations, and privacy and data protection statutes. He teaches courses in communications law and cyberlaw at The Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, and writes and speaks extensively on communications law issues.

Kennedy is the author or co-author of several books on the law of electronic communications and privacy, including: An Introduction to U.S. Telecommunications Law (1994, 2nd ed. 2001); An Introduction to International Telecommunications Law (1996); Modern Communications Law (1999); and The Business Privacy Law Handbook (2008). He received his B.A. from Florida State University and his J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School.

Content featuring Charlie Kennedy

Cybersecurity and the Warfare State

TechFreedom's Charlie Kennedy connects the threads among all of the cybersecurity bills in Congress in a new essay at RedState. As he notes, 

Experience teaches that when national security is the cause, attacks on liberty often are the effect. The thirteen cybersecurity bills now pending in Congress reinforce this ancient lesson.

Supremes to Congress: Bring Privacy Law into 21st Century

Last week's unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Jones (PDF) marks a major victory for constitutional rights.

While the justices split in their rationale, they agreed that protecting Americans' privacy in the digital age will require the Court to do a great deal more to untangle its confusing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. That will likely take several more decisions -- and many years. Meanwhile, Congress should heed Justice Samuel Alito's call for legislation limiting government's ability to track us and snoop through our private communications.

First, the good news: Law enforcement can no longer plant GPS tracking devices on our vehicles without satisfying the Fourth Amendment. Even better: the majority of justices -- including conservative Justices Antonin Scalia, John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, joined by Obama appointee Sonia Sotomayor -- agreed that Jones is only the beginning of the long-overdue inquiry into constitutional protections against location-based surveillance.

In a way, Jones was an easy case: By recognizing that law enforcement's physical trespass on private property to plant a surveillance device constituted a search, the Court ensured that the Fourth Amendment provides at least as much privacy protection today as when it was adopted. (Whether the Constitution required a probable cause warrant or would have been satisfied by some lesser standard, such as reasonable suspicion, the Jones majority did not decide.) Just as the Fourth Amendment would have been triggered if an 18th century constable hid himself in a suspect's stagecoach to track him or record his conversations, so too must modern police satisfy the Fourth Amendment before using satellites to track devices hidden on cars. (Whether the Constitution required a probable cause warrant or would have been satisfied by some lesser standard, such as reasonable suspicion, the Jones majority did not decide.) But what about purely electronic surveillance?

TechFreedom Joins Call to Action to Reform 25-Year Old Privacy Law

TechFreedom has joined with a philosophically diverse coalition of public interest groups in supporting the "Not Without a Warrant" grass-roots petition, which reads as follows:

The government should be required to go to a judge and get a warrant before it can read our email, access private photographs and documents we store online, or track our location using our mobile phones. Please support legislation that would update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to require warrants for this sensitive information and to require the government to report publicly on the use of its surveillance powers.

Anyone can sign the petition at NotWithoutAWarrant.com or show their support by liking the Facebook version.

TechFreedom President Berin Szoka had this to say about ECPA reform:

TechFreedom is calling on all Americans to stand up for their digital Fourth Amendment rights. The Constitution delicately balances privacy with the needs of law enforcement by making judges responsible for determining whether law enforcement has established 'probable cause.' This judicial warrant requirement has always been the crown jewel of our civil rights. Our Founding Fathers would be appalled to learn that this fundamental principle does not extend to our electronic communications and location. After all, they fought--and won--a revolution to prevent similar abuses by British authorities.

TechFreedom Senior Adjunct Fellow Charlie Kennedy spoke at a Cato Institute event yesterday about modernizing ECPA. The video is archived here. TechFreedom is also co-sponsoring an 80's-themed party tonight (October 20) to celebrate ECPA's 25th anniversary (October 21) and highlight how much the world has changed since ECPA was enacted.

Szoka and Kennedy are available for comment at media@techfreedom.org.

TechFreedom is a non-profit, non-partisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.

More Reasons to Fix the Telephone Consumer Protection Act

As four recent lawsuits show, the class actions bar has developed quick reflexes where possible Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA", 47 USC Sec. 227) violations are concerned. The new complaints were filed in April and May and appear to involve text messages sent in April. Besides demonstrating the efficiency of the plaintiffs' lawyers, the new actions reflect the legal perils of communicating with customers through text messaging or offering services that facilitate text messaging. They also underscore how poorly some of the TCPA's provisions serve the interests of consumers and legitimate businesses.

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Statement of Concern about Expansion of CALEA Has Broad Support

A Statement of Concern about Expansion of CALEA (embedded below) has been issued with the support of a wide range of industry groups and public-interest advocates. (CALEA stands for the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.)

As the Joint Statement points out, the Administration apparently wants Congress to extend CALEA to communications technologies that are not now required to be designed in a way that facilitates governmental surveillance of their users. The Administration has failed to tell the public exactly what it is seeking and why, so it is not possible at this point to describe the Administration’s wish list or respond to it with specificity. Nonetheless, the Joint Statement urges policy makers not to impose new mandates without first confirming the necessity for those requirements, and without balancing their possible benefits against the corresponding impact on trust in the confidentiality of Internet communications, security, innovation, competitiveness, availability of encryption, and privacy.

In order to understand the debate that will take place if the Administration persists in its effort to expand CALEA, it will be helpful to know a little about the statute’s terms and its complex history.

As enacted in 1994, CALEA required telecommunications carriers to ensure that their equipment, facilities or services that provide a customer the ability to originate, terminate or direct communications were capable of expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other authorization, to intercept communications and access call-identifying information. CALEA expressly provided that these requirements did not apply to information services and did not require carriers to be responsible for decrypting information carried over their networks unless the carrier had provided the encryption capability and possessed the information necessary to decrypt that information.